Spillovers from FDI and their determinants: the case of China by Sun, Sizhong
Spillovers from FDI and Their 
Determinants: the Case of China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sizhong Sun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy of 
The Australian National University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2008 
 
 
 ii
Candidate Statement 
 
 
I, Sizhong Sun, hereby declare that, except where acknowledged, this thesis is my 
own original work and has not been submitted for a higher degree at any other 
university or institution. 
 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
Sizhong Sun 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
Acknowledgements 
 
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisory panel, Ligang Song, Peter Drysdale, 
and Martin Richardson. Without their guidance, encouragement, insightful advice, 
and constructive feedback, this thesis would not be possible. I would also like to 
thank Jane Golley. She is not in my supervisory panel, but has been supportive in a 
way comparable to a supervisor. Chunlai Chen commented on several chapters of 
this thesis. His comments are greatly appreciated. 
 
During the past three years, I have attended the CBE/Crawford School Joint 
Economics Ph.D. Seminar, where I presented chapters of this thesis. I would like to 
thank seminar participants for their comments and suggestions that help to improve 
this thesis. Chapter 5 was presented at the 2007 annual Ph.D. Conference in 
Economics and Business at the University of Western Australia. The conference 
participants, particularly Prof. Xiangkang Yin of La Trobe University, have given 
very helpful comments and suggestions, which I gratefully appreciate. Several 
chapters of this thesis were also presented at the 18th, 19th, and 20th Annual 
Conference of the Association for Chinese Economic Studies Australia (ACESA). I 
would like to thank the conference participants’ inputs to this thesis. 
 
My last year of Ph.D. study was sponsored by the Rio Tinto–ANU China 
Partnership. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Rio Tinto–ANU 
China Partnership. 
 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents. They have been so 
supportive in my whole life that I can not describe in words how much I owe to 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
Abstract 
 
The thesis examines technology and export spillovers from foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and their determinants in China, both at an aggregate industry level and 
disaggregated firm level, using both cross-sectional and panel data.   
 
At the industry level, we examine technology spillovers by estimating industry 
value-added as a function of the interaction terms of the technology transfer of FDI 
with the technology gap, relative capital intensity and relative labour supply over an 
eight-year panel data set from 1995 to 2003. It is found that technology spillovers 
vary across both industries and time, and the technology gap plays a negative role in 
technology spillovers, while relative capital intensity and relative labour supply play 
positive roles in technology spillovers. At the firm level, using a simultaneous 
equation model estimated over a comprehensive cross-sectional micro-data set that 
covers over 180,000 firms in the manufacturing sector in China for 2003, we find 
positive and substantial technology spillovers from FDI. However technology 
spillovers do not exist across all industries. In the cultural, educational, and sporting 
product manufacturing industry, we find no evidence of technology spillovers. In an 
analysis of technology spillovers in Gansu province, we find positive spillovers, 
with the scale depending on firm’s R&D. 
 
On export spillovers, the thesis first set up a partial equilibrium model to show that if 
the presence of FDI reduces domestic firm’s export costs, for example by spillovers 
of knowledge about foreign markets and through labour movement, then domestic 
firms’ export intensity, which is equal to the share of firms’ exports in their total 
sales, will be unambiguously promoted. This hypothesis is tested using a Heckman 
sample selection model, estimated over both the comprehensive cross-sectional 
micro-data in China’ manufacturing sector in 2003 and the four year panel data in 
the cultural, educational, and sporting product manufacturing industry. We find that 
FDI generates export spillovers, with the scale of spillovers depending on firm 
characteristics, such as firm size, age, and geographical location.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s foreign direct investment 1  (hereafter FDI) has played an 
important role in Chinese economic development. FDI inflows contribute to 
physical capital accumulation, help to boost domestic employment, and may 
increase domestic competition, particularly in the short run. In addition, it is 
argued that FDI can positively affect domestic industries and firms, namely that 
there exist positive spillovers to domestically owned industry from FDI2.  
These spillovers can happen through many channels (see Blomstrom and Kokko, 
1998, for more discussions). For example, domestic firms can learn from FDI-
invested firms about the production process and ways of doing business, labour 
can move from FDI-invested firms to domestic firms, and bring expertise from 
FDI-invested firms, market competition can increase due to the presence of FDI 
and force domestic firms to increase their efficiency, and the backward and 
forward linkages with FDI-invested firms will benefit domestic firms. The 
positive spillovers from FDI are important in the sense that they not only imply 
benefit to domestic firms and industries but also justify the favourable 
government policies towards FDI, which have been adopted by many countries. 
In China, for the past decade the corporate tax rate for FDI-invested firms has 
ranged from 15 to 24 per cent, while in contrast their domestic counterparts have 
to pay a corporate tax rate as high as 33 per cent3 . The favourable policy 
treatment of FDI was premised on the hope that FDI-invested firms in China will 
                                                 
1 The foreign direct investment in China is defined as the investment, which participates in productive 
activities, from foreign firms, including firms from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. The firms with the 
share of foreign capital in the total registered capital above 25 per cent are classified as FDI-invested firms, 
and all the other firms are called domestic firms.  
2 Throughout this thesis, spillovers from FDI are defined as the impact of FDI on domestic firms or 
industries, or mathematically 
( )
( ) κFDI
DOMESTICspillovers ∂
∂= , where DOMESTIC denotes domestic 
firms or industries, FDI denotes FDI-invested firms or industries, and κ  denotes holding all other factors 
constant. If the impact is positive, then there exist positive spillovers from FDI. In this thesis, we study two 
types of FDI spillovers, namely technology spillovers, which are the impact on domestic firms or industries’ 
productivity, and export spillovers, which are the impact on domestic firms’ exports. 
3 The different corporate tax rates have now been converged into 25 per cent.  
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promote the economic development, through such channels as positive spillovers 
from FDI. Hence, the non-existence of, or even the negative effect of, spillovers 
from FDI will not support the favourable policy treatments.  
Little is known about extent of spillover effects and what form they are likely to 
take. Besides, different channels for spillovers imply that different domestic 
firms will be affected differently by FDI. Domestic firms with different 
characteristics, such as size and ownership, may respond differently to the 
presence of FDI. For example, bigger firms are more capable of imitating their 
FDI-invested competitors, as they can devote more resources to investment in 
learning. Again, little is known as to what kind of domestic firms will benefit or 
suffer from the presence of FDI.  
This thesis aims to examine the spillovers from FDI in China systematically, 
including both technology spillovers, a field that has been extensively explored 
(for example Li et al., 2001, Buckley et al., 2002, Chuang and Hsu, 2004, Liu, 
2002, 2008, Caves, 1974, Sinani and Meyer, 2004, Branstetter, 2006, 
Kohpaiboon, 2006, Aitken and Harrison, 1999, and Sadik and Bolbol, 2001), and 
export spillovers, a field that is much less studied. The thesis also tries to explore 
the determinants of, and the scale of, FDI spillovers.  
To test for the existence of technology and export spillovers from FDI and their 
determinants is of both analytic interest and policy importance. Analytically it 
enables us to better understand how domestic firms and industries respond to FDI. 
In terms of policy, a better understanding of the impact of FDI on domestic 
industries and firms will enable governments to formulate FDI policies that can 
alleviate the negative impacts from FDI. In China, FDI has been playing an 
important role in economic development over the past three decades, as 
discussed in the following section. Hence, examination of spillovers from FDI in 
China is of particular interest. Then we discuss the FDI policy setting in China, 
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which provides background to subsequent empirical analysis. In the last section, 
we present the structure for this thesis.  
Importance of FDI in China 
Since 1985, the inflow of FDI actually-utilized has been increasing rapidly 
although the Chinese economy is also growing bigger. A bigger economy tends 
to attract more FDI inflow. Hence if we account for this impact by dividing FDI 
by GDP, we find that the inflow of FDI every RMB of GDP has been declining 
(see Figure 1.1). In 1995, for every RMB of GDP, there was 0.0062 US dollar 
FDI in China. In contrast, this number decreased to 0.0033 US dollar in 2005, 
which is roughly about 50 per cent of the 1995 level. So the share of FDI inflow 
in Chinese economy overall actually displays a declining trend, while the level of 
inflow exhibits an increasing trend.  
Even with this declining trend in the “real” inflow of FDI in the Chinese 
economy, the contribution of FDI to the industrial output and exports has been 
increasing steadily (see Figure 1.2). In 1995, 14 per cent of total industrial output 
was made by FDI-invested firms, and in 2005, FDI-invested firms’ output 
accounted for 31 per cent of total industrial output, which is more than double 
that of 1995. Figure 1.2 also shows the contribution of FDI in terms of exports. 
The proportion of FDI-invested firms’ exports in the total exports has continued 
to increase since 1990. In 1990, 13 per cent of exports were produced by FDI 
invested firms, and in contrast in 2006, 58 per cent of exports came from FDI 
invested firms, almost five times that in 1990. 
FDI also contributes significantly to physical capital accumulation. From 1992 to 
2006, FDI actually-utilized accounted for 11 per cent of total fixed asset 
formation on average, but this proportion exhibited a declining trend (see Figure 
1.2). In 2006, FDI actually-utilized only accounted for 5 per cent of total fixed 
asset formation.  
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Figure 1.1 FDI Inflow since 1985 
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Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 2006 
 
Figure 1.2 Contribution of FDI (per cent) 
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Note: Output denotes the proportion of FDI invested firms' output in total industrial output; Fixed 
assets denotes the proportion of FDI actually utilized in the total fixed asset formation; Exports 
denotes the proportion of FDI invested firms' output in the total exports. 
Source: MOFCOM, 2007 
 
Even though the FDI inflow for every RMB in GDP and FDI’scontribution to 
fixed capital accumulation have been declining, the share of FDI-invested firms 
in the total industrial output and exports have been increasing, and this implies 
that domestic firms’ shares were decreasing. So compared with domestic firms, 
FDI-invested firms have become more productive and export-oriented. This 
could happen if FDI-invested firms have technological superiority and more 
knowledge of export markets. This technological superiority and knowledge 
about the world market can benefit domestic firms and industries. Given that the 
Chinese economy has been performing very well in the past three decades, it 
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could be reasonably argued that FDI spillovers have been playing a significant 
role. Positive FDI technology spillovers will promote domestic firms’ 
productivity and increase their production capacity, while positive export 
spillovers will boost domestic firms’ export activities and increase the whole 
industry’s exports. Thus, this thesis focuses on the analysis of these spillover 
effects from FDI in China.  
FDI Policy Settings 
Before we turn to empirical analysis of FDI spillovers, we discuss the current 
FDI policy settings. China’s FDI policy settings can be characterized from four 
perspectives, namely the legislation, which is the foundation of the FDI policy, 
national treatment, under which, until now, FDI invested firms have been 
enjoying treatment more favourable than their domestic counterparts, industrial 
composition, and regional distribution.  
The legislation 
The legislation on foreign investment is a fundamental part of China's FDI policy. 
Up to now, China has built up a relatively complete legal framework for FDI. 
This legal framework comprises of three parts: 1) national laws, 2) local laws, 
and 3) international agreements.  
China's Constitution permits foreigners to invest in China and their legitimate 
rights are protected, and these rights form the basis of China's legislation on 
foreign investment. At the national level, there are also other laws passed by 
National People's Congress, and rules and stipulations established by Department 
of State and other councils, among which the Law of Sino-foreign Contractual 
Joint Venture, the Law on Foreign Enterprises, and the Law on Chinese-foreign 
Cooperative Enterprises are the most important laws in this area. Four 
amendments were made to this legislation after accession to WTO. They are 
related to 1) the article on foreign exchange balance, 2) the article on local 
content, 3) the requirement on export performance, and 4) the article on firm's 
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production plans (Wang, 2004). In (1), the requirement that FDI invested firms 
must retain its foreign exchange balances was cancelled. In (2), the requirement 
that FDI invested firms must purchase in China as a priority was cancelled. In (3), 
the requirement that FDI invested firms must export all or most of their outputs 
was cancelled. FDI-invested firms can sell their outputs freely. In (4), the 
requirement that FDI invested firms must report their production plans to the 
government was cancelled. All these four amendments were made in order to 
comply with WTO rules, particularly the TRIMs.  
In addition to the national laws, the local People's Congress and governments 
also establish their own laws on foreign investment, under the condition that the 
laws will not contradict national laws. The laws are actually supplementary to the 
national laws, and are only applicable within the local region. In this respect, 
Chinese FDI laws are quite different with most Southeast Asian countries, where 
the regulation over FDI is made only at the national level. 
In order to encourage investment and protect the interests of foreign investors, 
the Chinese government also signed bilateral agreements with foreign 
governments on the protection of investment, avoidance of double taxation, and 
prevention of tax evasion.  China also acceded to the multilateral agreements that 
are related to investment, such as Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
Convention. 
National treatment 
Since the introduction of FDI, FDI invested firms have been treated differently 
from domestic firms. The aim of different treatment is to induce FDI to flow into 
particular industries and particular regions. These different treatments have 
involved 1) better than national treatment and 2) less favourable than national 
treatment. 
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Treatment that is better than national treatment includes 1) preferential tax 
treatment, 2) special rights in respect of import-export licensing 3) privileges in 
respect of foreign exchange management, 4) privileges in respect of overseas 
bank credit, 5) privileges in respect of enterprise establishment procedures (Bu 
and Zhen, 2005). In regard to (1), it is estimated that the nominal tax rate for FDI 
invested firms has been 15 per cent and the real tax rate has been 11 per cent, 
while in contrast the rates for domestic firms are 33 per cent and 23 per cent 
respectively. Roughly speaking, the tax burden for domestic firms is twice that of 
FDI invested firms. Specifically, in respect of income tax, it was stipulated that 
productive FDI invested firms committed to operation over 10 years can be 
exempted from business income tax for two years starting from the year when 
the firm makes profit for first time, and then half of the tax rate will be applied 
for subsequent three years; the rate for FDI invested firms located in special 
economic regions and foreign enterprises that establish branches in special 
economic regions for production and operation is 15 per cent. In regard to (2), if 
domestic firms want to do business overseas they must apply for import and 
export licenses. FDI invested firms are entitled to this license automatically upon 
the establishment of the firm. In regard to (3), FDI invested firms have been able 
to have foreign exchange accounts and retain a certain amount of foreign income. 
But domestic firms cannot have foreign exchange accounts without special 
permission. In regard to (4), FDI invested firms have been able to borrow from 
overseas banks with little procedure, but domestic firms must undergo rigorous 
approval procedure. In regard to (5), FDI invested firms have been able to be 
established without the registered capital being fully paid. But domestic firms 
must pay up the registered capital fully to get the business license. 
Less favourable than national treatment includes 1) the requirement that purchase 
of material needed by FDI invested firms, such as equipment and raw material, 
must be sourced as a priority in China if conditions between China and abroad 
are the same, 2) service fees to FDI invested firms is higher than that of domestic 
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firms, 3) the requirement FDI invested firms must retain foreign exchange 
balances, 4) the restrictions on market access and business scope (Bu and Zhen, 
2005). 
Industrial composition 
In 2002, Department of State released an amended Regulation on Guiding 
Foreign Direct Investment Direction, and a new Industry Guiding Category for 
Foreign Direct Investment. These documents govern the inflow of FDI by 
industrial category. The Industry Category classifies industries into 4 types: 
encouraged, permitted, restricted, and prohibited. The new Category enlarged the 
industrial categories open to foreign investment (Wang, 2004), as follows: 1) the 
number of encouraged industries was increased from 186 to 262, while the 
number of restricted industries was cut down from 112 to 75; 2) restrictions on 
the share of ownership held by foreign investors was relaxed. For example, the 
requirement that public wharfs should be controlled by Chinese investors was 
abolished; 3) more industries were opened to foreign direct investment, such as 
telecommunication, fuel gas, and water supply and sewage; 4) the services, such 
as banking, insurance, tourism, accounting, and law service, were further opened 
to FDI; 5) investment in western China was encouraged, and ownership and 
industry restrictions were loosened in western China; (6) the general 
manufacturing sector was classified as permitted category in order to boost 
market competition and optimize the industrial structure. 
Regional distribution 
As China launched its Strategy of Developing western China, the regional 
emphasis in FDI policy also shifted to western China by offering extended 
privileges to investors in western China. More investment was put into western 
China to build infrastructure; more transfer payments were made; more financial 
support and tax preference were offered; and openness was increased. In 2000 
Notification of Implementing 15 Per Cent of Preferential Business Income Tax 
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Rate over FDI Invested Firms in Midwest China for Three Years was issued, 
which offers better conditions than in other regions in that there is no 
requirement that the firms must have be in operation for 10 years and the period 
of preferential tax rate is longer. In 2001 and 2002, The Implementing Guidance 
of Some Policy Measures on Developing Western China and the Overall 
Planning of Developing Western China during ‘Tenth Five’ Period were 
launched respectively, which give general guidance over investing in western 
China. 
Evolution of FDI policy4 
Yin and Lu (2005) characterize the evolution of FDI policy from the perspective 
of both its industrial and regional dimensions. FDI policy reveals a gradual 
opening process that was not planned on a defined schedule, but evolved as 
experience accumulated over in opening up to FDI (policy learning by doing).  
Restrictions on FDI by industry category are adjusting over time, while the 
openness to FDI by region continues to increase. 
Table 1.1 shows the opening to FDI by region. We can see that the FDI inflow 
started from special economic regions (1979-1983), the open coastal belt (1984-
1991), border cities and inland cities (1992-1999), and to midwest China (2000-
2003) as is the emphasis of current FDI policy. Table 1.2 shows the opening to 
FDI by industry category. FDI policy proceeded from opening without industry 
guidance (1979-1982), priority on secondary industry (1983-1990), trial opening 
of tertiary industry (1991-2001), and overall opening (2002-2003).  
                                                 
4 This section is based on Yin and Lu, 2005 
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Table 1.1 Gradual Pattern of Regional Aspect of China’s FDI Policy 
Year Open 
Area 
Policy Experience Laws and Statutes Laws and Statutes of turning 
point 
More economic 
power to local 
governments 
Power of 
approval 
Foreign capital 
Fiscal credit 
1979-
1983 
Special 
Economic 
Regions 
Profit transfer to FDI 
firms 
Tax 
preferences 
Two Reports on Foreign Economic Activities 
and Flexible Measures by Guangdong and 
Fujian Provincial Party Committees, 1979 
Conference Minutes of Guangdong and 
Fujian, 1980 
Working Conference Minutes of Guangdong 
and Fujian and Special Economic Regions, 
1981 
Minutes on Issues of Establishing Special 
Economic Regions, 1982 
Directions on Strengthening 
the Utilization of Foreign 
Investment, 1983 
(1) emancipate the mind; 
(2) loosen the tax policy; 
(3) offer part of domestic 
market. 
Power of approving FDI lowered, 
foreign exchange quota and foreign 
exchange credit increased, tax 
preferences, technology development 
zones established 
Minutes of Symposia of Coastal Cities, 1984 
Minutes of Symposia of Yangtse River, Pearl 
River Delta and South Fujian- Xiamen 
Zhangzhou Quanzhou Delta, 1985 
Improve micro-
environments of  
FDI firms 
Materials 
supply 
Financing 
Foreign 
exchange 
revenue and 
expenditure 
1984-
1987 
Coastal 
Open Belt 
(coastal 
open 
cities, and 
coastal 
economic 
open 
zones) 
Improve the 
efficiency of 
administration 
Administrative 
management 
Stipulations on Encouraging Foreign 
Investment, 1986 
Various policies of attracting FDI issued by 
local governments 
 
1988- Coastal Enlarge power of approving FDI, Supplemental Provisions on Developing Opinions on Speeding up 
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manage the foreign exchange capital 
reasonably 
Export-oriented Economy in Coastal Area, 
1988 
1991 Open Belt 
(coastal 
economic 
open 
zones) 
Implement Minutes of Symposia of 
Yangtse River, Pearl River Delta and 
South Fujian-Xiamen Zhangzhou 
Quanzhou Delta (1985) and 
Supplemental Provisions on 
Developing Export-oriented Economy 
in Coastal Area (1988) 
Notification on Extending the Scope of 
Coastal Economic Open Zones, 1988 
Reply on Extending the Scope of South Fujian 
Delta Economic Open Zone, 1988 
Approval of Extending the Scope of 
Guangdong Coastal Economic Open Zone, 
1988 
Reply on Classifying Jinan City as Coastal 
Economic Open Zone, 1990 
Reform, Extending Opening, 
and Trying Better and More 
Quickly to Push Economy to a 
New Stage, 1992 
(1) The theoretical barriers to 
introducing FDI was 
resolved; 
(2) More domestic markets 
were opened 
1992-
1999 
Cities 
along 
rivers and 
borders, 
and inland 
capital 
cities 
Implement coastal open city policy Notification on Further Opening Chongqing 
and Other Cities, 1992 
 Border 
cities and 
towns 
Give certain power of approving 
license of foreign trade, tax 
preference, establish border economic 
cooperation zones, and arrange 
special-purpose loan etc. 
Notification on Further Opening Five Border 
Cities and Towns of Nanning, Kunming and 
Pinxiang etc., 1992 
Notification on Further Opening Four Border 
Cities of Heihe etc., 1992 
Notification on Policy 
Measures of Implementing 
Developing Western China 
Strategy, 2000 
(1) speed up to change idea; 
(2) increase opening 
2000-
2003 
Midwest 
China 
Increase the input of construction 
capital, the fiscal transfer payment, the 
financial credit support, the tax 
preference, and extend the opening 
etc. 
Notification on Implementing the 15% 
Preferential Business Income Tax Rate on 
FDI Firms ON Midwest Areas for Three 
Years, 2000 
Opinions on Implementing Policy Measures 
of Developing Western China, 2001 
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Overall Planning of Developing Western 
China during “Ten Fifth” Period, 2002 
Source: Yin and  Lu, 2005 
Table 1.2 Gradual Pattern of Industrial Aspect of China’s FDI Policy 
Year Opening Industry Policy 
Experience 
Laws and Statutes Laws and Statutes of turning point 
Manufacture, Mining Encouraging 1979-
1990 Transportation, 
commerce, tourism, 
catering services, 
service 
No restriction 
Rules for Implementing Business Income Tax on 
Chinese-foreign Joint Venture, 1980 
Direction on Strengthening the 
Utilization of FDI, 1983 
(1) The joint venture should be 
productive 
 
Second industry: 
“productive projects” 
and “two kinds of 
projects” 
Encouraging 1983-
1990 
Tertiary industry  Restriction 
Regulation for Implementing Law of Chinese-
foreign Joint Venture, 1983 
Stipulations on Encouraging Foreign 
Investment, 1986 
Temporary Stipulations and Category for 
Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment, 1987 
Notification on Approving National 
High-tech Industry Development 
Zone and Relevant Policies, 1991 
 
Decision on Speeding Up the 
Development of Tertiary Industry, 
1992 
(1) make various trial experiment 
Secondary industry: “3 
types of projects” 
Encouraging 1991-
2001 
Tertiary industry: 
experimental 
Restriction 
reduced 
Temporary Stipulations and Category for 
Guiding Direction of Foreign Investment, 1995, 
1997 
Various experimental laws 
Accession to WTO (2001) 
Secondary industry: “3 
types of projects” 
Encouraging 2002-
2003 
Tertiary industry Restriction 
cancelled 
gradually 
Stipulations and Category for Guiding 
Direction of Foreign Investment, 2002 
 
 
Source: Yin and Lu, 2005 
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Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows.  
In Chapter 2, there is a review of the literature of studies on technology and export 
spillovers of FDI. In Chapter 3, technology spillovers and their determinants are 
analysed at an industry level. We estimate an econometric model, in which industry 
value-added is a function of the interaction terms of the technology transfer of FDI 
with the technology gap, relative capital intensity and relative labour supply, over an 
eight-year panel data set from 1995 to 2003. This analysis suggests that on average 
there are negative technology spillovers from FDI. Yet domestic industries are doing 
better and better with FDI in the sense that from 1995 to 2003 more and more 
industries get positive technology spillovers and even for those industries that are 
negatively affected by FDI the magnitude of negative technology spillovers becomes 
smaller and smaller.  
Chapter 4 further explores technology spillovers by digging into more disaggregate 
data at the firm level. A simultaneous equation model, in which domestic labour 
productivity and foreign presence (proxy for FDI) are a function of each other, is set 
up to accommodate for the potential endogeneity of FDI. The simultaneous equation 
model is then estimated over a comprehensive cross-sectional firm level micro-data 
set that covers over 180,000 firms in the manufacturing sector in China in 2003, and 
we find substantial technology spillovers from FDI.  
Based on the same data set, Chapter 5 turns to the export spillovers of FDI. In 
Chapter 5, a partial equilibrium model is set up to illustrate that if the presence of 
FDI reduces domestic firms’ export costs, for example by spillovers of knowledge 
about foreign markets and through labour movement, then domestic firms’ export 
intensity, which is equal to the share of firms’ exports in their total sales, will be 
unambiguously promoted. This hypothesis is then tested by a Heckman sample 
selection model estimated over the comprehensive cross-sectional micro-data. The 
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estimation finds that FDI in the manufacturing sector does generate export spillovers, 
and furthermore the scale of the spillovers depends on firm characteristics. 
Chapter 6 focuses on technology and export spillovers in the cultural, educational, 
and sporting product manufacturing industry, a two-digit industry where FDI 
presence and firms’ export activities appear most significant, from 2000 to 2003. 
Focusing on an industry over time has three advantages. First, we do not need to 
worry about industry heterogeneity, which can be hard to capture. Secondly, 
endogeneity that occurs because of the possibility that FDI will tend to flow into 
industries with higher productivity or higher export intensity can be controlled for 
automatically. Thirdly, looking at technology and export spillovers over a period of 
time will also enable capture of the dynamic nature of spillovers. Following the 
specification in Chapters 4 and 5, we estimate a panel data model for technology 
spillovers and a Heckman sample selection model for export spillovers. We find no 
evidence of technology spillovers. However there exist export spillovers from FDI, 
with the scale depending on firm characteristics. 
Chapter 7 turns to the regional dimension of FDI, by examining the technology 
spillovers in Gansu Province, one of the least developed regions in China. In this 
chapter, the stochastic frontier model is adopted to test whether the foreign presence 
has a positive impact on domestic firms’ technical efficiency. Technology spillovers 
exist if the foreign presence positively affects domestic firms’ technical efficiency. 
In this chapter, we find that if the FDI invested firms’ activities are measured in 
terms of output share and employment share in the industry, FDI invested firms do 
have a positive impact on other firms’ technical efficiency, and domestic firms’ 
R&D spending plays a positive role in the scale of such technology spillovers. Based 
on findings of previous chapters, Chapter 8 discusses the policy implications of the 
analysis and offers some conclusions. 
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2. Review of Studies of the Spillover Effects of FDI  
There are various studies of the impact of spillovers from FDI on domestic firms and 
industry, both theoretical and empirical. This chapter will review recent studies on 
the spillover effect of FDI, including technology spillovers and export spillovers. In 
the next section, we discuss the link between FDI and spillovers. Then we 
summarize the estimation approach and data set issues of estimating FDI spillovers 
in the following section. The last two sections, we present a survey on recent studies 
on FDI spillovers.  
FDI and Spillovers 
The presence of FDI invested firms in the domestic market will inevitably affect 
domestic firms. There are a number of channels through which such impacts are 
transmitted, namely the linkage between FDI invested firms and domestic firms, the 
movement of employees trained by FDI invested firms, and demonstration and 
competition effects (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998).  
The domestic firms are linked to FDI invested firms as either or both local suppliers 
and customers. If being local suppliers and customers helps domestic firms to 
increase the level of their technology and exports, then spillovers take place. The 
linkage as local suppliers is called a backward linkage while as customers is called a 
forward linkage. Lall (1980) suggests five ways FDI invested firms can affect 
domestic firms through backward linkages. FDI invested firms can help local 
suppliers to set up production facilities, provide technical assistance and information, 
help purchasing raw materials and intermediary inputs, provide training and help in 
management and organization, and assist suppliers to diversity by finding additional 
customers. On forward linkages, Blomstrom (1991) argues that growing technical 
complexity in many industries contributes to an increasing role of MNE customer 
contact, especially in smaller countries. 
The second channel through which spillovers can happen is the movement of 
employees trained by FDI invested firms. MNEs usually have to provide training to 
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local employees, through a range of activities such as on-the-job training and even 
overseas education and training at the parent company. These well trained 
employees can move to domestic firms or set up their own businesses. The skill they 
obtained in FDI invested firms will be naturally carried over to domestic firms. 
However, as FDI invested firms tend to offer higher wages, employee movement 
may not in reality have a significant effect. 
The presence of FDI in host countries can also act as a learning model for domestic 
firms. By observing the business activities of FDI invested firms, domestic firms can 
learn from and imitate FDI invested firms to adopt similar production techniques and 
improve their own efficiency. The demonstration effect requires that the domestic 
firms must have capability to absorb the relevant know-how, that is, they cannot lag 
too far behind. Even if domestic firms are not inclined to imitate FDI invested firms, 
increased competition from FDI invested firms will force domestic firms to do so. 
As Jenkins (1990) observes, there is tendency for domestic firms to adopt similar 
production techniques to those of FDI invested firms if they are in competition with 
each other, produce similar products, have same scale and supply to the same market. 
In addition to forcing domestic firms to learn and imitate, the competition may have 
different effects in the short run and long run. It is argued that in the short run the 
competition will crowd some domestic firms out of the market and thus have a 
negative impact on domestic firms, but in the long run it will have a positive impact 
since firms that cannot adapt to the competition are forced out of the market and 
existing firms are forced to adopt more advanced technology to compete.  The 
presence of FDI may also affect domestic industry structure, which will change the 
efficiency and resource allocation in the industry and hence affect the spillovers. 
Blomstrom and Kokko (1998), their survey of the empirical studies, conclude that 
FDI tends to flow into industries with high entry barriers and high levels of 
concentration, and thus in the short run increases the number of firms in the market, 
but in the long run may contribute to increases in concentration, although bringing 
with it efficiency benefits. 
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Not only can FDI spillovers be delivered through different channels, but also FDI 
can generate different types of spillovers. The FDI inflow into host countries affects 
host countries (host country spillovers) but the home country may also be affected 
(home country spillovers).  For example MNEs may produce intermediate goods that 
are accessible to home country firms at a lower cost and thereby increase the 
international competitiveness of home country firms. In this thesis, we focus on the 
host country spillovers, namely the impact of FDI inflow in China.  
FDI can affect other firms and industries in different ways, for example via its 
impact on technology or via its impact on exports. If FDI enhances the technology 
level of domestic firms or industries, then technology spillovers occur. Similarly, if 
FDI has a positive effect on the exports of domestic firms or industries, export 
spillovers take place. Export spillovers can happen if local firms expand their 
production and achieve economies of scale as a result of being suppliers and sub-
contractors to FDI invested firms, or establish their own export channels through 
obtaining knowledge from FDI invested firms on foreign market conditions, such as 
foreign preferences on product design, packaging and quality. The thesis does not 
intend to cover all aspects of FDI spillovers, but instead I focus on technology and 
exports. Technology spillovers are most widely studied, while export spillovers are 
much less so, as will be shown in following sections.  
FDI spillovers can also be classified into horizontal spillovers and vertical spillovers. 
The inflow of FDI that brings in better technology can encourage domestic firms 
within the same industry to improve their performance and competitiveness. In 
addition, domestic firms in the same industry may benefit from the presence of FDI 
via the channels discussed above. This kind of spillover takes place within the same 
industry, and is hence called a horizontal spillover, or equivalently an intra-industry 
spillover. Domestic firms in one industry can also be affected by FDI in other 
industries, if they are in business contact with FDI invested firms in other industries. 
These types of spillover are called vertical spillovers, or equivalently inter-industry 
spillovers, as they are spillovers generated by the FDI from other industries. Forward 
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and backward linkages are important channels through which vertical spillovers can 
take place. In this thesis, we only cover the horizontal spillovers. 
FDI spillovers are generally assumed to be positive. However, the impact of FDI is 
not necessarily always positive. Different domestic firms will respond differently to 
the FDI presence, and are then affected differently, depending on their own 
characteristics and the economic environment. For example, the market size, local 
content regulations, and size and technological capability of domestic firms will 
affect the extent of backward and forward linkages, all of which in turn affects the 
extent of spillovers (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998). Hence it is not surprising to 
expect and observe that some domestic firms will suffer from the presence of FDI. 
Furthermore, it is more reasonable to expect that the magnitude of FDI spillovers 
will depend on the characteristics of domestic firms. Compared with previous 
studies, this thesis emphasizes the importance of domestic firm characteristics in 
FDI spillovers in the empirical exercises undertaken in subsequent chapters.  
Estimation Approach and Data Sets 
Hence, FDI is closely linked to spillovers conceptually. However is this necessarily 
the case in the real world? There have been a number of studies that test this link in 
reality. These empirical exercises can be summarized from three perspectives: the 
methodology, data set, and other issues in testing the spillover effect. 
Firstly, in respect of the methodology, the commonly used method in testing FDI 
technology spillovers is to regress a proxy of technology, labour productivity or total 
factor productivity, against a proxy for FDI, usually called foreign presence, by 
controlling for the relevant factors that have a direct effect on the proxy of 
technology, such as the capital intensity and human capital. It is implicitly assumed 
that there exists a production function for the firm and or the industry and that its 
technology is a function of factors such as the FDI, market concentration, 
technology gap, and human resources, in which the FDI is the variable of interest. 
For FDI export spillovers, most empirical studies that directly target the issue at the 
firm level regress domestic firms’ export intensity, measured as the share of 
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domestic firms’ exports in their total sales, against the foreign presence and other 
factors that affect firms’ export activities, such as firms’ capital intensity and size. 
The regression is completed using the Heckman sample selection model, accounting 
for a two-step decision procedure in firms’ export activities: firms first decide 
whether to export and then decide how much to export if they have initially decided 
to export. In both the case of technology and export spillovers, the significance and 
magnitude of the coefficient of FDI is the focus of the studies. Thus it is important to 
choose an appropriate proxy for FDI.  
Conventionally, there are three kinds of proxies for FDI, which are also called 
foreign presence, that is, the share of foreign owned firms’ equity in the whole 
industry, the share of foreign owned firms’ employment in the whole industry, and 
the share of foreign owned firms’ production in the whole industry. Each of these 
three proxies has different deficiencies. The share of foreign owned firms’ equity in 
the whole industry may be distorted by host country ownership restrictions 
(Kohpaiboon, 2006): for example the host country may impose a restriction that the 
share of foreign capital in total capital can not be higher than a fixed amount in some 
industries. FDI tends to invest in more capital-intensive industries compared with 
their counterparts and the share of foreign owned firms’ employment in the whole 
industry will be lower because foreign firms are usually less labour intensive, so that 
this proxy will underestimate the presence of FDI (Kohpaiboon, 2006). The 
employment share is particularly problematic in China as China’s state and 
collectively owned enterprises have to bear redundant employment because of their 
historical role in providing social services and security. As for the share of output of 
foreign owned firms in the whole industry, it is argued that since the dependent 
variable is productivity, which usually is calculated from the output, it is more 
appropriate to measure the foreign presence by inputs (Caves, 1974).  
In summary, these three proxies may distort the true measurement of foreign 
investment presence. These distortions may contribute to the mixed empirical results, 
and make the estimation results sensitive to the choice of FDI proxy (Gorg and 
Strobl, 2001). In recognition of this, all three proxies are used in empirical exercises 
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in subsequent chapters, with the interpretation based on one proxy and the other two 
serving as sensitivity analysis. 
For productivity, a proxy for technology, it is well known that the conventional 
measure reflects not only technical efficiency, but also market power (for example, 
Bernard et al., 2003, Branstetter, 2006). To compute productivity, either labour 
productivity or total factor productivity, value added is needed, which in turn is 
calculated by assuming a competitive market and constant returns to scale. Hence 
the effect of market power and non-constant returns to scale affects the calculation 
of value added. For this reason, it is also argued that gross output data is preferable 
to the value-added data in empirical estimations (Basu and Fernald, 1995). 
In addition to the widely used traditional approach, there are other approaches, such 
as those of Branstetter (2006) and Sadik and Bolbol (2001). The approach of 
Branstetter (2006) differs from the traditional approach in that different proxies for 
the technology of FDI are used. In Branstetter’s analysis, patent citation is used as a 
proxy for technology. This excludes other technology such as technical know-how. 
Besides, one might argue that this definition of technology spillovers is too narrow 
in the sense that only spillovers that lead to innovations are treated as spillovers. 
Thus, Branstetter’s approach very likely underestimates the true level of technology 
spillovers from FDI in a host country. Sadik and Bolbol (2001) adopted a growth 
accounting framework to study technology spillovers from incoming FDI. In their 
approach, FDI is treated as part of the domestic capital stock, and at the same time it 
also has an effect on the technology of the production function. A potential problem 
comes from the poor fit of the growth accounting method with reality, as is 
illustrated by the fact that the 2R  of Sadik and Bolbol’s study is very low, which 
indicates that some important factors are left out. 
For the studies of export spillovers of FDI, there are another two lines of approach, 
in addition to the approach that regresses export intensity against foreign presence. 
One is to examine the issue in the context of whether FDI positively affects 
aggregate exports in studying the determinants of exports, as in Lipsey and Weiss 
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(1981, 1984), Bento (2004), Hu and Ma (1999), Zhang et al. (2005), and Li et al. 
(2003). The other is to test whether FDI positively causes or predicts aggregate 
exports, as in, for example, Mello and Fukasaku (2000), Liu et al. (2001), Shan 
(2002), and Aizenman and Noy (2006). Compared with the first line of studies, the 
second focuses more on the dynamics of FDI’s impact on exports, which is 
reasonable as it takes time for FDI to have an impact on exports. However, both 
lines of study are at an aggregate level, namely examining whether the aggregate 
FDI flow positively affects aggregate exports. If there are export spillovers from FDI, 
then we can observe that aggregate FDI flow positively affects aggregate exports. 
However, the observation that aggregate FDI flow positively affects aggregate 
exports does not necessarily imply that there are export spillovers from FDI, as the 
increase in aggregate exports may come from FDI invested firms themselves. Hence 
these two lines of study do not address the export spillovers directly. 
Second,  data sets, either cross-sectional or panel data sets are used in these studies, 
and these data sets are either on a firm level or on an industry level. So this is a two 
dimensional issue. The major problem for cross-sectional data is that they tend to 
overestimate the magnitude of technology spillovers. As found by Gorg and Strobl 
(2001), studies using cross-sectional data find systematically more technology 
spillovers from FDI than studies using panel data. One reason is that there is usually 
a reverse causality from productivity/export activities to FDI, that is, not only may 
the presence of FDI increase the productivity/export activities of domestic firms, but 
also FDI often tends to flow into industries with higher productivity/exports, or the 
FDI parent firm tends to enter a market by acquiring domestic firms with higher 
productivity/export activity. The solution to this reverse causality problem is either 
to find an instrumental variable, which is difficult in reality in that the variables that 
are correlated with FDI usually are also correlated with productivity/export activity, 
or to use a simultaneous equation system, which is not used by all previous studies 
that employ cross-sectional data sets. In contrast, in addition to the usual advantages, 
such as potentially increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing multi-collinearity 
problems (Hsiao, 2003), panel data can also accommodate the reverse causality 
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problem easily, for example by using lagged FDI as the instrument. Besides, 
technology and export spillovers themselves have a dynamic nature, that is, they 
usually occur through time. This means that cross-sectional data sets may not be able 
to capture all relevant aspects of technology and export spillovers. In this sense, 
panel data is probably preferable to cross-sectional data.  
The other dimension of data sets is the level of aggregation. As shown by Caballero 
and Lyons (1989), spillovers at a lower level of aggregation may be internalized at a 
higher level of aggregation, which means that if the lower level of aggregation gives 
a correct estimation of the magnitude of technology spillovers then the higher level 
will probably underestimate the magnitude, and vice versa. Thus, estimation by 
using firm-level (disaggregated) data and industry-level (aggregated) data will tend 
to present contrasting results. Compared with firm-level data, industry-level data is 
unable to control for differences in productivity across sectors which might be 
correlated with, but not caused by, foreign presence (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
However, from the researchers’ point of view, industry level data are often much 
easier to obtain than firm level data, because industry level data are usually 
published officially while firm level data are often census data.  
There are other issues about estimation that need attention. Gorg and Strobl (2001) 
argue that a proper definition of foreign presence, proxy for FDI, is important to 
capture technology spillover effects. The conventional measurements all have some 
deficiencies. Thus, while using these proxies, the specific situation from which the 
data come should be examined carefully. For example, in a country where ownership 
is restricted, measures of capital share should be used with caution.  
One alternative is to construct a proxy for technology transfer of FDI, as is done in 
Chapter 3. Moreover the appropriate control variables should be selected carefully. 
Technology is transferred across country boundaries via several channels, namely 
international trade, particularly trade of capital goods, technology licensing, and FDI 
(Pack and Saggi, 1997). Technology spillovers may take place in all three channels. 
It is better to control for the other two channels while studying any one channel. 
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These can be called channel control variables. However, due to data constraints, we 
are not able to do so in this thesis. Factors that directly contribute to the development 
of technology, such as capital intensity, will be controlled. These factors can be 
called direct control variables. In export spillover studies, factors that contribute to 
firms’ exports shall also be controlled, like firms’ marketing expenses. However, the 
ensuing potential multicollinearity problem is a concern. In subsequent empirical 
exercises in this thesis, the potential multicollinearity is checked by examining 
whether individually insignificant variables are jointly significant. 
Technology Spillovers from FDI 
Testing the technology spillover effect of FDI has attracted a lot of attention5, partly 
because economists think the foreign firms usually have some advantages (most 
often technological superiority) to offset their disadvantages compared with local 
firms.  These advantages will inevitably benefit their local counterparts, and this 
implies that spillovers occur.  
Theoretically, technology diffusion has been modelled through technology transfer 
and spillovers. There are two kinds of hypothesis regarding technology diffusion. 
One is that the larger the gap between domestic and foreign countries, the quicker 
the domestic country will be able to catch up internationally (because of relative 
backwardness), namely there exists technological convergence. This sort of idea 
comes from the observation that the less developed is a country compared with the 
industrialized countries, the quicker it will develop (Veblen, 1915, Gerschenkron, 
1962). The other is that technology diffusion can be viewed like the spread of a 
contagious disease (that is, with a contagion effect). This idea emphasizes the 
importance of personal contacts in the process of technology diffusion. Technology 
is most effectively copied if there are inter-personal contacts between the actual 
users of technology and potential users of technology. Findlay (1978) captures these 
two hypothesises by proposing a function where the growth rate of domestic 
technology in a backward region is an increasing function of the technology gap 
                                                 
5 A more complete survey of empirical studies on technology spillovers of FDI can be found in Gorg and 
Greenaway (2004). 
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between an advanced region and the backward region, and an increasing function of 
foreign presence (the ratio of the capital stock of FDI invested firms to that of 
domestic firms in the backward region).  Then he shows that the technology gap and 
foreign presence converge to a steady state, which implies technology spillovers 
from FDI, as the increase of foreign presence leads to a reduction of technology gap.  
Assuming a cost-reducing technology and costless spillovers, Das (1987) examines 
the technology spillovers of FDI in an oligopolistic market where the FDI invested 
firm is the leader and domestic firms constitute the fringe.  Technology spillovers of 
FDI will reduce domestic firms’ production costs and hence will hurt the 
profitability of FDI invested firms. In spite of this, Das shows that FDI invested 
firms still import better technology, in that the positive effect of cost saving of better 
technology outweighs the negative effect of reducing profitability due to spillovers 
to domestic firms. In contrast to Das’ model, Wang and Blomstrom (1998) propose a 
model in which both the domestic firms’ learning activities and the technology 
transferring process are costly. They show that the technology spillovers from FDI 
are positively related to the level of host country firms’ learning investment.  
Findlay’s (1978) model emphasises the importance of the technology gap for 
spillovers. In Chapter 3, we test the role of the technology gap in spillovers using 
industry level panel data, and show that technology spillovers are negatively related 
to the technology gap. Das’ (1987) model illustrates that indeed FDI invested firms 
have incentives to bring in technology from their parent firms continuously, even 
though the technology will spill over to domestic firms. Wang and Blomstrom’s 
(1998) model emphasises the importance of one aspect of domestic firms, namely 
their investment in learning, in the process of spillovers. This thesis builds on this 
idea by incorporating numerous other firm characteristics in the empirical analysis, 
for example the firm size and age, which may also influence their ability to absorb 
spillovers.  
Pioneered by Caves (1974), there are numerous empirical studies on testing 
technology spillovers from FDI. These empirical studies are often carried out by 
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regressing the productivity of domestic firms or industries against a proxy of FDI, 
and then a significant and positive estimate of the coefficient implies positive 
spillovers from FDI. However the results are quite mixed in the sense that some 
found positive spillovers, while others found negative spillovers or the nonexistence 
of spillovers. Nevertheless, in regard to China, most studies find positive technology 
spillovers from FDI.  
Li et al. (2001) examine two channels through which FDI spillovers occur, namely 
the demonstration effect and competition effect, in China’s manufacturing sector, 
using the third industrial census data in 1995. They find positive spillovers, with the 
scale depending on the types of domestic firm ownership and different sources of 
FDI. For example, state-owned firms increase their technology level by competing 
with FDI invested firms. In addition, it is also found that the technology gap, which 
is measured as the difference in labour productivity between foreign owned firms 
and domestic firms, plays a negative role in technology spillovers, that is, a smaller 
technology gap implies larger spillovers. The findings of Li et al. (2001) are further 
explored by Buckley et al. (2002). Using the same data set, they confirm that 
collectively-owned firms are more capable of absorbing technology spillovers from 
FDI than state-owned firms, and that FDI from overseas Chinese multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) does not generate spillovers in terms of productivity gains, while 
FDI from non-overseas Chinese MNEs does generate spillovers, which can happen 
if non-overseas Chinese MNEs are technological superior to overseas Chinese 
MNEs. Again using the same data set, Chuang and Hsu (2004) find positive 
evidence of FDI technology spillovers. Like Li et al. (2001), they also examine the 
role of a technology gap in FDI technology spillovers, by splitting the data set into 
two subsets over which the regressions were run separately and compared, and 
found firms with a lower technology gap have bigger spillover benefits.  
The studies of Li et al. (2001) and Buckley et al. (2002) show the importance of 
domestic firms’ ownership and source of FDI in technology spillovers. In the 
subsequent chapters, the ownership of domestic firms is always incorporated into the 
empirical testing. For the source of FDI, as this thesis aims at exploring what 
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domestic firm characteristics determine the extent of FDI spillovers, we do not 
distinguish between whether the FDI comes from overseas Chinese MNEs or non-
overseas Chinese MNEs, but instead control for the potential effect of not 
distinguishing overseas and non-overseas Chinese MNEs by using the regional and 
industry dummies in subsequent empirical exercises. Overseas Chinese MNEs tend 
to distribute in coastal China and concentrate in certain industries, for example the 
textile industry.  On the role of the technology gap in spillovers, in spite of the idea 
that bigger technology gap leads to quicker catch up (Findlay, 1978) the studies of 
both Li et al. (2001) and Chuang and Hsu (2004) yield the opposite finding, namely 
that the bigger the technology gap the smaller the technology spillovers. In Chapter 
3 this study reports the same result.   
Similar studies have also been carried out on regional China. Liu (2002) tests the 
intra-industry and inter-industry technology spillovers of FDI in the manufacturing 
sector of Shenzhen City, using a panel data from 1993 to 1998, and finds that the 
relationship between FDI in the manufacturing sector and the level and growth rate 
of productivity in component industries is significant and positive, and this is 
interpreted as positive FDI spillovers. Later, using firm level data in the Chinese 
manufacturing sector, Liu (2008) confirms that an increase in FDI lowers domestic 
firms’ short-term productivity levels, but raises their long-term rates of productivity 
growth. Chuang and Lin (1999), using firm-level cross-sectional census data in 1991, 
examine the spillover effects of FDI in Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, and find a 
significant positive effect of FDI on domestic firms’ technology development with 
an elasticity ranging from 1.4 per cent to 1.88 per cent.  
Outside China there are many more empirical studies on FDI technology spillovers, 
with mixed results. At both industry and firm levels, Caves (1974), Sinani and 
Meyer (2004), Branstetter (2006), and Kohpaiboon (2006) find positive technology 
spillovers, while, in contrast, Aitken and Harrison (1999), and Sadik and Bolbol 
(2001) find negative technology spillovers.  
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In his pioneering work, Caves (1974) uses data for Australia’s manufacturing sector 
to test the effect of MNEs on technology spillovers on domestic firms, and finds a 
significantly positive relationship between foreign presence and domestic firms’ 
labour productivity. Sinani and Meyer (2004) explore the FDI technology spillovers 
in Estonian manufacturing sector from 1994 to 1999. They examine the magnitude 
of intra-industry technology spillovers and how the magnitude varies with the 
domestic firm characteristics, finding evidence of considerable technology spillovers 
with the magnitude depending on the size, trade orientation and ownership structure 
of the recipient firms. Small firms, non-exporting firms, and outsider-owned firms 
benefit more from spillovers than other types of firms, suggesting that these firms 
are more capable of absorbing technology spillovers, possibly because of the 
competition effect. Branstetter (2006) tests the technology spillovers of FDI from 
Japan on domestic firms in the United States. In his study, patent citations are used 
to proxy technology, and technology spillovers are defined to exist when the number 
of patent citations is positively affected by FDI. His estimation shows that Japanese 
FDI in the U.S. has technology spillovers for domestic firms, and Japanese affiliates 
with higher technology levels have a stronger impact in terms of spillovers to 
domestic firms. Kohpaiboon (2006) examines the technology spillovers of FDI in 
Thailand by testing the Bhagwati (1973) hypothesis that the technology spillovers 
are conditioned by the nature of the trade policy regime, that is, the technology 
spillovers are more likely to happen under an export promotion policy regime than 
an import substitution policy regime. His study does not reject the Bhagwati 
hypothesis, and also confirms that trade barriers and domestic market size play 
important roles in determining FDI participation. In different industries FDI may 
have quite different effects in terms of the scale of technology spillovers. Alvarez 
and Molero (2005) examine whether FDI has a different degree of technology 
spillover in industries with different of technology intensity in Spain’s 
manufacturing sector and find that in low-tech industries there exist significant 
technology spillovers but not in medium-tech and high-tech industries.  
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FDI may also have negative technology spillovers on domestic firms (that is, the 
presence of FDI may actually hurt domestic firms), as discussed in the previous 
section. Aitken and Harrison (1999) provide evidence of this from Venezuela. Using 
firm level panel data, they find foreign investment negatively affects the productivity 
of domestic firms, with the magnitude of negative spillovers ranging from -0.21 per 
cent to -0.32 per cent in different specifications. The explanation suggested is a 
market-stealing effect, that is, even though the presence of FDI may lower domestic 
firms’ average costs (positive spillovers), it can also squeeze its domestic markets by 
drawing demand away from domestic firms if the market is imperfectly competitive, 
particularly in the short run. Sadik and Bolbol (2001) employ a growth accounting 
framework to study FDI technology spillovers in six Arab countries (Oman, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt) from 1978 to 1998. They find 
that for Oman, Morocco, and Jordan, there exist insignificant spillovers, but for the 
other three countries there exist negative and significant spillovers.  
So we can see the empirical tests of technology spillovers from FDI give mixed 
results. What are the reasons behind this? Gorg and Strobl (2001) test whether the 
differences in research design, methodology, and data play a role, by conducting a 
meta-analysis of the literature on multinational companies and productivity 
spillovers over a sample consisting of 25 observations which are taken from 18 
published papers and 3 unpublished papers. Their analysis finds that research design 
affects the results of studies. Specifically, cross-sectional studies usually find higher 
productivity spillovers than panel data studies, different definitions of foreign 
presence also tend to affect the results, and the studies with significant results are 
more likely to be published, namely there exists a ‘publication bias’. Gorg and 
Strobl’s study sheds light on the presence of mixed results in the empirical studies of 
FDI’s technology spillovers. Based on their findings, we use both cross-sectional 
and panel data, and three measurements of foreign presence in the empirical 
exercises later, in order to ensure the robustness of the estimations.  
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Export Spillovers from FDI 
In addition to technology spillovers, FDI also affects domestic firms’ and industries’ 
exports. Most studies of this issue focus on the impact of FDI on exports at an 
aggregate level, for which a positive impact from FDI on aggregate exports may 
imply export spillovers, and in contrast far fewer of them directly handle export 
spillovers at the firm level.   
At an aggregate level, analysts usually examine whether the FDI determines or 
predicts exports. If FDI positively determines or predicts exports, then there may be 
export spillovers from FDI. In his review, Lipsey (2002) reveals that several country 
and industry studies (for example Rhee and Belot, 1990) show that FDI inflow 
positively affects exports by establishing new industries or sub-industries and 
transforming the host country from being an exporter of raw material and foods to 
being an exporter of manufacturing goods. In this process, presumably FDI 
positively affects domestic firms’ exports, and there are export spillovers.  
In addition to his review, Lipsey also investigates outward FDI’s impact on 
aggregate exports in the US. Lipsey and Weiss (1981) examine the impact of direct 
investment by US firms (outward FDI) on exports to 44 foreign destinations by the 
US in 1970 at the three-digit level of manufacturing industries. Measuring outward 
direct investment by the output of US-owned affiliates and the number of foreign-
owned manufacturing affiliates in each country, they find that there is a positive 
relationship between US affiliates’ output and US exports. Later, Lipsey and Weiss 
(1984) use firm level cross sectional survey data to confirm the positive relationship 
between US firms’ foreign affiliate activities and exports. Their estimation shows 
that the higher the level of output of a US firm in a foreign country (outward US FDI 
firm activities), the higher in general were that firm’s exports from the US to that 
country. Outward FDI can bring home knowledge about the foreign market where its 
affiliates are located, and can spill over to other firms in home countries, boosting 
home country’s exports to that market. The positive impact on exports by the 
outward FDI is also confirmed by Lin (1995). Lin (1995) looks at the trade effect of 
both the stock and flow of outward FDI in Taiwan from 1972 to 1992, and finds that 
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the outward flow and stock of FDI have a significant and positive impact on the 
exports.  
In assessing the general determinants of intra-EC (European Union) trade patterns, 
Fontagne et al. (1997) find that FDI has a significant and positive effect on both the 
intra-industry (vertical and horizontal) and inter-industry trade. Using a dataset of 
bilateral trade and FDI flows constructed by the OECD, Fontagne (1999) explores 
the relationship between inward/outward FDI and the export/import/trade balance in 
the UK, US, France, and the aggregation of 14 European countries at an industry 
level. The analysis shows that there exists a complementary relationship between 
both inward and outward FDI and exports and imports. Bento (2004) investigates the 
pattern and determinants of Portugal’s trade in manufactured goods from 1971 to 
1998. Using time series econometrics to capture dynamic nature of FDI’s impact on 
exports, he examines the impact of manufacturing related FDI on the net exports, 
and finds that FDI inflows positively affect both the export and import. 
In addition to studies that treat FDI as a determinant of exports, some studies focus 
on whether FDI positively predicts (causes) exports. If FDI positively predicts 
exports, then there are potentially export spillovers from FDI. Mello and Fukasaku 
(2000) examine the relationship between trade and inward FDI in selected Latin 
American and Southeast Asian economies, using time series covering the period 
1970 to 1994. The results seem rather mixed in the sense that for some countries the 
causality, namely whether FDI positively predicts exports, exists but for other 
countries it does not. Liu et al. (2001) examine the causality between FDI and 
exports/imports in China, using a panel of annual bilateral data for China and 19 
home countries/regions over the period 1984-1998. Granger causality tests show that 
the growth of China’s imports Granger causes the growth of the FDI stock from a 
home country/region, which in turn Granger causes the growth of exports from 
China to this country/region.  Shan (2002) adopts the impulse response function and 
variance decomposition technique to analyse the dynamic relationship between 
financial development and different economic variables within a framework of the 
vector autoregression model, in which FDI is one variable examined, and finds that 
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the exports made a low contribution to the forecast error variance of FDI and FDI 
made a higher contribution to the forecast error variance of the exports, which 
implies a positive impact on exports by FDI. Aizenman and Noy (2006) investigate 
the inter-temporal link between FDI and trade using an annual panel data set of 81 
countries from 1982 to 1998. Their empirical estimation confirms the existence of 
such linkages, and the feedback between FDI and manufacturing trade is the 
strongest linkage.  
All these studies at the aggregate level are carried out in two frameworks6: one is 
whether FDI is a positive determinant of exports (that is, whether FDI of the current 
period positively affects exports of current period) and the other is whether FDI of 
previous periods positively Granger causes (predicts) exports of current period. Even 
though most of these studies find FDI positively affects aggregate exports, which 
implies potential export spillovers from FDI, these studies usually do not target the 
impact of the FDI on exports directly, and instead are by-products in addressing 
other issues. Nevertheless, they do reveal the possibility of export spillovers from 
FDI. Further studies that directly handle the impact of FDI on exports at the firm 
level are needed. This thesis will adopt an approach that directly addresses this issue. 
Compared with studies that test the impact of FDI on aggregate exports as described 
above, there are far fewer studies that directly handle export spillovers of FDI at the 
firm level. Aitken et al. (1997) examine whether FDI firms’ export activities reduce 
domestic firms’ export costs in Mexico from 1986 to 1990. They find that the 
probability of a firm’s exporting is positively correlated with the local concentration 
of multinational enterprises’ activities, and uncorrelated with the local concentration 
of total export activities. In other words, domestic firms benefit from being near to 
multinational firms, even after accounting for the possibility that multinational firms 
                                                 
6 Another line of study is made within the intra-industry trade framework, which tests whether FDI promotes 
intra-industry trade. For example, Hu and Ma (1999) study the determinants of intra-industry trade in China by 
using three-digit SITC cross-sectional data for 1995, and find that the FDI has a significant and positive impact 
on the vertical intra-industry trade. Similarly, using a panel data from 1992 to 2001, Zhang et al. (2005) find FDI 
exerts positive and significant effect on intra-industry trade, in exploring the determinants of the intra-industry 
trade in China. Li et al. (2003) test the determinants of intra-industry trade in the insurance service sector 
between the US and its 26 trading partners, using both cross-sectional and two year pooled data in 1995 and 
1996. They find that FDI in the insurance service sector contributes significantly to the growth of trade in 
insurance services. 
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choose to invest where domestic firms are better. Extending Aitken et al.’s (1997) 
work, Greenaway et al. (2004) test export spillovers from FDI in the United 
Kingdom. They find that the intensity of foreign R&D expenditure, and the relative 
importance of multinational enterprises’ production have positive impact on 
domestic firms’ probability and propensity (which is equal to the share of firms’ 
exports in their total sales) to export, while multinational enterprises’ export 
activities promote domestic firms’ probability to export, but not domestic firms’ 
export propensity. Kneller and Pisu (2007) further examine export spillovers of FDI 
in the United Kingdom, by distinguishing horizontal export spillovers and vertical 
export spillovers. They confirm the existence of significant export spillovers from 
FDI in the UK. Furthermore, they find significant and positive horizontal and 
regional export spillovers from FDI on the probability of a firm’s exporting, and 
significant backward vertical spillovers on firms’ export intensity, which implies 
export spillovers are not homogenous; later we capture this by allowing export 
spillovers to vary across firms. Ruane and Sutherland (2005) test export spillovers 
from FDI in Ireland. Following Aitken et al. (1997) and Greenaway et al. (2004), 
they estimate export spillovers of FDI from firm level census data on the Irish 
manufacturing sector that covers 3,561 firms from 1991 to 1998. They find that 
domestic firms’ decisions on whether to export are positively affected by the 
presence of FDI in the sector, while in contrast their export intensity is negatively 
associated with the export sales ratio of FDI firms.  
Willmore (1992) examines the impact of firms’ foreign ownership on domestic 
firms’ exports and imports, using cross-sectional data that covers 17,053 firms in 
Brazil. Foreign ownership, which is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
the firm is foreign owned, has a large and independent effect on both export 
performance and import propensity. In studying the impact of FDI under different 
trade regimes in Uruguay, Kokko et al. (2001) find the presence of foreign affiliates 
established after 1973, when the Uruguayan trade regime changed from import 
substitution to export orientation, raises the likelihood that domestic firms 
participate in exporting, confirming the Bhagwati hypothesis. Barrios et al. (2003) 
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study the impact on domestic firms’ exports of FDI and R&D in Spain. After 
controlling for firm age, size, productivity, wage, and domestic firms’ R&D 
intensity, they find a positive spillover effect from multinational enterprises’ R&D 
activities, but not from their export activities. Swensen (2007) studies the 
relationship between FDI firms and private Chinese firms’ exports between 1997 
and 2003, and finds that the FDI firms’ export activities are positively associated 
with the creation of trading relationships of private Chinese firms, and this effect is 
particularly large when the FDI firms are in the same industry. 
This chapter has surveyed current studies of the spillover effects of FDI, including 
technology spillovers and export spillovers. Analysts find mixed results in respect of 
technology spillovers, as some studies reveal a positive impact from FDI while other 
studies show a negative impact. On export spillovers, studies of aggregated data find 
FDI causes trade, implying the presence of export spillovers. At the disaggregated 
firm level, there are fewer studies, but all of them find that FDI positively affects the 
probability of a domestic firm’s exporting and the intensity of its exporting. This 
review lays a foundation for the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters in which 
some of the findings of previous studies are incorporated. For example, we 
incorporate the ownership of domestic firms into empirical regressions as a control 
variable because some previous studies find firms’ ownership significantly affects 
their productivity and exports. 
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3. Testing Technology Spillovers at Industry Level 
FDI not only adds to the accumulation of physical capital, it also has the 
potential to contribute to the productivity growth of the host economy through 
technology spillovers to domestic firms and industries. Are technology spillovers 
from FDI important in China? If so, what factors influence the scale of 
technology spillovers?  This chapter examines these two issues, using industry 
level data.  
In Chapter 2, we reviewed recent studies of technology spillover, and found that 
the results are quite mixed, in the sense that some find positive spillovers, while 
others find negative spillovers or no evidence of significant spillover effects. For 
example, Caves (1974), Chuang and Lin (1999), Sinani and Meyer (2004), 
Branstetter (2006), and Kohpaiboon (2006) find positive spillovers from FDI in 
Australia, Taiwan, Estonia, United States, and Thailand, while Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) and Sadik and Bolbol (2001) find negative evidence in 
Venezuela and five Arab countries (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and 
Egypt). One implication is that technology spillovers from FDI may indeed be 
different across time, industries, and countries. Hence in this chapter, we account 
for this possibility, by allowing for the technological impact of FDI to vary 
across time and industries. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to 
attempt this. In addition, our study is also different from previous research in that 
we use a proxy for technology transfer of FDI, instead of the commonly used 
proxy for FDI, foreign presence calculated as a share of the output, equity, or 
employment of FDI invested firms in the industry. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
FDI inflow into China. Then we set out an analytical framework for assessing the 
effect of FDI spillovers. The econometric specification and hypothesis testing 
using the analytical framework follows. The data set and variables used in the 
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estimation are then discussed. The estimation results are presented and reviewed. 
The conclusion follows. 
Overview of FDI in China 
In Chapter 1, we established the importance of FDI in Chinese economy. Here 
we provide a more detailed overview on FDI in China, with a focus on features 
that may affect empirical testing of FDI spillovers. The level of FDI inflow in 
China has been rapidly growing in the past three decades, as shown in Figure 1.1, 
even though the trend of its growth, after accounting for growth due to the scale 
of the economy, appears to be declining. Accompanying the overall increase in 
FDI inflow, there are two features that can potentially affect empirical testing of 
FDI spillovers. The first is the concentration of FDI in the manufacturing sector 
in terms of industry distribution. The second is so-called ‘round-tripping’ FDI, 
made by domestic investors in response to incentives such as lower tax rates for 
FDI invested firms.  
FDI and GDP growth 
From 1985 to 2004, the average annual growth rate of FDI inflow was as high as 
15.2 per cent. In 2004, the inflow of FDI reached US $60.6 billion. Figure 3.1 
presents a picture of the annual growth rate of GDP and FDI inflow in China 
since 1985. We can see that there are similar trends in GDP and FDI. The 
correlation between the annual growth rates of GDP and FDI inflow is as high as 
0.7. This suggests that FDI inflow in China may have contributed substantially to 
economic development7. The curve in the figure shows the trend in FDI growth, 
and indicates that, except in 1998-99, FDI inflow in China maintained a rising 
trend. The decline of FDI inflow in 1998-99 was a result of the Asian financial 
crisis that undermined foreign investors’ confidence in Chinese economy.  
 
                                                 
7 However it is also possible that that higher economic growth rate and bigger economy will attract more 
FDI inflow. Hence this tells nothing about the direction of causality. 
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Figure 3.1 China's FDI Inflow and GDP Growth Since 1985 
 
Industry distribution 
FDI in China is concentrated in the manufacturing sector, which has continually 
ranked number one as the destination for FDI inflow. Measured in terms of the 
stock of FDI, the manufacturing sector is the biggest recipient of FDI in China, 
and roughly takes account of two thirds of China’s total FDI stock. The real 
estate industry accounts for about 21 per cent of total FDI stock, and other 
industries account for about eight per cent of total FDI stock (MOFCOM, 2005). 
In contrast, FDI inflow into the service industries has been slower. FDI inflow in 
all sectors in 2004, except in the service industries, grew positively, while FDI 
inflow in the service industries declined. Figure 3.2 shows the industry 
distribution of FDI in China in 2004. The manufacturing sector alone accounted 
for 71 per cent of actually-utilized FDI in the year.  
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Figure 3.2 Industry Distribution of FDI in 2004 
 
Source: MOFCOM website, 2005, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn 
 
One reason for the focus of FDI inflow into the manufacturing sector may be the 
emphasis in government policy. In order to optimize its industry structure, the 
central government launched the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign 
Investment Industries in 1995, which classified all industries into four categories: 
investments that were encouraged, investments that were allowed, restricted 
investments, and prohibited investments. Many sub-industries within the 
manufacturing sector fall into the category of investment that is encouraged.  
This kind of classification creates a potential problem for empirical FDI studies 
in China, namely the endogeneity problem. If the classification is made 
according to the growth prospects of industries, for example high-growth 
industries are ‘encouraged’, then FDI inflow will self-select into high growth 
industries. It is also possible that the standard happens to be correlated with the 
growth prospect of industries. For example high-tech industries are usually 
encouraged, but high-tech industries also usually grow more quickly than other 
industries. However, as will be discussed later, the endogeneity test by using 
instrumental variables fails to reject the null hypothesis of no evidence of the 
endogeneity problem. 
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Problem of round-tripping FDI 
Another issue in empirical study of FDI in China is the round-tripping problem. 
China offers many policy privileges to FDI invested firms, including low tax 
rates, favourable land use rights, administrative support, and favourable financial 
services from domestic and foreign financial institutions (Xiao, 2004). This gives 
domestic capital a large incentive to go offshore and return, in the guise of FDI, 
in order to make use of various privileges offered by both central and local 
governments. According to a World Bank estimation (2002, cited in Xiao 2004), 
round-tripping FDI inflow could be as high as one quarter of total FDI inflow. 
The estimate of Xiao (2004) is even higher, at 40 per cent of total FDI inflow.  
Like normal FDI, round-tripping FDI inflow also serves capital accumulation. It 
is doubtful, however, that it will have the same technology effect as normal FDI 
inflow. Hence, in measuring the technology effect, it is better to distinguish 
round-tripping FDI from regular FDI. Yet it is very difficult to distinguish the 
two in practice due to lack of information and data. One simple approach is to 
look at the source country of FDI inflow since domestic capital usually flows out 
to countries and regions that have less control on capital movements. If FDI 
inflow comes from developed countries, it is more likely that it is regular FDI. If 
the FDI inflow comes from offshore financial centres or countries and regions 
that enjoy a reputation of less capital movement control, then it is more likely 
that it is round-tripping FDI. Table 3.1 shows the top ten countries and regions 
that were sources of FDI in 2001, 2002, and 2003. We can see that FDI inflow 
from the Virgin Islands ranked in the top two consecutively in 2001, 2002 and 
2003; FDI from Cayman Islands ranked in the top nine in 2001 and top eight in 
2002 and 2003; and FDI from Samoa which is not reported in the table ranked in 
the top 11 in 2002 and top ten in 2002 and 2003. Altogether, FDI from these 
three regions accounted for 14.2 per cent, 15.5 per cent, and 15.3 per cent of FDI 
in 2001, 2002 and 2003 respectively. Considering that these regions have less 
control over capital movement than many other countries and regions, it is 
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reasonable to suspect that FDI from these regions is more likely to have been 
round-tripping investment. This problem is handled by excluding these countries 
and regions in constructing the proxy for technology transfer in the following 
section. 
Table 3.1 Source of FDI Inflow 
Rank 2001 2002 2003 
1 Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong 
2 Virgin Islands Virgin Islands Virgin Islands 
3 U.S. U.S. U.S. 
4 Japan Japan Japan 
5 Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
6 Korea Korea Korea 
7 Singapore Singapore Singapore 
8 Germany Cayman Islands Cayman Islands 
9 Cayman Islands Germany Germany 
10 Britain Britain Britain 
Source: MOFCOM, 2005 
FDI inflow is concentrated in the manufacturing sector, and round-tripping FDI 
accounts for a significant proportion of FDI inflow and both features can create 
problems of the endogeneity and over-estimation in analysing FDI inflows. The 
endogeneity problem is dealt with by the instrumental variable estimation, and 
the round-tripping FDI problem is accommodated by excluding potential sources 
of round-tripping FDI in constructing the proxy of technology transfer. 
Analytical Framework 
In an industry composed of domestic firms and MNE affiliates, the output of the 
industry is described by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, as: 
βα LAKY =          (3.1) 
where Y is the output; K is the stock of domestic physical capital and FDI; A is 
the technology level; and L is the labour supply. In addition to the direct 
contribution of FDI as a part of the capital stock, it also exerts an indirect impact 
on the output through the technology A, that is, technology transfer and 
subsequent potential technology spillovers, which can happen through several 
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channels as discussed in Chapter 2. Hence the technology A in the industry 
depends on the technology brought by FDI, and is assumed as: 
( ) EAA Bf=          (3.2) 
where E denotes the exogenous technical factors, which captures all the other 
factors that contribute to technology formation, and fA  denotes the technology 
transfer from FDI. fA  is subject to an efficiency parameter B, which can be used 
to measure the existence of spillovers.  
Technology spillovers exist if the technology transfer of FDI triggers a positive 
domestic technology formation. Hence technology spillovers can be measured by 
the elasticity of domestic technology with respect to the technology brought by 
FDI (
ff AA
AA
&
&
, where A denotes technology stock and the subscript f denotes the 
technology brought by FDI). If the elasticity is positive, then the technology 
transfer of FDI generates positive domestic technology accumulation, and thus 
there exist technology spillovers from FDI. From equation (3.2), B
A
A
A
A
f
f
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&
. 
Therefore, spillovers exist if and only if 0>B . In addition, a bigger value of 
parameter B implies a bigger domestic technology formation, for a given one per 
cent increase of technology transfer by FDI. That is, the domestic industry can 
utilize the technology brought by FDI more efficiently.  
Since the parameter B denotes the efficiency with which the domestic industry 
can utilize the technology brought by FDI, and can measure the existence of 
technology spillovers, B will be assumed to be endogenously determined by the 
interaction of research efforts, captured by firms’ R&D expenditure, of 
representative domestic firms and FDI invested firms, as:  
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( ) ⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛== 1221 log, xxxxfB  
s.t. 
0'1 <f  0''11 ≥f    (assumption1) 
0'2 >f  0''22 ≤f    (assumption2) 
0''12 ≤f     (assumption3) 
where 1x  is the research effort of FDI invested firm, which is carried out in its 
parent firm and thus exogenous, and 2x  is the research effort of domestic firm.  
The research effort of a FDI invested firm captures its investment in 
technological development. The higher the FDI invested firm’s research effort, 
the more superior its technology level is likely to be, and the larger the 
technology gap will be8. Thus it is then more difficult for a domestic firm to learn 
from a FDI invested firm and in turn the less the spillover effect. Furthermore, as 
the FDI invested firm increases its research effort, not only does it become more 
difficult for a domestic firm to learn, but also the marginal difficulty of learning 
becomes larger and larger. This idea is captured by Assumption 1, in which the 
negative first partial derivative ( 0'1 <f ) implies that it is more difficult for a 
domestic firm to learn if FDI invested firm exerts more research effort and the 
positive second partial derivative ( 0''11 ≥f ) implies the increasing marginal 
difficulty of learning.  
The research effort of domestic firm captures its investment in learning, one 
important aspect of domestic firms in the process of technological spillovers as 
                                                 
8 In regard to the role of a technology gap in spillovers, as discovered above, there is one idea that the bigger 
the technology gap, the quicker the catch-up, that is a sort of convergence, for example Findlay (1978). 
However, there are some empirical studies supporting the idea that smaller technology gap makes larger 
technology spillovers, for example Chuang and Hsu (2004) and Li et al. (2001). 
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emphasised by Wang and Blomstrom (1998). The more effort a domestic firm 
exerts, the bigger technology spillovers are likely to be. However, due to the 
decreasing marginal productivity of investment in learning, the increase of 
technology spillovers is subject to decreasing pace. This idea is captured by 
Assumption 2, in which the positive first partial derivative ( 0'2 >f ) implies the 
positive role of domestic firm’s investment in learning and the negative second 
partial derivative ( 0''22 ≤f ) implies the diminishing marginal productivity of 
investment in learning.  
Assumption 3 ensures that the increase in a FDI invested firm’s research effort 
will lower the marginal productivity of domestic research effort and hence to 
keep the efficiency parameter (B) unchanged, more domestic research efforts are 
needed. From the assumption of firm’s profit maximization, we can derive the 
optimal behaviour of domestic firm’s research efforts. 
To do so, suppose firms are endowed with fixed resources, capital K and labour L, 
for simplicity9. The firm’s problem is to decide the allocation of the endowment 
between R&D and production, in order to maximize its profit. The role of R&D 
is to increase firms’ technology level, which in turn improves efficiency in the 
production process. The firm is faced with linear market demand, bQap −= , 
and exogenous factor prices, w (labour wage) and r (real interest rate). The firm’s 
production function is ( )XlkQQ ,, 11= ; the R&D function is ( )FDIlkXX ,, 22= ; 
the firm’s total cost is LwKrTC += ; the resource constraints are: Kkk =+ 21  
and Lll =+ 21 , where the subscript 1 denotes resources used in production, and 
2 denotes resources used in R&D, and FDI denotes the presence of FDI, which 
                                                 
9 To maximize profit, the firm is faced with a two-stage problem. At stage 1, it decides how many resources 
(capital and labour) to buy in the factor market. Then at stage 2 it decides the allocation of resources 
between R&D and production. However, here the stage 1 problem is abstracted away. 
 43
positively affect domestic firm’s R&D, reflecting the firm level externality from 
FDI. 
Then the firm’s problem10 is to:  
( )( )[ ] ( )( ) TCFDIlkXlkQFDIlkXlkbQa
lklk
−−= ,,,,.,,,max 22112211},,,{ 2211 π  
s.t. Kkk =+ 21 , and Lll =+ 21 . 
Solving the problem, we can obtain: 
'''
21 kxk
XQQ =  
'''
21 lxl
XQQ =  
which says the marginal product of each resource (capital and labour) used in 
production should be equal to the marginal product of each resource used in 
R&D. 
Then in order to solve for 2k  and 2l  explicitly, functional forms of production 
and R&D are specified. We assume the most commonly used Cobb-Douglas 
functional form, as follows: 
xlkQ βα 11=  
ηγλ
22 lkAx =  
where A denotes the industry technology stock and is an implicit increasing 
function of FDI. 
                                                 
10 Here the firm is monopolist. However, if the firm is a price taker, the solution to the profit maximization 
problem obtains same results. 
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Hence, we can solve for 2k  and 2l  as:  
Kk γα
γ
+=2 , Ll ηβ
η
+=2  
Then the optimal research effort of domestic firms is: 
ηγλ LKCAx =  
where 
ηγ
ηβ
η
γα
γ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+≡C . 
Similar reasoning can be applied to determine the optimal level of research effort 
of FDI invested firms. We can find ηγλ wwww LKCAx = , where the subscript w 
denotes ‘world’. Thus plugging domestic firm’s research effort ( ηγλ LKCAx = ) 
and FDI invested firm’s research effort ( ηγλ wwww LKCAx = ) into ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
1
2log x
xB , 
we obtain 
( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−=
w
w
w
w
L
L
L
K
L
K
A
AB logloglog γηγλ     (3.3) 
Equation (3.3) says the efficiency parameter B is determined by three 
components: the technology gap, the relative capital-labour ratio (relative factor 
intensity), and relative labour supply11. The technology gap AAw  has a negative 
impact on B. The larger the technology gap, the less capability the domestic 
industry has to absorb technology transferred. From equation (3.3), 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that equation (3.3) implicitly assumes the domestic and foreign R&D functions have 
same parameters. 
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0
)log(
>=∂
∂ λ
A
B , which says that if a country has a larger technology stock, it 
will be easier to use the foreign technology. The relative capital-labour ratio, 
w
w
L
K
L
K
, characterizes the comparison of capital-labour ratios between the 
foreign country and host industry. As both the investment in learning by 
domestic industry and investment in technological development by foreign 
industry are capital intensive activities, a ratio higher than 1 implies that the 
domestic industry can afford to allocate more capital resources in learning than 
capital resources allocated by the foreign industry in technological development, 
and hence the domestic industry will be more capable of making use of 
technology introduced through FDI. If this ratio is less than 1, it implies that the 
domestic industry is not able to make full use of the technology brought in 
through FDI. Relative labour supply12, wLL , may have a positive/negative/zero 
impact on B, which depends on the parameters of the R&D function. A higher 
value of relative labour supply implies that there is relatively more labour in the 
domestic industry than the foreign industry, and hence it is more likely that 
technology spillovers will occur due to the contagious effect. Meanwhile the 
supply of labour is closely correlated with the factor intensity of the industry, 
namely a higher relative labour supply indicates that the domestic industry is 
relatively more labour intensive than the foreign industry, which is not good for 
such capital intensive activity as investment in learning. 
Econometric Specification and Hypothesis Testing 
By inserting equations (3.2) and (3.3) into equation (3.1), and taking logs of both 
sides, we can get: 
                                                 
12 It would be more reasonable to think that human capital will also play a part in the R&D, which can be 
easily incorporated by adding human capital into the R&D function. However, due to the data constraint in 
the subsequent empirical testing, we do not incorporate the human capital here. 
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Hence, the econometric specification can be written as: 
itiit
ititititfit
itfititfitit
uttv
vLKrLA
rKArAAY
+++=
+++×+
×+×+=
2
213
210
loglogloglog
loglogloglog)log(
γλα
ββδ
δδβ
   (3.4) 
where i denotes the industry, t denotes time, rA denotes the technology gap, 
A
Aw , 
rK denotes the relative factor intensity, 
w
w
L
K
L
K
,  and rL denotes the relative 
labour supply, 
wL
L . In the composite error term itv , we allow for the industry 
fixed effect ( iα ), which controls for the industry heterogeneity in production and 
technology accumulation, and potential time constant omitted variables, a 
nonlinear time trend ( 2tt γλ + ) which can control for other potential time varying 
omitted variables 13 , and i.i.d. normal idiosyncratic error terms ( itu ). The 
exogenous technical factors in equation (3.2) are captured by the industry fixed 
effect and quadratic time trend. 
In equation (3.4), testing the existence of technology spillovers from FDI follows 
two steps: first test the joint significance of 1δ , 2δ , and 3δ . If these are jointly 
insignificant, then the technology spillovers do not exist. Second, differentiate 
equation (3.4) with respect to fitAlog , to obtain the technology transfer elasticity: 
                                                 
13 See Chow and Lin (2002) 
 47
ititit rLrKrA logloglog 321 δδδε ++=      (3.5) 
where ε  denotes the technology transfer elasticity, namely the percentage that 
domestic technology will grow for one per cent increase in technology transfer 
by FDI. We then insert the estimated 1δ , 2δ , and 3δ  into equation (3.5), and 
evaluate it at the industry’s technology gap (in log form), relative factor intensity 
(in log form), and relative labour supply (in log form). If the evaluated elasticity 
is positive, we can then conclude there exist technology spillovers from FDI as 
the technology transfer of FDI generates positive impact on domestic technology 
formation. The elasticity depends on three factors: the technology gap, relative 
factor intensity, and relative labour supply, which can be different across 
industries. Hence the specification in equation (3.4) actually allows for the 
possibility that FDI may have different impacts on different domestic industries. 
This possibility is not accommodated for by previous studies. 
In equation (3.4), we can also examine the role of the technology gap, relative 
factor intensity, and relative labour supply in the industry’s utilization efficiency 
of the technology transfer by FDI14. Differentiating equation (3.5) with respect to 
itrAlog , itrKlog , and itrLlog  respectively, we obtain 1log
δε =∂
∂
itrA
, 
2log
δε =∂
∂
itrK
, and 3log
δε =∂
∂
itrL
.  Hence the sign and significance of the 
estimated 1δ , 2δ , and 3δ  will show the impact of the technology gap, relative 
factor intensity, and relative labour supply. As shown in the above, we expect the 
technology gap plays a negative role, that is, 1δ  is negative, and the relative 
factor intensity plays a positive role, i.e. 2δ  is positive. No prior expectation can 
be made in regard to the role of the relative labour supply. 
                                                 
14 In the case where the technology spillovers do happen (ε >0), then we are actually examining the 
determinants of technology spillovers. 
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The Data 
Summary of the original data set 
The data set used in the analysis here is an eight-year panel from 1995 to 2003, 
which comes from China Statistical Yearbooks 1996-2004, and UNIDO 
INTSTAT3 database, 2004. It covers 23 industries in the manufacturing sector. 
The 1998 data are not included due to lack of FDI data.  
The data from China Statistical Yearbook contain the gross value of output in 
current prices, value added in current prices, number of employees, original 
value of fixed assets, annual balance of net value of fixed assets, and working 
capital. The data from UNIDO INTSTAT3 database, 2004, contain the output 
value and value added in nominal US dollars, number of employees, and gross 
fixed capital formation in nominal US dollars. These four variables are used to 
construct the proxy for technology transfer by FDI ( fA ), technology gap ( A
Aw ), 
relative factor intensity (
w
w
L
K
L
K
), and relative labour supply (
wL
L ).  
Construction of variables 
There are nine variables included in the econometric analysis: the real value 
added, real capital stock, number of employees, proxy for technology transfer, 
technology gap, relative factor intensity, relative labour supply, time (equal to the 
year), and time squared.  
The dependent variable used in the econometric analysis is the real value added, 
obtained by deflating the value added in current price using implicit deflators, 
which are the ratios of the gross output in current prices and in constant 1990 
prices that are obtained from China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook 
various issues. The number of employees is used to proxy for labour supply, 
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which even though is not the best measurement 15  is the only available 
information.  
The real capital stock is constructed following Liu (2002), in which Chow’s 
method (1993) is employed to construct the real fixed capital stock that is then 
added to real working capital to form real capital stock. In constructing the 
measure of real fixed capital stock, nominal newly added fixed assets in each 
year are calculated16, which is then deflated by the price index of investment in 
fixed assets to 1991 prices. Then the initial real capital stock is assumed to be the 
deflated annual balance of the net value of fixed assets in 1995. The annual real 
fixed capital stock is the sum of the previous year’s fixed capital stock and the 
annual increment. As argued by Liu (2002), it is not reasonable to exclude 
working capital from the real capital stock as the size of working capital is 
substantial relative to that of fixed capital. Hence, nominal working capital is 
then deflated to 1991 prices using the ex-factory price index of industrial 
products. Deflated working capital is then added to the fixed capital stock to 
form the real capital stock.  
In constructing the proxy for technology transfer by FDI, the technology gap, 
relative factor intensity, and relative labour supply, the data from the UNIDO 
INTSTAT3 database, 2004, is applied. As China uses its own national economy 
industry classification method and UNIDO uses ISIC, we must first reconcile 
these two industry classifications. Table 3.2 presents the match between China’s 
industry classification and the ISIC 3 digit classification. All data that come from 
the UNIDO INTSTAT3 database, such as the value of output, value added, and 
gross fixed capital formation, are deflated to the 1995 price before using them to 
construct the above four variables, by using the producer price index obtained 
from the International Financial Statistics, 2004. The data from the UNIDO 
                                                 
15 The number of working hours better captures the labour inputs.  
16 Even though the 1998 FDI series is not available, other series such as the original value of fixed assets 
and working capital in 1998 are still available. Hence the construction of real capital stock is not affected by 
the unavailability of 1998 FDI series. 
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INSTAT3 database are two-year lagged, reflecting the possibility that technology 
brought by FDI is lagged, and are summed over 13 countries and regions, namely 
Hong Kong, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Australia, Malaysia, Italy, and Indonesia. This 
summation is able to represent the FDI inflow in China as the inflow from these 
13 countries and regions accounts for over 70 per cent of total FDI inflow into 
China since 1995. This helps us ameliorate the impact of ‘round-tripping’ FDI, as 
discussed above. 
The proxy for technology transfer by FDI is computed according to the formula 
w
wf AK
DA = , where fA  denotes technology transfer by FDI, D denotes the total 
assets of FDI invested enterprises, wK  denotes the world gross fixed capital 
formation, and wA  is the world labour productivity. This formula relates the FDI 
technology transfer with the world labour productivity, which is scaled down by 
the ratio of total assets of FDI invested enterprises to world gross fixed capital 
formation. The advantage of using this proxy is that it alleviates the impact of 
‘round-tripping’ FDI by excluding regions that are potential destination of 
‘round-tripping’ FDI in calculating the world labour productivity. 
The technology gap is proxied by the ratio of world labour productivity to labour 
productivity in China. The relative factor intensity is the ratio of the fixed capital 
stock per worker in China to the world fixed capital stock per worker. The 
UNIDO INTSTAT3 database provides the data of gross fixed capital formation, 
which is deflated and summed to compute the fixed capital stock, assuming the 
deflated value of gross fixed capital formation in the initial period to be the fixed 
capital stock in that period. The relative labour supply is the ratio of the number 
of employees in China to that of the world. 
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Table 3.2 Match of Industries 
  China Classification ISIC Code UNIDO Classification 
1 Food Processing, and Food 
Manufacturing                          
311 Food products 
2 Beverage Manufacturing                 313 Beverages 
3 Tobacco Processing                         314 Tobacco 
4 Textile Industry                               321 Textiles 
5 Garments and Other Fiber 
Products               
322 Wearing apparel, except 
footwear 
6 Leather, Furs, Down and Related 
Products        
323 Leather products 
7 Timber Processing, Bamboo, 
Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw 
Products 
331 Wood products, except 
furniture 
8 Furniture Manufacturing                  332 Furniture, except metal 
9 Papermaking and Paper Products    341 Paper and products 
10 Printing and Record Medium 
Reproduction         
342 Printing and publishing 
11 Stationery, Educational and 
Sports Goods 
390 Other Manufacturing, 
including manufacturing of 
musical instruments, sporting 
and athletic goods 
12 Petroleum Processing and Coking   353 Petroleum refineries 
13 Raw Chemical Materials and 
Chemical Products, Chemical 
Fibers, and Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Products 
351 
352 
Industrial chemicals  
Other chemicals 
14 Rubber Products                               355 Rubber products 
15 Plastic Products                               356 Plastic products 
16 Nonmetal Mineral Products             369 Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
17 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous 
Metals         
371 Iron and steel 
18 Smelting and Pressing of 
Nonferrous Metals      
372 Non-ferrous metals 
19 Metal Products                                 381 Fabricated metal products 
20 Ordinary Machinery, and 
Instruments, Meters, Cultural and 
Official Machinery                         
382 Machinery, except electrical 
21 Special Purpose Equipment             385 Professional & scientific 
equipment 
22 Transport Equipment                       384 Transport equipment 
23 Electric Equipment and 
Machinery, and Electronic and 
Telecommunications                        
383 Machinery, electric 
Source: Author’s match based on China national industry classification and the International 
Standard Industrial Classification. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics for variables used in the regression 
analysis. We can see that the sample mean for the log value of technology gap, 
relative factor intensity, and relative labour supply are all positive, indicating that 
the world has a higher technology level, proxied by labour productivity, and a 
higher capital labour ratio and labour supply, which satisfied the test of 
reasonableness.  
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
ln(value added) 184 6.05  1.19  3.15  9.17  
ln(capital) 184 7.10  0.99  4.84  9.26  
ln(labour) 184 4.78  0.92  2.73  6.51  
ln(technology transfer) 184 3.28  1.07  1.13  6.85  
ln(technology gap) 184 0.66  1.03  -4.34  2.56  
ln(relative factor intensity) 184 0.21  1.06  -2.90  2.58  
ln(relative labour supply) 184 0.17  1.15  -2.29  3.79  
Source: constructed from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues, and UNIDO 
INDSTAT Database 2004 
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Estimation Strategy  
To estimate equation (3.4), we first assume FDI inflow in China is exogenous, 
and then apply the fixed effect and random effect estimators. However, it is 
likely that the idiosyncratic error terms in equation (3.4) are serially correlated. 
To check this, the Wooldridge (2002) test for AR(1) autocorrelation is adopted. 
The Wooldridge test regresses the residuals, obtained from the regression of the 
first-differenced variables, against their one-period lag, and under the null 
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error terms the coefficient 
estimated is -0.5. The test statistic is the usual t statistic on the estimated 
coefficient. Drukker (2003) shows that this test has good size and power 
properties in reasonable sample sizes. In our test, the test statistic is 0.008 with a 
p-value of 0.93, and hence we conclude that there is no first order autocorrelation 
at the 5 per cent significance level.  
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The dependent variable in equation (3.4) is the value added in the industry, 
which is very different across industries in the manufacturing sector. Hence it 
appears that there is a potential heteroskedasticity problem. To test for this, a 
procedure suggested by Wiggins and Poi (2003) is adopted. First, the equation 
(3.4) is estimated using an iterated GLS estimator by allowing for panel-level 
heteroskedasticity and by assuming homoskedasticity respectively. Then these 
two estimations are compared with each other to see whether there is a 
significant difference. The likelihood ratio test can be adopted to test this as the 
estimation assuming homoskedasticity is nested within the estimation allowing 
for panel-level heteroskedasticity. The test statistic we obtained, which is chi-
square distributed with degree of freedom of 22, is 115.73 with a p-value of 0. 
Hence we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 5 per cent 
significance level. In the fixed effect estimation, we also conduct a modified 
Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity, and obtained a test statistic of 
5601.92 with a p-value of 0. Hence at the 5 per cent significance level we reject 
the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  
Assuming the exogeneity of FDI, equation (3.4) is estimated using the fixed 
effect estimator and random effect estimator separately, with robust standard 
errors computed to account for heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form. In the fixed 
effect estimation, the F test statistic for the significance of fixed effect, namely 
the joint significance of industry dummies, is 6.72 with a p-value of 0, which 
rejects the null hypothesis of no fixed effects. For the fixed effect and random 
effect estimator, if the fixed effects (or the unobserved industry heterogeneity) 
are uncorrelated with the regressors, then the random effect estimator is more 
efficient than the fixed effect estimator, however if they are correlated the 
random effect estimator will be inconsistent. Under the assumption of 
conditional homoskedasticity and no autocorrelation, this can be tested by 
carrying out the Hausman test. Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity which is 
accommodated by computing the robust standard errors, the Hausman test is 
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invalid. To determine whether the fixed effect estimator or the random effect 
estimator is appropriate, we conduct an ‘omitted variables’ version of the 
Hausman test, which is asymptotically equivalent to the Hausman test. We first 
compute the time demeaned explanatory variables, the quasi-time demeaned 
explanatory variables and dependent variable, and then regress the quasi-time 
demeaned dependent variable against both the time demeaned and quasi-time 
demeaned explanatory variables. Under the null hypothesis that the fixed effects 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, namely the random effect 
estimator is appropriate, the coefficients of time demeaned explanatory variables 
shall be jointly insignificant, that is, if the random effect estimator is appropriate, 
the time de-meaned explanatory variables shall have no explanatory power. 
Hence a joint significance of the coefficients will reject the random effect 
estimator in favour of the fixed effect estimator. The F statistic for the joint 
significance of the time demeaned explanatory variables in our test is 13.12 with 
a p-value of 0. Hence we conclude that the fixed effect estimator is appropriate at 
the 5 per cent significance level.  
Up to this point, FDI is assumed to be exogenous. However, it is possible that 
FDI is endogenous in equation (3.4), which will make the fixed effect (FE) 
estimation inconsistent and biased. The endogeneity problem can occur if there is 
reverse causality, for example FDI tends to flow into industries that are growing 
more quickly, or FDI is correlated with some unobserved and uncontrolled 
factors that also have impact on the industry’s output, for example the Chinese 
government’s industrial policy may cause FDI to self-select into faster growing 
industries. This kind of endogeneity of FDI will make the three terms, 
itfit rAA loglog × , itfit rKA loglog × , and itfit rLA loglog × , correlate with the 
idiosyncratic error term in equation (3.4), which can not be eliminated by the 
panel data estimation technique. Hence, with the endogeneity of FDI, our 
estimation using FE estimator will be biased and inconsistent. To resolve the 
endogeneity problem of FDI, we employ the instrumental variable (IV) estimator. 
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The key point of an IV estimator is to identify the instrument of FDI that is 
correlated with FDI (the relevance of instruments) and uncorrelated with the 
error term (the validity of instruments). Conventionally, the lagged endogenous 
variable is a good instrument. So in our IV estimation, we use the one-period 
lagged fitAlog , which is interacted with itrAlog  (the log of technology gap), 
itrKlog   (the log of relative factor intensity), and itrLlog  (the log of relative 
labour supply), and the number of firms in the industry as the instruments.  
The IV estimation is carried out using Schaffer’s (2007) procedure. In the 
estimation, we first test the relevance and validity of instruments. As discussed in 
Baum et al. (2003), the relevance of instruments can be tested by examining the 
fit of the first stage regressions, for which there are three statistics, namely the 
Bound et al. (1995) partial 2R , the Shea (1997) partial 2R , and the F statistic for 
joint significance of the lagged variables and the number of firms. Table 3.4 
presents the test statistics, which confirms that the instruments are all relevant as 
both the 2R  are high and the F statistics are significant. For the validity of 
instruments (overidentifying restriction), as we have more excluded instruments 
than endogenous variables, we are able to test it using Hansen’s (1982) J statistic, 
which is asymptotically chi-square distributed with degrees of freedom equal to 
the number of overidentifying restrictions. The J statistic is 1.441 with a p-value 
of 0.2299. Hence we conclude the instruments are valid at the 5 per cent 
significance level. 
Table 3.4 Test for Relevance of Instruments 
Endogenous Variables Shea Partial 2R  
Bound et. al. 
Partial 2R  
F(4,   
107) P-value
ln(technology transfer) 
×ln(technology gap) 0.81 0.8133 30.19 0 
ln(technology transfer) ×ln(relative 
labour supply) 0.5208 0.8108 33.3 0 
ln(technology transfer) ×ln(relative 
factor intensity) 0.5071 0.7858 34.69 0 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
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As we find evidence of heteroskedasticity in the estimations that assume FDI to 
be exogenous, it is reasonable to suspect the existence of heteroskedasticity in 
the IV estimation. The Pagan and Hall (1983) statistic is thus computed to test 
the heteroskedasticity. The statistic obtained is 60.6 with a p-value of 0.0005, and 
hence we reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 5 per cent 
significance level. Thus, the robust standard errors are computed in the IV 
estimator and the feasible efficient two-step GMM estimator which is more 
efficient than the IV estimator if there is heteroskedasticity (Baum et al., 2003).  
The last step in our estimation process is to determine whether the IV/GMM 
estimators or the FE estimator is more appropriate, which is done by an 
endogeneity test. The endogeneity test is carried out using the C statistic 
(Hayashi, 2000, Eichenbaum et al., 1988, discussed in Baum et al., 2003), which 
tests the orthogonality of endogenous variables and is chi-square distributed. The 
C statistic we obtain is 2.951 with a p-value of 0.3992, and hence we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of orthogonality of endogenous variables at the 5 per cent 
significance level, namely there is no endogeneity problem, which is consistent 
with the finding of Liu (2002). So we conclude the FE estimator is most 
appropriate to estimate equation (3.4). 
Testing for Existence of Technology Spillovers  
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results. Columns one to five are the coefficient 
estimations using the fixed effect (FE) estimator, feasible efficient two-step 
generalized method of moments (GMM) without instruments, instrumental 
variable (IV) estimator, feasible efficient two-step GMM estimator with 
instruments, FE estimator with the dependent variable (value added), the capital 
and labour being the industry average respectively. In general, the estimated 
coefficients are robust in the sense that most of the estimate is generally within 
one or two standard deviations of another estimate. Compared with the 
FE/IV/GMM estimations, the IV/GMM with instruments estimations get bigger 
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point estimate of coefficients of the relative labour supply and relative factor 
intensity terms and smaller point estimate of the coefficient of the technology 
gap terms. As explained in the above estimation strategy, we conclude that the 
FE estimation in the column one presents the most appropriate estimation of 
equation (3.4). Hence, the following test for existence of technology spillovers 
are based on the FE estimation in column one17.  
The estimated coefficients for the capital and labour inputs are both statistically 
significant (0.4164 for the capital input with t statistic of 2.58, 0.4818 for the 
labour input with t statistic of 2.85), and the magnitude is consistent with the 
findings of Chow (1993), Liu (2002), and Chow and Lin (2002). The coefficients 
for the nonlinear time trend are both individually significant (t statistics for the t 
and 2t  are 6.03 and -6.03 respectively) and jointly significant (F statistic is 18.25 
with a p-value of 0). The negative coefficient for 2t  and positive coefficient for t 
show an inverse U-shaped time trend, which implies that the manufacturing 
sector as a whole has experienced positive productivity growth after the capital, 
labour and FDI factors are conditioned out, but this exogenous productivity 
growth is subject to a decreasing pace.  
As described above, testing for the existence of technology spillovers from FDI 
follows two steps. First, test the joint significance of coefficients 1δ , 2δ , and 3δ . 
The F statistic obtained is 61.33 with a p-value of 0, which indicates the three 
coefficients are jointly significant at 5 per cent significance level. Second, plug 
the estimated coefficients 1δ , 2δ , and 3δ  in to equation (3.5), the technology 
transfer elasticity, and evaluate it at different industries’ value of technology gap, 
relative factor intensity, and relative labour supply in different periods. If this 
evaluated elasticity is positive, then the technology transfer by FDI has positive 
                                                 
17 In addition, compare the FE and GMM without instruments estimations, there is only a negligible 
difference. 
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impact on domestic productivity growth, namely there exist technology 
spillovers from FDI. Table 3.6 presents the obtained technology transfer 
elasticity across time and industries.  
In Table 3.6, a positive figure indicates the FDI has positive impact on domestic 
industry’s productivity, and hence there exists technology spillovers. In contrast, 
a negative figure shows the domestic industry actually suffers from the presence 
of FDI. Table 3.6 shows that most industries actually suffer from the presence of 
FDI. On average, the elasticity is -0.1114, which indicates that 1 per cent 
increase in the technology transfer by FDI will decrease domestic productivity by 
0.1114 per cent. Nevertheless, Table 3.6 also presents several interesting 
dynamic patterns on the impact of technology transfer by FDI. First, there are 
more and more industries that have a positive elasticity over time. In 1995, only 
one industry, namely the tobacco processing industry, has a positive elasticity. In 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, the number of industries with 
positive elasticities increases to 3, 3, 3, 4, 4, 7, and 20 respectively. Second, most 
industries’ elasticity is increasing over time (see Figure 3.3 for detail), which 
reflects the learning effect of domestic industries. Third, from 1999 to 2000, 
most industries’ elasticity decreases, except for the tobacco processing industry, 
the smelting and pressing of ferrous metals industry, the electric equipment, 
machinery, electronic and telecommunications industry, and the petroleum 
processing and coking industry. The decrease of elasticity in this year may come 
from the adverse impact of 1997-8 Asian financial crisis when the FDI inflow 
declined.  
The driving forces for our different estimates of technology transfer elasticity 
across different industries in different time periods are the technology gap, 
relative factor intensity, and relative labour supply. Our estimation confirms prior 
expectation. For the technology gap, the coefficient estimated is -0.2027 with a t 
statistic of -13.43, which is significant at the 5 per cent level and indicates that 
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for a 1 per cent increase in the technology gap the technology transfer elasticity 
will decrease by 0.2027 per cent. For relative factor intensity, the coefficient is 
0.052 with a t statistic of 1.7, which is significant at the 10 per cent level and 
indicates that a 1 per cent increase in the relative factor intensity will promote the 
elasticity by 0.052 per cent. For the relative labour supply, our estimation shows 
it has positive and significant impact on the elasticity, with 1 per cent increase in 
the relative labour supply promoting the elasticity by 0.0681 per cent. 
Discussion 
We test empirically for the technology spillovers of FDI and their determinants 
in China’s 23 industries from 1995 to 2003. As distinct from previous studies, we 
allow for the FDI’s impact on domestic industries to vary across time and 
industries. We find that for most of the time FDI inflow in China has a negative 
impact on domestic industries’ productivity, which may be caused by the 
competition effect from FDI. However as time goes by domestic industries 
benefit more and more from the presence of FDI. In 2003, 20 out of all the 23 
industries benefit from the presence of FDI. We also confirm that the technology 
gap and relative factor intensity play a negative/positive role in the happening of 
spillovers respectively.  
Is this result driven by the aggregation of industry level data? To find out 
whether our result is sensitive to aggregation problems, we re-estimate equation 
(3.4) by FE estimator using a dependent variable of log of average industrial 
value added which is equal to value added divided by the number of firms in the 
industry, the log of average industrial capital and labour inputs which are equal 
to the capital and labour inputs divided by the number of firms in the industry 
respectively. Column (5) of Table 3.5 presents the estimation results. Compared 
with column (1), the capital and labour coefficients are smaller, but are still 
within a reasonable range. For the three interaction terms of technology transfer, 
the estimated coefficients display no significant difference in the sense that they 
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are within one standard deviation of each other. The evaluated elasticity is 
presented in Table 3.7 and Figure 3.4, which shows no difference compared with 
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3. Hence we conclude our estimation result is robust to 
the data aggregation. 
In equation (3.2), domestic technology accumulation in the industry is only 
affected by FDI flowing into the industry, not by FDI that flows into the other 
industries. This means that we are only testing intra-industry technology 
spillovers of FDI, not inter-industry technology spillovers. Besides, we are also 
not able to distinguish horizontal FDI and vertical FDI. For these two types of 
FDI, the FDI invested firms will have different power of technology control and 
in turn will generate different magnitude of spillovers.   
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have tried to estimate the technology spillover effect of FDI in 
China and its determinants with an eight-year balanced industry level panel data 
set. To do so, we first proposed an analytical framework from which the 
empirical model is derived and estimated. Unlike previous studies, our study 
allows for the impact of FDI to vary across time and industries, and moreover we 
are able to empirically test the determinants by further decomposing the spillover 
parameter in equation (2) into three general factors: the technology gap, relative 
factor intensity, and relative labour supply. 
Our empirical estimations find that the FDI inflow in China in different 
industries generates different effects on domestic industries’ productivity. On 
average FDI exerts a negative impact on domestic industry, and for a 1 per cent 
increase in the technology transfer by FDI, domestic industries’ productivity will 
decrease by 0.1114 per cent. However, domestic industries are doing better and 
better over time, either because domestic industries learn to handle the challenge 
of FDI or because the competition effect from FDI lessens as industries 
consolidate. In 1995 only one industry benefits from the presence of FDI, while 
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in 2003 there are 20 industries that benefit from the presence of FDI. Moreover 
even for industries that never benefit from the presence of FDI over the sample 
periods, the negative impact from FDI gets smaller and smaller. The finding that 
different industries benefit differently from the presence of FDI hints at the 
possibility of designing specific industrial policy for attracting FDI that suits the 
specific requirements of different industries in China. We also test the 
determinants of technology spillovers of FDI, and find the technology gap plays 
a negative role in the occurrence of technology spillovers, relative factor 
intensity plays a positive role, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation, 
and the relative labour supply plays a positive role. 
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Table 3.5 Estimation Results 
Variables  (1)FE (2)GMM (3)IV (4)GMM (5)FE 
ln(technology transfer) 
×ln(technology gap) 
1δ  -0.2027 
(0.0151) 
-0.2027  
(0.0148) 
-0.2337  
(0.0322)  
-0.2271  
(0.0318)  
-0.2018  
(0.0133)  
ln(technology transfer)  
×ln(relative factor 
 intensity) 
2δ  0.052* 
(0.0305) 
0.052* 
(0.0299) 
0.1353*  
(0.0708)  
0.1337*  
(0.0708)  
0.0436**  
(0.0296)  
ln(technology transfer)  
×ln(relative labour 
 supply) 
3δ  0.0681  
(0.03) 
0.0681  
(0.0293) 
0.1389  
(0.06) 
0.1429  
(0.0599)  
0.0626  
(0.0273)  
ln(capital) 1β  0.4164  
(0.1614) 
0.4164  
(0.1578) 
0.3768  
(0.1749)  
0.4056  
(0.1732)  
0.3696  
(0.1235)  
ln(labour) 2β  0.4818  
(0.1688) 
0.4818  
(0.1651) 
0.5063  
(0.235)  
0.5122  
(0.2349)  
0.3324  
(0.1461)  
t λ  114.3869 
(18.9828) 
114.3871 
(18.5516)
144.0401 
(35.9258)
153.2507 
(35.0973) 
136.812 
(19.2635) 
2t  γ  -0.0286  
(0.0047) 
-0.0286  
(0.0046) 
-0.036 
(0.009) 
-0.0383 
(0.0088) 
-0.0342 
(0.0048) 
constant  -114295.2 
(18987.07)
no no no -136746.4 
(19265.13)
Wooldridge Test for 
AR(1) Autocorrelation 
 0.008 
[0.9312] 
0.008 
[0.9312] 
n.a. n.a. 0.010 
[0.9232] 
Test for Instrument 
Validity 
(Hansen’s J statistic) 
 n.a. n.a. 1.441 
[0.2299] 
1.441 
[0.2299] 
n.a. 
Endogeneity Test 
(C statistic) 
 
 
n.a. n.a. 2.951 
[0.3992] 
2.951 
[0.3992] 
n.a. 
R-square  0.84 0.813 0.78 0.784 0.87 
Sample Size  184 184 138 138 184 
Note: The dependent variable is ln(value added in the industry); the proxy for technology transfer enters the 
estimation only through its interaction terms with the technology gap, relative factor intensity, and relative 
labour supply. However if the proxy itself is included in the estimation, the estimated coefficients do not 
change significantly and the coefficient for the proxy itself is insignificant; all figures are rounded at 4-digit 
level; figures in the bracket are the robust standard errors; figures in the square bracket are the p-values; * 
denotes significance at 10 per cent level; ** denotes the p-value being 0.143; Column (1) is the fixed effect 
estimator; Column (2) is the feasible efficient two-step GMM estimator which is estimated with no 
instruments used and is more efficient in the presence of heteroskedasticity; Column (3) and (4) are the 
instrument variable estimator and GMM estimator respectively, which uses one-period lagged proxy of 
technology transfer and number of firms in the industry as instruments; Column (5) is the fixed effect 
estimator in which the dependent variable is ln(average value added in the industry) and the capital and labour 
are also the industry average. 
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Table 3.6 Technology Transfer Elasticity of FDI 
ID Industry 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Food Processing, and Food Manufacturing                          -0.2651  -0.2162  -0.2019  -0.1392  -0.2502  -0.1983  -0.0326  0.1906  
2 Beverage Manufacturing                          -0.2747  -0.2787  -0.2650  -0.1968  -0.2449  -0.2210  -0.1326  0.0575  
3 Tobacco Processing                              0.1168  0.1680  0.2246  -0.0421  0.5810  0.6124  0.9662  0.6997  
4 Textile Industry                                -0.1309  -0.0937  -0.0938  -0.0470  -0.1214  -0.1042  -0.0156  0.2081  
5 Garments and Other Fiber Products               -0.0339  0.0506  0.0423  0.0382  -0.1172  -0.0915  -0.0396  0.2657  
6 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products        -0.0004  0.0468  0.0316  0.0806  -0.0706  -0.0390  0.0079  0.0800  
7 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products -0.2561  -0.1677  -0.1373  -0.1161  -0.2906  -0.2320  -0.1507  0.2011  
8 Furniture Manufacturing                         -0.2265  -0.1385  -0.1287  -0.1214  -0.3117  -0.2475  -0.1410  0.1678  
9 Papermaking and Paper Products                  -0.3647  -0.2881  -0.3158  -0.1784  -0.3137  -0.2686  -0.1258  0.1401  
10 Printing and Record Medium Reproduction         -0.4510  -0.3731  -0.3624  -0.2540  -0.5819  -0.4952  -0.4321  0.0185  
11 Stationery, Educational and Sports Goods -0.1992  -0.1314  -0.1306  -0.1023  -0.2846  -0.2339  -0.1862  0.1206  
12 Petroleum Processing and Coking                 -0.3095  -0.4383  -0.4630  -0.3087  0.2340  0.2088  0.3120  -0.1302  
13 Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products, Chemical Fibers, and Medical and Pharmaceutical Products -0.3757  -0.3030  -0.3078  -0.2065  -0.2369  -0.2359  -0.1009  0.2284  
14 Rubber Products                                 -0.2677  -0.1494  -0.1288  -0.0836  -0.2029  -0.1342  -0.0084  0.3350  
15 Plastic Products                                -0.2774  -0.1617  -0.1496  -0.0468  -0.2421  -0.1930  -0.1130  0.1998  
16 Nonmetal Mineral Products                       -0.1901  -0.1569  -0.1633  -0.1147  -0.3354  -0.3023  -0.2210  -0.0492  
17 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals         -0.2004  -0.2459  -0.2693  -0.1744  0.0521  0.1223  0.2009  0.0949  
18 Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals      -0.1987  -0.1974  -0.2145  -0.0860  -0.0460  -0.0242  0.0558  0.1930  
19 Metal Products                                  -0.2979  -0.2094  -0.2124  -0.1068  -0.3027  -0.2637  -0.1833  0.0968  
20 Ordinary Machinery, and Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Official Machinery                          -0.4081  -0.3524  -0.3242  -0.2105  -0.3671  -0.3238  -0.2463  -0.0241  
21 Special Purpose Equipment                       -0.3249  -0.2704  -0.2730  -0.2049  -0.3804  -0.3420  -0.1709  0.0727  
22 Transport Equipment                             -0.3419  -0.2684  -0.2704  -0.1705  -0.1793  -0.1117  0.0596  0.2109  
23 Electric Equipment and Machinery, and Electronic and Telecommunications                             -0.2798  -0.1698  -0.1347  0.0508  0.1225  0.1779  0.2404  0.1988  
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Table 3.7 Technology Transfer Elasticity of FDI for Sensitivity Analysis 
ID Industry 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1 Food Processing, and Food Manufacturing             -0.2651  -0.2162  -0.2019  -0.1392  -0.2502  -0.1983  -0.0326  0.1906  
2 Beverage Manufacturing                          -0.2747  -0.2787  -0.2650  -0.1968  -0.2449  -0.2210  -0.1326  0.0575  
3 Tobacco Processing                              0.1168  0.1680  0.2246  -0.0421  0.5810  0.6124  0.9662  0.6997  
4 Textile Industry                                -0.1309  -0.0937  -0.0938  -0.0470  -0.1214  -0.1042  -0.0156  0.2081  
5 Garments and Other Fiber Products               -0.0339  0.0506  0.0423  0.0382  -0.1172  -0.0915  -0.0396  0.2657  
6 Leather, Furs, Down and Related Products        -0.0004  0.0468  0.0316  0.0806  -0.0706  -0.0390  0.0079  0.0800  
7 Timber Processing, Bamboo, Cane, Palm Fiber and Straw Products -0.2561  -0.1677  -0.1373  -0.1161  -0.2906  -0.2320  -0.1507  0.2011  
8 Furniture Manufacturing                         -0.2265  -0.1385  -0.1287  -0.1214  -0.3117  -0.2475  -0.1410  0.1678  
9 Papermaking and Paper Products                  -0.3647  -0.2881  -0.3158  -0.1784  -0.3137  -0.2686  -0.1258  0.1401  
10 Printing and Record Medium Reproduction         -0.4510  -0.3731  -0.3624  -0.2540  -0.5819  -0.4952  -0.4321  0.0185  
11 Stationery, Educational and Sports Goods -0.1992  -0.1314  -0.1306  -0.1023  -0.2846  -0.2339  -0.1862  0.1206  
12 Petroleum Processing and Coking                 -0.3095  -0.4383  -0.4630  -0.3087  0.2340  0.2088  0.3120  -0.1302  
13 
Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products, 
Chemical Fibers, and Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Products 
-0.3757  -0.3030  -0.3078  -0.2065  -0.2369  -0.2359  -0.1009  0.2284  
14 Rubber Products                                 -0.2677  -0.1494  -0.1288  -0.0836  -0.2029  -0.1342  -0.0084  0.3350  
15 Plastic Products                                -0.2774  -0.1617  -0.1496  -0.0468  -0.2421  -0.1930  -0.1130  0.1998  
16 Nonmetal Mineral Products                       -0.1901  -0.1569  -0.1633  -0.1147  -0.3354  -0.3023  -0.2210  -0.0492  
17 Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals         -0.2004  -0.2459  -0.2693  -0.1744  0.0521  0.1223  0.2009  0.0949  
18 Smelting and Pressing of Nonferrous Metals      -0.1987  -0.1974  -0.2145  -0.0860  -0.0460  -0.0242  0.0558  0.1930  
19 Metal Products                                  -0.2979  -0.2094  -0.2124  -0.1068  -0.3027  -0.2637  -0.1833  0.0968  
20 Ordinary Machinery, and Instruments, Meters, Cultural and Official Machinery                          -0.4081  -0.3524  -0.3242  -0.2105  -0.3671  -0.3238  -0.2463  -0.0241  
21 Special Purpose Equipment                       -0.3249  -0.2704  -0.2730  -0.2049  -0.3804  -0.3420  -0.1709  0.0727  
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22 Transport Equipment                             -0.3419  -0.2684  -0.2704  -0.1705  -0.1793  -0.1117  0.0596  0.2109  
23 Electric Equipment and Machinery, and Electronic and Telecommunications                        -0.2798  -0.1698  -0.1347  0.0508  0.1225  0.1779  0.2404  0.1988  
Note: Elasticity computed from the regression where the average value added, average capital stock, and average labour. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66
Figure 3.3 Evaluated Technology Transfer Elasticity 
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Figure 3.4 Evaluated Technology Transfer Elasticity for Sensitivity Analysis 
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4. Technology Spillovers: Firm Level Evidence 
Over the period from 1995 to 2003, Chinese domestic industries appear to have 
become better and better at benefiting from the presence of FDI. In 2003, 20 out of 
the 23 industrial sectors identified in this study benefited from FDI, that is, they 
experienced positive technology spillovers from FDI. In Chapter 3, the tests for 
technology spillovers of FDI were undertaken at an aggregate industry level, using 
an eight year balanced panel data, and it was found that the marginal impact from 
FDI on domestic industry’s productivity varies across both time and industries. But 
the analysis in Chapter 3 is highly aggregated. What happens if we analyse the 
relationship between FDI and spillovers at a more disaggregated level? As shown by 
Caballero and Lyons (1989), spillovers at a lower level of aggregation can be 
internalised at a higher level of aggregation. Hence we will expect to find more 
evidence of spillovers at lower level of aggregation. This chapter thus aims at testing 
technology spillovers from FDI at a firm level, using a comprehensive firm level 
micro-data set in the Chinese manufacturing sector for 2003.  
The chapter is composed of five sections. The following section discusses the 
presence of FDI in the manufacturing sector and the distribution of firm productivity, 
which gives background knowledge for the subsequent empirical modelling. Then 
we present the empirical model, in which a simultaneous equation model is set up, to 
accommodate for the potential endogeneity of FDI, and construct variables used in 
the estimation. The last two sections present the findings from empirical modelling, 
and conclude the chapter. 
FDI and Firm Productivity in the Manufacturing Sector 
The data set used in this chapter is a cross-sectional firm level micro-data from the 
Enterprise Data, National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing, which covers 181,188 firms 
in the manufacturing sector in China in 2003.  From this data set, we construct the 
FDI measurement and calculate firm productivity. 
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FDI measured in terms of foreign presence 
Conventionally, as discussed earlier, there are three proxies for measuring the 
activities of FDI in domestic industries, namely the share of FDI invested firms’ 
output/employees/assets in the domestic industry, as follows: 
∑
∑
∈
∈=
Jj
j
Ii
i
x
x
fp  
where fp denotes foreign presence, x denotes a firm’s output/employees/assets, I 
denotes the set of FDI invested firms in the industry, J denotes the set of all firms in 
the industry, and JI ⊂ . In the following, we use fpe/fpa/fpo to denote the 
employment/assets/output share foreign presence respectively. 
Each of these three measurements has its own pitfalls. It is argued that FDI invested 
firms are usually more capital intensive than their domestic counterparts and hence 
that the employment share will under-represent the true scale of FDI activity. The 
assets share is sensitive to host country’s ownership restrictions (Kohpaiboon, 2006). 
Since the output share is an output measurement of FDI, it is thought to be more 
appropriate to use the input measurements of FDI, such as the employment share, in 
testing the technology spillovers (Caves, 1974). In recognition of these pitfalls, all 
three measurements are used in this chapter, the interpretation in which is based on 
the employment share with the other two measurements serving as sensitivity 
comparisons18. 
Table 4.1 presents FDI in the manufacturing sector measured by the three proxies of 
foreign presence we have identified at the two-digit industry level.  Several 
observations can be made from the results in the table. FDI has a significant 
presence in the manufacturing sector in China. On average, FDI invested firms 
account for 28 per cent of total employment, 36 per cent of total assets, and 34 per 
cent of total output in the industry. However, the distribution of FDI across 
                                                 
18  In the subsequent empirical exercise, we find that estimations using the three measurements of FDI 
respectively exhibit little variation and hence the interpretation based on the employment share will be the same 
as those based on the other two measurements. 
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industries is uneven. Some industries have very high foreign presence.  For example, 
the nuclear radiation processing industry in the two-digit ‘crafts and other products 
manufacturing industry’ has a foreign presence of 100 per cent as the industry only 
has one FDI invested firm and the container manufacturing industry in the two-digit 
‘fabricated metal products industry’ has a foreign presence higher than over 90 per 
cent, and is an industry in which there are 55 firms. In contrast, some industries have 
rather low foreign presence. For example, in the two-digit tobacco industry, which 
has 255 firms, foreign presence is lower than 4 per cent. The uneven distribution of 
FDI in different industries comes from two sources. First, the government’s industry 
policy, which classifies industries into those which are encouraged, allowed, 
restricted, and prohibited, making in likely that FDI will self-select industries that 
are encouraged and allowed. Second, in addition to the self-selection caused by 
government industry policy, it is also possible that FDI itself will tend to flow into 
industries with some characteristics, such as industries with higher productivity. 
These two factors may raise a potential endogeneity problem in testing the 
technology spillover effects of FDI19.  
Comparing the three proxies, we find that there are some industries where all three 
proxies give very similar measurements.  For example, in the textile garments, shoes 
and hats manufacturing industry the average foreign presence is 52/52/53 per cent 
respectively. However, there are also industries in which the three proxies are quite 
different.  For example, in the waste resources and recycling materials processing 
industry, fpa is over three times the value of fpe. In addition, quite often the proxy 
measured in terms of employee share is lower than the other two proxies, which 
reflects the fact that FDI invested firms are usually more capital intensive than their 
purely domestic counterparts.  
Ideally, we would expect all these three proxies to rank the industries consistently. 
For example, if one industry is ranked third in terms of output share, then it will be 
also ranked third in terms of both employee share and assets share. If this kind of 
                                                 
19 Edogeneity caused by the self-selection of FDI only occurs when the government’s industry policy is set 
according to the standard that industries with higher productivity are more likely to be classified as encouraged 
or allowed categories. 
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consistency is satisfied, then these would appear to be a reasonable set of proxies for 
foreign presence. From Table 4.1, it can be seen that the three proxies give similar 
measurement of foreign presence in that their mean and standard deviation are quite 
close to each other. In terms of ranking of average level of foreign presence, the 
ranking of fpo is consistent with that of fpa. However, the ranking of fpe is different 
(see Table 4.2).  
Distribution of firm productivity 
We use labour productivity to proxy for firm productivity. Conventionally, labour 
productivity is equal to value added divided by the number of employees. However, 
as there is a large stock of inventories, and hence the construction of value added 
will be distorted upwards (as the output that is stored as inventories will be taken 
into account in constructing value added and hence value added is exaggerated),  
sales per employee is used as a measurement of labour productivity (Chuang and 
Hsu, 2004). In 2003, the average inventory output ratio was as high as 77.2 per cent 
in the manufacturing sector.  
There is considerable variation in labour productivity across different firms. Average 
labour productivity is 280 thousand RMB/employee with a standard deviation of 917 
thousand RMB/employee. The highest labour productivity is 209,775 thousand 
RMB/employee, in the four-digit camera and equipment manufacturing industry 
(4153), and in contrast the lowest labour productivity is 0, which occurs either 
because of data collection error or indeed these firms are so weak to compete in the 
market that they simply cannot sell anything. Nevertheless even though there are 
1,696 such firms, they account for only a very small proportion of total firms (0.94 
per cent). Table 4.3 sets out productivity distribution across two-digit industries. It 
confirms that there is a big variation in firms’ labour productivity, and the big 
variation does not come from the fact that firms belong to different industries. Even 
in the same two-digit industry, some firms have much higher labour productivity 
than others. For example, in the food processing industry (13), the average labour 
productivity is 430 thousand RMB/employee with a standard deviation of 899 
thousand RMB/employee. The highest labour productivity is 66,883 thousand 
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RMB/employee, over 150 times that of average value, and in contrast the lowest 
labour productivity is 0.  
Figure 4.1 presents the density of the log of labour productivity, which is 
approximately symmetric around 5. Figure 4.2 presents a breakdown of the labour 
productivity distribution by firm ownership structure. It appears that the productivity 
distribution of privately owned firms is biased more to the right, compared with that 
of state and collectively owned firms, indicating that privately owned firms have 
higher labour productivity. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of two 
distributions also rejects the null of equal distribution with a test statistic of 0.1208 
and p-value of 0. In terms of regional difference, the distribution of labour 
productivity of firms located in coastal China is also different from those of firms in 
central and western China, indicating that firms located in coastal China are more 
likely to have higher labour productivity than their counterparts in central and 
western China.  If we compare the productivity distribution of domestic firms with 
that of FDI invested firms, they appear to be similar to each other (Figure 4.4). 
However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis that they are 
equal with a test statistic of 0.0329 and p-value of 0. 
In summary, we observe that there exists significant variation in firm labour 
productivity, and in addition firm labour productivity exhibits a significant 
difference by ownership structure and regions, which are two sets of control 
variables incorporated in the following empirical modelling.  
The Empirical Model 
We aim at testing whether FDI in China has a positive impact on domestic firms 
productivity. However, it is possible that FDI tends to flow into industries with 
higher productivity, and in the case of China the government’s FDI industry policy 
may also make FDI self-select into industries that happen to have higher 
productivity. In both cases FDI will be endogenous. Hence, in empirically testing 
technology spillovers of FDI, we need to account for the endogeneity of FDI. To 
address this issue, we set up a simple simultaneous equation model, as follows: 
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where lp denotes the labour productivity, proxied by sales per employee, kl denotes 
domestic firms’ capital intensity, ml denotes firms’ intermediate inputs per employee, 
lq denotes the labour quality, proxied by firms’ average wage, age is firms’ age, fp 
denotes foreign presence, scale is the industry’s scale economies, herfindahl is the 
Herfindahl index that captures domestic market structure, ownership is a dummy 
that takes a value of 1 if the firm is privately owned firm, middle and western are 
regional dummies that capture firms’ regional heterogeneity and take a value of 1 if 
the firm is located in central or western China respectively, idummies is a vector of 
29 two-digit industry dummies that capture firms’ industry heterogeneity and other 
possible omitted variables, dmkts denotes the domestic market size which is equal to 
the sum of firms’ domestic sale in the four-digit industries, ie is the industry export 
intensity which is equal to the four-digit industry ’s total exports divided by its total 
sales, and iuprodcst denotes the industry unit production cost which is equal to the 
four-digit industry’s total production cost divided by its total outputs. We intend to 
test the significance and sign of the coefficient of fp in equation (4.1). A 
significantly positive coefficient implies the FDI does have positive impact on 
domestic firms’ productivity.   
Equation (4.1) hypothesises that domestic firms’ labour productivity depends on 
their capital intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, labour quality, age, FDI, 
the scale of economies in the industry, domestic market structure, ownership 
structure, regional location, and industry heterogeneity. For capital intensity, we 
expect it to have a positive impact on domestic firms’ labour productivity. A firm 
with higher capital intensity is more capable of conducting R&D, an important 
factor that positively affects firms’ productivity but is not available in our data set. 
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The variable intermediate inputs per employee is expected to exert positive impact, 
as the higher the intermediate inputs per employee, the more output the firm will 
produce and hence the more sales the firm will make. Labour quality is expected to 
have a positive impact. Labour quality, measured by a firm’s average wage, is a 
proxy for a firms’ human capital, which should positively affect firm productivity.  
For firm age, the impact on firm labour productivity may be nonlinear. At an early 
age, the firm may be too young to be efficient and may remain inefficient until it 
learns to improve its efficiency. Then eventually the firm will become efficient as it 
gains enough experience. Hence the impact of firm age on efficiency may exhibit a 
U shape.  This nonlinearity is captured by the square term of age. Regarding foreign 
presence, which is the focus of the study, we expect it to affect a domestic firm’s 
labour productivity positively, as FDI invested firms’ technology transfer will 
possibly benefit domestic firms by imitation, labour mobility, and competition. In 
addition, most previous studies in China obtained positive technology spillovers 
from FDI.  
In regard to scale economies, as the scale of production increases, firms are usually 
more capable of reducing their cost and promoting their efficiency. Hence a positive 
impact is expected. For market structure, proxied by the Herfindahl index, there is 
no prior expectation about the sign of its coefficient. On the one hand, firms in a 
more concentrated market have less incentive to upgrade their technology and 
improve their efficiency, as they are not confronted with fierce market competition. 
But on the other hand, firms that have market power are usually bigger and hence 
more able to overcome the usually big fixed cost in R&D activities and adopt 
measures that will improve their efficiency, and can possibly enjoy a scale of 
economy, which may be not captured fully by the industry’s scale economies.  
For ownership structure, as discussed in previous section, the distribution of 
privately owned firm labour productivity is biased to the right compared with that of 
state and collectively owned firms (see Figure 4.2), and hence we expect the 
coefficient of ownership to be positive. For the regional dummies, middle and 
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western, the discussion in the previous section also shows that firms located in 
coastal China are more efficient than their counterparts in the central and western 
China (see Figure 4.3), and thus their coefficients are expected to be negative.  
In addition, the two regional dummies, together with the set of industry dummies, 
control different roles of export-oriented and market-oriented FDI in generating 
technology spillovers. FDI inflow in a host country can be broadly classified into 
two categories according to its objectives or motivation, namely export-oriented and 
market-oriented FDI, with the former targeting exports while the latter focuses on 
the domestic market in the host country. Hence these two types of FDI may generate 
quite different technology spillovers, and need to be differentiated in testing for 
spillovers. In China, export-oriented FDI is concentrated in certain industries 
(processing industries) and most of them are located in coastal China due to its 
proximity to international markets and the lower transportation costs involved in 
delivering output. The regional and industry dummies are intended to control for this. 
Equation (4.2) hypothesises that foreign presence depends on the domestic market 
size, industry’s export intensity, industry unit production cost, domestic firms’ 
labour productivity, regional dummies and a set of industry dummies. For export-
oriented FDI, the domestic industry’s export prospect is clearly an important factor 
that foreign firms consider in their decision on whether to enter the market. Better 
export prospects will attract more FDI inflow. The industry’s export prospects are 
captured by the industry export intensity, for which higher industry export intensity 
means better export prospects. Hence we expect the industry export intensity to have 
a positive impact on the foreign presence. Unlike export-oriented FDI, market-
oriented FDI aims at penetrating the domestic market, and hence in deciding 
whether to enter the market, domestic market size will be an important factor, and 
the bigger the domestic market is the more likely the FDI will flow in. We measure 
domestic market size as the sum of all firms’ domestic sales in the four-digit 
industry, and its coefficient is expected to be positive.  
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In addition to the domestic market size and industry export intensity, the domestic 
industry’s cost of production is another important factor that affects foreign firms’ 
entry decision. Particularly for China, which enjoys a name of ‘World Factory’, the 
low cost of production is one factor that attracts so many multinational enterprises, 
no matter whether they are export-oriented or market-oriented. An industry’s labour 
quality is another factor that affects the foreign presence. Compared with domestic 
counterparts, FDI invested firms are usually more capital intensive, and are likely to 
have higher skill requirements for their employees, for example they may require 
their employees to be able to speak English, and hence may flow into industries with 
better labour quality.  So we expect labour quality, proxied by the industry’s average 
wage, to have a positive impact on the foreign presence.   
Domestic firms’ labour productivity will have a positive impact on foreign presence 
if the FDI tends to flow into industries with higher productivity. Besides, it is also 
reasonable to assume that the foreign presence will display regional and industry 
heterogeneity, which is captured by the two regional dummies and 29 industry 
dummies. For the regional difference, we expect FDI will flow more into coastal 
China than central and western China, as coastal China is more developed. For 
industry heterogeneity, we expect they will be jointly significant, due to government 
industry policy that regulates the FDI inflow. 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) can be estimated by a three stage least square estimator 
(3SLS), which uses the instrumental variable approach and generalized least squares 
to obtain consistent estimation. At stage one, the reduced form of equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) is estimated, namely each endogenous variable (lnlp and fp here) is regressed 
against all exogenous variables, from which the predicted lnlp and fp are obtained. 
The predicted values of lnlp and fp are then used as instruments in estimating 
equation (4.1) and (4.2). Then at stage two, based on the residuals from estimating 
equations (4.1) and (4.2), a consistent estimate for the covariance matrix of the error 
terms in equations (4.1) and (4.2) is obtained. At stage three,  a generalized least 
squares estimation is made, using the estimated covariance matrix in stage two and 
the instruments obtained in stage one (Stata Corp., 2005) 
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Variable Construction 
Of the over 180,000 firms in the data set, there are 143,161 domestic firms, which 
are used in the estimation.  Here we describe how we construct the variables used in 
equations (4.1) and (4.2). 
Capital intensity is equal to domestic firm assets divided by the number of 
employees; the intermediate inputs per employee is equal to total intermediate inputs 
divided by the number of employees; labour quality is equal to total salaries payable 
divided by the number of employees; scale economies are defined as average of firm 
sales revenue relative to the minimum efficient scale of the industry, which in turn is 
equal to average sales revenue of firms with a market share bigger than 50 per cent 
(see Cory, 1981, Chuang and Hsu, 2004); the Herfindahl index, which captures the 
domestic market structure, is calculated at the four-digit industry level and equal to 
the sum of firms’ shares in the industry total sales squared; domestic market size is 
equal to sum of  domestic firm sales in the four-digit industry; industry export 
intensity is equal to total industry exports divided by total industry sales; the 
industry average wage is calculated as the industry’s total salaries payable divided 
by total number of employees; and industry unit production cost is equal to total 
industry production cost divided by total industry output. 
The ownership structure is a dummy variable, which is constructed from the type of 
firm registration, and takes a value of 1 if the firm is privately owned firm. Regional 
heterogeneity consists of two regional dummies, the variable western which takes a 
value of 1 if the firm is located in western China, and the variable middle which 
takes value of 1 if the firm is located in central China. Western China includes 
Chongqing City, Sichuan Province, Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province, Tibet 
Autonomous Zone, Shannxi Province, Gansu Province, Qinghai Province, Ningxia 
Autonomous Zone, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Zone, Xinjiang Autonomous Zone, 
and Guangxi Autonomous Zone. Central China includes Shanxi Province, Henan 
Province, Anhui Province, Jiangxi Province, Hunan Province, Hubei Province, Jilin 
Province, and Heilongjiang Province. The rest of China is classified as coastal 
region, including Beijing City, Tianjin City, Shanghai City, Liaoning Province, 
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Hebei Province, Shandong Province, Jiangsu Province, Zhejiang Province, Fujian 
Province, Guangdong Province, and Hainan Province. The industry dummies are 
constructed at two digit level (see Table 4.4).  
Table 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics of variables used in the estimation, and 
Table 4.6 reports the correlation among key variables. The top panel of Table 4.5 
reports the summary statistics for continuous variables, from which we can see that 
there are missing variables. The missing values come from two sources. One is that 
some firms report zero employment, which makes variables constructed by dividing 
the number of employees meaningless, and the second source is taking natural 
logarithm, which results in missing values if the natural logarithm is taken over zero. 
However, compared with the total sample size, the number of missing values is 
relatively small, and a further examination of observations in the sample shows that 
the missing values appear to be randomly distributed across industries. The bottom 
panel of Table 4.5 shows a summary of dummy variables, with the number 
indicating the percentage that the dummy variable takes a value of 1. For example, 
51.9 per cent of domestic firms are privately owned, 12 per cent of domestic firms 
are located in western China, and 19 per cent of domestic firms are located in central 
China. From Table 4.6, we can see the correlations among key variables are 
relatively small, indicating that the multicollinearity issue may not be a problem in 
our estimation20. 
Empirical Results 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are set up to capture the potential simultaneity between 
domestic firm labour productivity and FDI. However this simultaneity may not exist. 
Hence before estimating the model by 3SLS, we need to test whether the 
simultaneous equation model is appropriate or not. Following Geroski (1982), and 
also Li et al. (2001), we first estimate the reduced form equations in which the 
labour productivity and foreign presence, measured by the FDI invested firms’ 
employment share in the industry, are regressed against all exogenous variables 
respectively, and then plug the predicted residuals from the labour 
                                                 
20 Due to the large sample size, the estimation is very robust to the possible multicollinearity problem. 
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productivity/foreign presence estimation into the estimation of the foreign 
presence/labour productivity structural equation. If the residuals have significant 
impact, then it indicates that equations (4.1) and (4.2) are simultaneously determined. 
In the Geroski test, the coefficient of the residuals, predicted from the reduced form 
foreign presence equation estimation, is estimated to be -4.9432 with t-statistic of -
2.35 and p-value of 0.019 in the foreign presence structural equation estimation, and 
the coefficient of the residuals, predicted from the reduced form labour productivity 
equation estimation, is estimated to be -0.0105 with t-statistic of -15.73 and p-value 
of 0 in the labour productivity structural equation, which indicates that equations 
(4.1) and (4.2) are simultaneously determined and the simultaneous equation model 
is appropriate. 
For equations (4.1) and (4.2) to be estimated simultaneously, they need to be 
identifiable. One rule of thumb is that there need to be some exogenous variables 
that appear in equation (4.1) but not in equation (4.2) and vice versa. This condition 
is clearly satisfied in both equations. In addition, we also check whether the rank 
condition is satisfied for each equation in the two equation system, using a procedure 
proposed by Baum (2007).  Baum’s procedure checks whether the rank condition is 
satisfied for each of equations (4.1) and (4.2) and confirms that the two equation 
system is identified.  Then equations (4.1) and (4.2) are estimated using 3SLS 
procedure, and Table 4.7 presents the estimation results, in which employment share 
is used as a proxy for foreign presence. 
The labour productivity equation 
In the labour productivity equation estimates shown in Table 4.7, the sign and 
significance of most estimated coefficients are consistent with prior expectation. For 
capital intensity, we find it positively affects domestic firms’ labour productivity, 
with a 1 per cent increase in capital intensity leading to a 0.3901 per cent increase in 
labour productivity, confirming that firms that are more capital intensive are usually 
more efficient. For the intermediate inputs per employee, a 1 per cent increase in 
intermediate inputs results in a 0.0083 per cent increase in labour productivity, 
refecting the fact that more intermediate inputs usually mean more output and sales. 
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Labour quality also has a significantly positive impact on labour productivity, and a 
1 per cent increase in labour quality leads to a 0.3325 per cent increase in the labour 
productivity.  
Firms’ age has a nonlinear impact on the labour productivity. With the coefficient 
for age being significantly negative and the coefficient for squared age being 
significantly positive, the nonlinear impact exhibits a U shape. However the 
coefficient for squared age is much smaller than the absolute value of the coefficient 
of age, resulting in the turning point of the U shape being 283 years old, much older 
than the firm age in the sample. So for the firms in the data set, after controlling 
other factors that affect productivity, the older the firm is, the less efficient it is, 
possibly due to the fact that older firms are less willing to upgrade their technology 
and improve the efficiency than younger firms.  
For economies of scale and domestic market structure, both appear to affect 
domestic firms’ labour productivity positively, indicating that domestic firms enjoy 
economies of scale, even though the coefficient of scale economy is only significant 
at the 10 per cent level. For the ownership structure, the coefficient is significantly 
positive, indicating that privately owned firms are more efficient than state and 
collectively owned firms, confirming the finding of the previous section that 
productivity distribution of privately owned firms is biased to the right compared 
with that of state and collectively owned firms, even after controlling for other 
factors. For the two regional dummies, the coefficient of middle is insignificant, 
while in contrast the coefficient of western is significantly negative, which implies 
that firms located in western China are less efficient than their counterparts in 
central and coastal China. The industry dummies are jointly significant at the 1 per 
cent level, which controls the industry heterogeneity and other omitted variables.  
For the foreign presence -- the focus of our study, measured here by the FDI 
invested firms’ employment share in the four-digit industry -- the coefficient is 
significant and positive (5.7707 with a t statistic of 2.24 and p-value of 0.025), 
confirming that FDI in China does generate significantly positive technology 
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spillovers to domestic firms. A 1 per cent increase in the presence of FDI in the 
domestic industry will promote domestic firms’ labour productivity by 5.7707 per 
cent, an impressively substantial magnitude.  
The foreign presence equation 
The right-hand panel of Table 4.7 presents the estimation of the foreign presence 
equation (equation 4.2). For domestic market size, the coefficient is insignificant at 
the 10 per cent level, indicating that the domestic market size appears not to play a 
role in attracting the FDI inflow. However, the domestic industry’s export prospects 
do positively affect the entry decision of FDI. The estimated coefficient is 0.0045 
with a t statistic of 2.95 and p-value of 0.003, indicating that a 1 per cent increase in 
industry export intensity will lead to a 0.0045 per cent increase in the foreign 
presence. The coefficient for the industry average wage is significantly negative, 
surprisingly contradicting our prior expectation. However this may be explained by 
higher average wages being more likely to be offered in industries where the FDI 
entry is more difficult because of the government industry policy. For example, the 
average wage in the petroleum industry is high, but FDI is discouraged in this 
industry by government policy.  
The coefficient for industry unit production cost is positive and significant at the 10 
per cent level, again contradicting our prior expectation. This may be a consequence 
of MNE production costs being lowered through investing in China compared with 
costs at home, even when Chinese costs are driven up by the FDI. For the regional 
dummies, the coefficients for both middle and western are significantly negative. 
FDI tends to flow into Coastal China where the economy is more developed and the 
infrastructure is better than central and western China. The 29 industry dummies are 
jointly significant at the 1 per cent level, confirming the existence of industry 
heterogeneity and other potential omitted variables. Domestic firm labour 
productivity does positively affect foreign presence, indicating that FDI does tend to 
flow into industries with higher levels of labour productivity, which makes FDI 
endogenous. The estimated coefficient is 0.0104 with a t-statistic of 19.89 and p-
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value of 0.000, implying that a 1 per cent increase in domestic firms’ labour 
productivity will promote foreign presence by 0.0104 per cent. 
Sensitivity analysis 
Using the FDI invested firms’ employment share in the industry as the proxy for 
foreign presence, we have found that the FDI in domestic industry does generate 
positive technology spillovers to domestic firms, and that FDI also tends to flow into 
industries with higher domestic labour productivity. However, is the result sensitive 
to how we measure the foreign presence? To examine the robustness of the result, 
we re-estimated equations (4.1) and (4.2) using the assets and output share 
respectively as the measurement of foreign presence. 
In the two estimations, we first test the appropriateness of the simultaneous equation 
model, following the Geroski (1982) approach, and find that the residuals predicted 
from the reduced form equation estimations are significant when they are augmented 
into the structural equation estimation, indicating that the simultaneous equation 
model is appropriate. Then we test whether the system is fully identified by using 
Baum’s (2007) procedure, and find in both estimations that the system is fully 
identified. Then the 3SLS is applied to estimate the model. Tables 4.8 and 4.9 
present the estimation outputs, using the assets and output share as foreign presence 
respectively.  Comparing the three estimations (in Tables 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9), we can 
see that they are quite consistent with each other in the sense that the sign of 
estimated coefficients does not change and the magnitude of the coefficients are 
within one or two standard deviations of each other. For foreign presence in the 
labour productivity equation, the coefficient estimated in the three estimations is 
5.77, 5.98, and 6.3 respectively, which are all significant, positive, and within one 
standard deviation of each other. For domestic labour productivity in the foreign 
presence equation, the coefficient estimated in the three estimations is 0.01, 0.02, 
and 0.02 respectively, which are all significant and positive but there is more 
variation among them compared with the estimated coefficient of foreign presence 
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in the labour productivity equation. Hence, we can conclude that the result is robust 
to different measurements of foreign presence21. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we used a simultaneous equation model, which captures the potential 
endogeneity of the FDI inflow, to test the existence of technology spillovers from 
FDI. The simultaneous equation model was estimated over a comprehensive cross-
sectional firm level micro-data set that covers 181,188 firms in the manufacturing 
sector in China in 2003. The results suggest that FDI inflow into the manufacturing 
sector generates positive technology spillovers to domestic firms, with a 1 per cent 
increase in the presence of FDI in the domestic industry promoting domestic firms’ 
labour productivity by 5.7707 per cent. It is also found that FDI tends to flow into 
industries with higher labour productivity. In Chapter 3, we tested FDI’s technology 
spillovers at an industry level, and found that more and more domestic industries 
benefited from the presence of FDI from 1995 to 2003. In 2003, 20 out of all the 23 
industries benefited from the presence of FDI. This chapter confirms the importance 
of spillovers and we find substantial technology spillovers from the FDI at the firm 
level in 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21  So fortunately the ranking issue of the three measurements of foreign presence in the previous section is not 
problematic.  
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Table 4.1 Foreign Presence by Industries 
  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
13 Food processing industry  
fpo 11193 0.26 0.16 0.07  0.82  
fpe 11193 0.20 0.15 0.04  0.60  
fpa 11193 0.30 0.15 0.10  0.80  
14 Food manufacturing industry 
fpo 4636 0.40 0.16 0.10  0.76  
fpe 4636 0.29 0.12 0.13  0.53  
fpa 4636 0.40 0.16 0.17  0.71  
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 
fpo 3194 0.39 0.23 0.09  0.89  
fpe 3194 0.27 0.19 0.07  0.76  
fpa 3194 0.38 0.23 0.12  0.87  
16 Tobacco industry  
fpo 255 0.02 0.02 0.00  0.05  
fpe 255 0.04 0.04 0.01  0.10  
fpa 255 0.03 0.04 0.00  0.08  
17 Textile industry 
fpo 14863 0.32 0.14 0.10  0.56  
fpe 14863 0.27 0.15 0.03  0.54  
fpa 14863 0.35 0.15 0.12  0.65  
18 Textile garments, shoes and hats manufacturing  
fpo 9717 0.52 0.01 0.52  0.57  
fpe 9717 0.52 0.03 0.51  0.62  
fpa 9717 0.53 0.02 0.53  0.63  
19 Leather, fur, feathers (cashmere) and the apparel industry 
fpo 4518 0.54 0.10 0.32  0.71  
fpe 4518 0.57 0.15 0.25  0.73  
fpa 4518 0.58 0.10 0.37  0.75  
20 Timber processing and wood, bamboo, vines and brown grass-
products industry 
fpo 3501 0.28 0.13 0.07  0.44  
fpe 3501 0.23 0.11 0.02  0.43  
fpa 3501 0.36 0.14 0.09  0.64  
21 Furniture manufacturing 
fpo 2046 0.50 0.05 0.13  0.57  
fpe 2046 0.51 0.04 0.21  0.56  
fpa 2046 0.53 0.06 0.23  0.60  
22 Paper and paper products industry  
fpo 5570 0.35 0.06 0.12  0.54  
fpe 5570 0.23 0.08 0.10  0.39  
fpa 5570 0.41 0.08 0.08  0.58  
23 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
fpo 4084 0.35 0.09 0.23  0.49  
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fpe 4084 0.27 0.10 0.13  0.46  
fpa 4084 0.35 0.10 0.21  0.43  
24 Cultural, educational, sporting products manufacturing  
fpo 2516 0.59 0.14 0.01  0.91  
fpe 2516 0.61 0.16 0.00  0.92  
fpa 2516 0.65 0.15 0.01  0.80  
25 Oil processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing industry 
fpo 1323 0.13 0.07 0.00  0.20  
fpe 1323 0.10 0.05 0.00  0.14  
fpa 1323 0.17 0.10 0.00  0.26  
26 Chemical materials and chemical products industry 
fpo 13803 0.28 0.17 0.00  0.70  
fpe 13803 0.16 0.10 0.01  0.52  
fpa 13803 0.28 0.16 0.00  0.66  
27 Pharmaceutical industry  
fpo 4063 0.27 0.06 0.15  0.36  
fpe 4063 0.20 0.04 0.10  0.26  
fpa 4063 0.26 0.06 0.15  0.36  
28 Chemical fiber industry  
fpo 937 0.33 0.06 0.07  0.37  
fpe 937 0.25 0.06 0.05  0.30  
fpa 937 0.38 0.12 0.02  0.48  
29 Rubber products industry  
fpo 2016 0.37 0.10 0.09  0.47  
fpe 2016 0.32 0.14 0.08  0.56  
fpa 2016 0.42 0.12 0.12  0.56  
30 Plastic products industry 
fpo 8382 0.45 0.13 0.22  0.61  
fpe 8382 0.41 0.17 0.15  0.62  
fpa 8382 0.50 0.15 0.25  0.67  
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 
fpo 16245 0.18 0.09 0.03  0.51  
fpe 16245 0.11 0.08 0.01  0.45  
fpa 16245 0.22 0.10 0.07  0.60  
32 Smelting and rolling of ferrous metals industry  
fpo 4119 0.17 0.03 0.11  0.23  
fpe 4119 0.09 0.02 0.07  0.15  
fpa 4119 0.15 0.01 0.13  0.19  
33 Smelting and rolling of non-ferrous metals industry  
fpo 3367 0.18 0.09 0.00  0.29  
fpe 3367 0.12 0.07 0.00  0.26  
fpa 3367 0.20 0.12 0.00  0.39  
34 Fabricated metal products  
fpo 9746 0.33 0.12 0.01  0.92  
fpe 9746 0.27 0.13 0.04  0.93  
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fpa 9746 0.36 0.13 0.01  0.94  
35 General equipment manufacturing industry  
fpo 12546 0.26 0.13 0.06  0.67  
fpe 12546 0.18 0.09 0.04  0.48  
fpa 12546 0.29 0.12 0.05  0.69  
36 Specialized equipment manufacturing 
fpo 7129 0.24 0.17 0.01  0.75  
fpe 7129 0.16 0.14 0.00  0.48  
fpa 7129 0.23 0.18 0.00  0.76  
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing 
fpo 8281 0.33 0.17 0.00  0.83  
fpe 8281 0.19 0.11 0.00  0.87  
fpa 8281 0.32 0.16 0.00  0.89  
39 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing industry 
fpo 10400 0.40 0.14 0.22  0.74  
fpe 10400 0.36 0.14 0.13  0.74  
fpa 10400 0.40 0.16 0.16  0.70  
40 Communication equipment, computer and other electronic 
equipment manufacturing  
fpo 5857 0.75 0.17 0.20  0.92  
fpe 5857 0.66 0.15 0.07  0.87  
fpa 5857 0.66 0.17 0.06  0.92  
41 Instrumentation and cultural, office machinery manufacturing 
fpo 2515 0.50 0.22 0.00  0.97  
fpe 2515 0.39 0.23 0.00  0.88  
fpa 2515 0.42 0.24 0.00  0.91  
42 Crafts and other products manufacturing industries  
fpo 4259 0.42 0.11 0.20  1.00  
fpe 4259 0.46 0.14 0.14  1.00  
fpa 4259 0.46 0.12 0.23  1.00  
43 Waste resources and recycling materials processing industry 
fpo 107 0.20 0.02 0.17  0.21  
fpe 107 0.08 0.02 0.07  0.12  
fpa 107 0.31 0.07 0.22  0.36  
Note: fpo/fpe/fpa denotes foreign presence measured in terms of 
output/employee/assets share. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
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Table 4.2 Ranking Consistency of Three FDI Proxies 
Industry Code fpo rank (fpo) fpe Rank (fpe) fpa Rank (fpa) 
40  0.75 1 0.66 1 0.66 1  
24  0.59 2 0.61 2 0.65 2  
19  0.54 3 0.57 3 0.58 3  
21  0.50 4 0.51 5 0.53 4  
18  0.52 5 0.52 4 0.53 5  
30  0.45 6 0.41 7 0.50 6  
42  0.42 7 0.46 6 0.46 7  
41  0.50 8 0.39 8 0.42 8  
29  0.37 9 0.32 10 0.42 9  
22  0.35 10 0.23 18 0.41 10  
14  0.40 11 0.29 11 0.40 11  
39  0.40 12 0.36 9 0.40 12  
15  0.39 13 0.27 14 0.38 13  
28  0.33 14 0.25 16 0.38 14  
34  0.33 15 0.27 12 0.36 15  
20  0.28 16 0.23 17 0.36 16  
23  0.35 17 0.27 13 0.35 17  
17  0.32 18 0.27 15 0.35 18  
37  0.33 19 0.19 21 0.32 19  
43  0.20 20 0.08 29 0.31 20  
13  0.26 21 0.20 19 0.30 21  
35  0.26 22 0.18 22 0.29 22  
26  0.28 23 0.16 24 0.28 23  
27  0.27 24 0.20 20 0.26 24  
36  0.24 25 0.16 23 0.23 25  
31  0.18 26 0.11 26 0.22 26  
33  0.18 27 0.12 25 0.20 27  
25  0.13 28 0.10 27 0.17 28  
32  0.17 29 0.09 28 0.15 29  
16  0.02 30 0.04 30 0.03 30  
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
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Table 4.3 Firm Labour Productivity by Industries  
(Unit: thousand RMB/employee)
  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
13 Food processing industry  11080 429.58 898.82  0 66883.00 
14 Food manufacturing industry 4574 246.76 356.58  0 7669.55 
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 3167 254.58 483.65  0 12491.43 
16 Tobacco industry  251 616.20 849.69  0 6038.04 
17 Textile industry 14813 220.67 420.02  0 27370.00 
18 Textile garments, shoes and hats manufacturing  9692 141.68 218.13  0 10937.50 
19 Leather, fur, feathers (cashmere) and the apparel 
industry 4510 208.11 343.28  0 6215.86 
20 Timber processing and wood, bamboo, vines and 
brown grass-products industry 3480 200.33 249.37  0 6028.07 
21 Furniture manufacturing 2040 209.08 273.85  0 6422.00 
22 Paper and paper products industry  5537 236.51 293.24  0 6729.53 
23 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 4052 194.44 751.76  0 45220.00 
24 Cultural, educational, sporting products 
manufacturing  2510 154.96 217.62  0 5111.67 
25 Oil processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing 
industry 1306 740.11 1321.09  0 14392.31 
26 Chemical materials and chemical products 
industry 13708 385.91 850.68  0 44287.96 
27 Pharmaceutical industry  4031 254.41 352.64  0 8132.70 
28 Chemical fiber industry  936 439.03 432.20  0 3600.00 
29 Rubber products industry  2010 209.24 385.29  0 10904.13 
30 Plastic products industry 8360 270.83 402.24  0 17978.96 
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 16132 190.51 425.69  0 29915.71 
32 Smelting and rolling of ferrous metals industry  4085 465.97 1409.28  0 78858.00 
33 Smelting and rolling of non-ferrous metals industry 3352 542.01 899.68  0 16488.91 
34 Fabricated metal products  9714 293.64 841.84  0 51506.67 
35 General equipment manufacturing industry  12496 230.37 380.52  0 21617.50 
36 Specialized equipment manufacturing 7087 234.65 464.82  0 25240.00 
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing 8239 261.98 491.05  0 9313.50 
39 Electrical machinery and equipment 
manufacturing industry 10367 308.35 501.09  0 18493.13 
40 Communication equipment, computer and other 
electronic equipment manufacturing  5843 479.23 2700.76  0 152445.90 
41 Instrumentation and cultural, office machinery 
manufacturing 2510 333.70 4208.82  0 209774.80 
42 Crafts and other products industries  4250 207.52 654.48  0 33803.60 
43 Waste resources and recycling materials 
processing industry 106 907.64 1760.79  6.47  10996.92 
Note: the number of firms here is different from that of Table 4.1, due to missing value.  
Source: Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
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Table 4.4 Coverage of Manufacturing Sector 
Code Industry Name 
13 Food processing industry  
14 Food manufacturing industry 
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 
16 Tobacco industry  
17 Textile industry 
18 Textile garments, shoes and hats manufacturing  
19 Leather, fur, feathers (cashmere) and the apparel industry 
20 Timber processing and wood, bamboo, vines and brown grass-products industry 
21 Furniture manufacturing 
22 Paper and paper products industry  
23 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
24 Cultural, educational, sporting products manufacturing  
25 Oil processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing industry 
26 Chemical materials and chemical products industry 
27 Pharmaceutical industry  
28 Chemical fibre industry  
29 Rubber products industry  
30 Plastic products industry 
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 
32 Smelting and rolling of ferrous metals industry  
33 Smelting and rolling of non-ferrous metals industry  
34 Fabricated metal products  
35 General equipment manufacturing industry  
36 Specialized equipment manufacturing 
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing 
39 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing industry 
40 
Communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment 
manufacturing  
41 Instrumentation and cultural, office machinery manufacturing 
42 Crafts and other products industries  
43 Waste resources and recycling materials processing industry 
Note: 29 industry dummies are constructed from this classification 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ln(labour 
productivity) 140805 4.9918 1.1472 -8.1198  12.2538 
fpe 143161 0.2635 0.1842 0 0.9333 
fpa 143161 0.3478 0.1796 0 0.9379 
fpo 143161 0.3305 0.1811 0 0.9744 
ln(capital intensity) 141942 -2.0867 1.0879 -13.3047  6.7739 
ln(intermediate 
inputs per 
employee) 
140627 4.6098 1.2285 -8.8130  11.3739 
ln(labour quality) 141952 2.1162 0.7584 -6.9985  6.6493 
age 143161 11.5010 12.9647 0 403
scale economy 143161 0.1617 0.0810 0.0113  1
Herfindahl 143161 0.0002 0.0059 0 1
ln(domestic market 
size)  143161 17.1874 1.3764 8.8223  20.1563 
industry export 
intensity 143161 0.1858 0.1919 0 0.9798 
industry average 
wage 143161 11.5896 3.8558 5.2282  78.6448 
industry unit 
production cost 143161 0.6457 0.9047 0.0492  9.1009 
      
Dummy variables 
 per 
cent 
Dummy 
variables  per cent 
Dummy 
variables 
 per 
cent 
Ownership 0.5187 d21 0.0109 d32 0.0237
Western 0.1201 d22 0.0315 d33 0.0193
Middle 0.1895 d23 0.0235 d34 0.0534
Past exporting 
experience 0.1926 d24 0.0117 d35 0.0734
d14 0.0255 d25 0.0076 d36 0.0415
d15 0.0182 d26 0.0792 d37 0.048
d16 0.0016 d27 0.0235 d39 0.0575
d17 0.0801 d28 0.005 d40 0.0288
d18 0.0472 d29 0.0113 d41 0.0133
d19 0.0219 d30 0.0437 d42 0.021
d20 0.0191 d31 0.0942 d43 0.0006
Note: (1) fpo/fpe/fpa is the foreign presence measured in terms of output/employee/assets 
share in the industry; (2) Variables starting with letter d are the industry dummies, for 
example d14 denotes whether the firm is in Industry 14; (3) Percentage for dummy variables 
denotes the proportion of firms that take value 1, for example for dummy Western, 12.01 per 
cent of domestic firms are located in western China. 
Source: Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
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Table 4.6 Correlation Matrix among Key Variables 
  lnspe fpe fpa fpo lnkl lnml lnlq age scale herfindahl lndmkts ieintensity iaveragewage iuprodct 
lnspe 1              
fpe -0.011 1             
fpa 0.0151 0.918 1            
fpo 0.017 0.9185 0.9532 1           
lnkl 0.4879 -0.0899 -0.056 -0.0185 1          
lnml 0.0258 0.0234 0.0261 0.0218 -0.0107 1         
lnlq 0.3905 0.1125 0.1067 0.1293 0.3563 0.0014 1        
age -0.2363 -0.1487 -0.1526 -0.1289 0.0293 -0.0723 -0.0501 1       
scale 0.0124 0.011 0.0107 0.0102 -0.0033 0.0084 0.0072 -0.0214 1      
herfindahl 0.0284 0.0009 -0.0045 0.0007 0.0309 0.0007 0.0266 0.0202 -0.0036 1     
lndmkts -0.0073 -0.0115 -0.0121 -0.0105 -0.0046 0.0437 -0.0157 0.01 -0.4992 0.006 1    
ieintensity 0.0257 0.0256 0.0234 0.0206 0.0055 -0.0045 0.0215 -0.0626 0.357 -0.0022 -0.3031 1   
iaveragewage 0.0008 0.0037 0.0045 0.0061 0.0192 0.0666 0.0217 0.0169 -0.3268 0.0022 0.2048 -0.1356 1  
iuprodct -0.0113 -0.0122 -0.0113 -0.0074 0.0145 -0.1919 -0.0002 0.0454 -0.2826 0.0044 0.2064 -0.2962 0.2828 1 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
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Table 4.7 Estimation Results Using Employment Share as Proxy for FDI 
labour productivity equation foreign presence equation 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Variables Coef. Std. Err. 
ln(capital 
intensity) 
0.3901 0.0098 ln(domestic 
market 
size) 
0.0002** 0.0002 
ln(intermediate 
inputs per 
employee) 
0.0083 0.0026 industry 
export 
intensity 
0.0045 0.0015 
ln(labour 
quality) 
0.3325 0.0222 industry 
average 
wage 
-0.0002 0.0001 
age -0.0170 0.0018 industry unit 
production 
cost 
0.0006* 0.0004 
age2 0.00003 0.0000 ln(labour 
productivity)
0.0104 0.0005 
fpe 5.7707 2.5738    
scale 0.0524* 0.0298    
herfindahl 2.9730 0.3935    
ownership 0.1520 0.0480    
middle 0.1409** 0.0980 middle -0.0406 0.0009 
western -0.2127 0.1063 western -0.0420 0.0011 
d14 -1.0862 0.2222 d14 0.0925 0.0024 
d15 -1.0692 0.1754 d15 0.0713 0.0027 
d16 0.6139* 0.3666 d16 -0.1558 0.0081 
d17 -0.8591 0.1091 d17 0.0534 0.0017 
d18 -2.5399 0.7554 d18 0.3141 0.0020 
d19 -2.6026 0.8793 d19 0.3582 0.0025 
d20 -0.6727 0.0583 d20 0.0352 0.0026 
d21 -2.3670 0.7616 d21 0.3096 0.0033 
d22 -0.6006 0.0686 d22 0.0314 0.0022 
d23 -1.1913 0.1789 d23 0.0735 0.0025 
d24 -3.0263 0.9749 d24 0.3985 0.0032 
d25 0.5529 0.2414 d25 -0.0954 0.0039 
d26 -0.0795** 0.1094 d26 -0.0397 0.0017 
d27 -0.7170 0.0326 d27 0.0118 0.0024 
d28 -0.5152 0.0954 d28 0.0370 0.0046 
d29 -1.3102 0.2797 d29 0.1169 0.0033 
d30 -1.6460 0.4912 d30 0.1999 0.0020 
d31 -0.1803** 0.2246 d31 -0.0788 0.0017 
d32 0.5384* 0.2762 d32 -0.1049 0.0024 
d33 0.4174* 0.2142 d33 -0.0823 0.0026 
d34 -0.8387 0.1371 d34 0.0616 0.0019 
d35 -0.4477 0.0849 d35 -0.0258 0.0018 
d36 -0.4550 0.1139 d36 -0.0388 0.0020 
d37 -0.5847 0.0328 d37 -0.0047 0.0019 
d39 -1.3457 0.3719 d39 0.1501 0.0018 
d40 -3.2436 1.1072 d40 0.4403 0.0023 
d41 -1.7720 0.3957 d41 0.1627 0.0031 
d42 -2.0342 0.5931 d42 0.2458 0.0026 
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d43 0.6948 0.3433 d43 -0.1241 0.0127 
constant 4.5193 0.4814 constant 0.1573 0.0048 
R-square 0.0177   R-square 0.5923   
Note: * denotes insignificant at 5 per cent level but significant at 10 per cent level; ** 
denotes insignificant at 10 per cent level. 
 
 
 
Table 4.8 Estimation Results Using Assets Share as Proxy for FDI 
labour productivity equation foreign presence equation 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Variables Coef. Std. Err. 
ln(capital 
intensity) 0.3853 0.0027
ln(domestic 
market size) 0.0002** 0.0002 
ln(intermediate 
inputs per 
employee) 0.0062* 0.0034
industry 
exports 
intensity 0.0036 0.0017 
ln(labour 
quality) 0.3156 0.0202
industry 
average wage -0.0002 0.0001 
age 
-0.0155 0.0021
industry unit 
production 
cost 0.0005** 0.0004 
age2 
0.0000 0.0000
ln(labour 
productivity) 0.0163 0.0006 
fpa 5.9832 2.4376    
scale 0.0557* 0.0292    
herfindahl 3.1186 0.4654    
ownership 0.1180 0.0508    
middle 0.1618** 0.1007 middle -0.0429 0.0010 
western -0.1856* 0.1115 western -0.0434 0.0013 
d14 -1.2110 0.2546 d14 0.1138 0.0028 
d15 -1.2111 0.2162 d15 0.0959 0.0031 
d16 1.2080 0.5794 d16 -0.2535 0.0093 
d17 -0.7803 0.0718 d17 0.0432 0.0020 
d18 -2.1022 0.5206 d18 0.2377 0.0023 
d19 -2.1973 0.6452 d19 0.2840 0.0029 
d20 -0.8306 0.1204 d20 0.0658 0.0030 
d21 -1.9892 0.5471 d21 0.2412 0.0038 
d22 -1.1269 0.2766 d22 0.1213 0.0025 
d23 -1.1188 0.1349 d23 0.0624 0.0029 
d24 -2.7255 0.7764 d24 0.3417 0.0037 
d25 0.7653 0.3074 d25 -0.1284 0.0045 
d26 -0.2010 0.0509 d26 -0.0164 0.0020 
d27 -0.5257 0.0610 d27 -0.0176 0.0028 
d28 -0.7537 0.1807 d28 0.0776 0.0053 
d29 -1.3343 0.2677 d29 0.1214 0.0038 
d30 -1.6607 0.4577 d30 0.1994 0.0023 
d31 -0.215** 0.1889 d31 -0.0658 0.0019 
d32 0.8030 0.3586 d32 -0.1448 0.0028 
d33 0.5075 0.2315 d33 -0.0942 0.0030 
d34 -0.8357 0.1274 d34 0.0628 0.0022 
d35 -0.5501 0.0355 d35 -0.0041 0.0020 
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d36 -0.2929* 0.1687 d36 -0.0611 0.0023 
d37 -0.7560 0.0494 d37 0.0276 0.0022 
d39 -1.0229 0.2103 d39 0.0939 0.0021 
d40 -2.7751 0.8238 d40 0.3514 0.0026 
d41 -1.4376 0.2291 d41 0.1062 0.0035 
d42 -1.5321 0.3438 d42 0.1593 0.0030 
d43 -0.12** 0.1158 d43 0.0166** 0.0145 
constant 3.9297 0.7054 constant 0.2215 0.0056 
R-square -0.1122   R-square 0.4344   
Note: * denotes insignificant at 5 per cent level but significant at 10 per cent level; ** 
denotes insignificant at 10 per cent level. 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 Estimation Results Using Output Share as Proxy for FDI 
labour productivity equation foreign presence equation 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Variables Coef. Std. Err. 
ln(capital 
intensity) 0.3736 0.0060
ln(domestic 
market size) 0.0002** 0.0002 
ln(intermediate 
inputs per 
employee) 0.0066 0.0030
industry exports 
intensity 
0.0026* 0.0016 
ln(labour 
quality) 0.3102 0.0183
industry 
average wage -0.0002 0.0001 
age 
-0.0155 0.0016
industry unit 
production cost 0.0007* 0.0004 
age2 
0.0000 0.0000
ln(labour 
productivity) 0.0185 0.0006 
fpo 6.2990 2.1743    
scale 0.0596 0.0295    
herfindahl 2.9856 0.4020    
ownership 0.1228 0.0388    
middle 0.1363** 0.0774 middle -0.0361 0.0010 
western -0.2053 0.0891 western -0.0362 0.0012 
d14 -1.4415 0.2953 d14 0.1464 0.0027 
d15 -1.4639 0.2693 d15 0.1336 0.0030 
d16 1.2029 0.4971 d16 -0.2371 0.0090 
d17 -0.8199 0.0759 d17 0.0487 0.0019 
d18 -2.3284 0.5222 d18 0.2630 0.0023 
d19 -2.2537 0.5688 d19 0.2796 0.0028 
d20 -0.6113 0.0353 d20 0.0285 0.0029 
d21 -2.0959 0.5022 d21 0.2473 0.0037 
d22 -1.0052 0.1931 d22 0.0972 0.0025 
d23 -1.3426 0.1897 d23 0.0978 0.0028 
d24 -2.7254 0.6606 d24 0.3260 0.0036 
d25 0.8168 0.2794 d25 -0.1299 0.0043 
d26 -0.3541 0.0186 d26 0.0099 0.0019 
d27 -0.7498 0.0347 d27 0.0213 0.0027 
d28 -0.6381 0.1167 d28 0.0563 0.0052 
d29 -1.2979 0.2151 d29 0.1114 0.0036 
d30 -1.5896 0.3642 d30 0.1794 0.0022 
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d31 -0.1529** 0.1815 d31 -0.0704 0.0019 
d32 0.5171 0.2054 d32 -0.0920 0.0027 
d33 0.4917 0.1911 d33 -0.0868 0.0029 
d34 -0.8567 0.1162 d34 0.0643 0.0021 
d35 -0.5964 0.0192 d35 0.0055 0.0020 
d36 -0.5255 0.0655 d36 -0.0186 0.0023 
d37 -1.0597 0.1446 d37 0.0766 0.0022 
d39 -1.2977 0.2729 d39 0.1344 0.0021 
d40 -3.6362 0.9955 d40 0.4726 0.0025 
d41 -2.1934 0.4541 d41 0.2236 0.0034 
d42 -1.5825 0.3110 d42 0.1607 0.0029 
d43 0.4383 0.1942 d43 -0.0728 0.0141 
constant 4.0369 0.5642 constant 0.1734 0.0053 
R-square -0.1393   R-square 0.4761   
Note: * denotes insignificant at 5 per cent level but significant at 10 per cent level; ** 
denotes insignificant at 10 per cent level. 
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of Labour Productivity by Ownership 
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of Labour Productivity by Regions 
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Figure 4.4 Distribution of Labour Productivity of Domestic and FDI Invested Firms 
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5. Export Spillovers of FDI in the Manufacturing 
Sector 
FDI in manufacturing has been welcomed in China for the contribution that it could 
make to generating exports and foreign exchange earnings. Foreign invested firms 
are indeed associated with a very large proportion of China’s exports. In Chapters 3 
and 4, we tested technology spillovers of FDI at both the industry and firm levels. In 
this chapter, we turn to export spillovers of FDI in the manufacturing sector in China.  
The chapter is organized into six sections. The following section makes a survey on 
determinants of firms’ exports. In the subsequent two sections, we lay out a 
theoretical model to show that if the presence of FDI reduces domestic firms’ export 
costs, for example by knowledge spillovers, domestic firms’ export intensity will be 
promoted unambiguously. We deploy the econometric specification and estimation 
strategy used, namely the Heckman sample selection model, to test export spillovers.  
Then we describe the data set used, construct variables, present and discuss 
empirical results. The last section concludes the chapter. 
Determinants of Firm Exports 
A firm’s export behaviour is affected by a variety of factors, which can be classified 
into three categories: the firm’s characteristics, industry characteristics, and 
institutional factors. Different firms will take different values for firm characteristics. 
For industry-level characteristics, firms located in the same industry will take the 
same values, while firms located in different industries will have different values. 
Institutional factors are policy instruments, such as the tariff rate and export tax 
refund. In our subsequent empirical analysis, these three categories of factors serve 
as control variables.  
Firm characteristics 
A firm’s characteristics indicate the firm’s competitiveness in the market, and 
include size, capital intensity, production cost, composition of employment, 
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innovation activity, marketing expense, past exporting experience, ownership 
structure, and regional heterogeneity.  
Firm size is expected to have a positive relationship with firm exports, at least for 
the following two reasons. First, international trade allows for the exploitation of 
internal economies of scale as international trade can be viewed as a way of 
extending the market (for example, Krugman, 1979), and firm size is a good 
indicator of such scale economies (Hirsch and Adlar, 1974, Glejser et al. 1990, Lall 
and Kumar, 1981). In a bigger firm, particularly in a big business group, its 
subsidiaries are more able to exploit export channels of other subsidiaries within the 
same group, and obtain necessary export resources, such as finance, marketing, 
physical and human capital. Second, bigger firms usually have more resources to 
support entering the world market, and this can be particularly important if there 
exist fixed costs of exporting, such as gathering information and covering the 
uncertainty of a foreign market (Wakelin, 1998). Hence a bigger firm is more likely 
to export. However, the relationship between firm size and exports may not 
necessarily be linear. Firm size may be important for firms to overcome initial cost 
barriers in establishing their export channels. With the establishment of export 
channels, the initial investment is regarded as a sunk cost and firm size may be less 
important in determining export intensity, that is, the relationship between firm size 
and exports is likely to be an inverted U shape. In empirical studies, this kind of 
inverted U shaped relationship is found by Willmore (1992), Kumar and Siddharthan 
(1994), Wagner (1995), Wakelin (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999), Sterlacchini 
(1999), and Roper and Love (2002). 
Capital intensity, which is measured by the capital-labour ratio, captures a 
fundamental aspect of firm’s production technology, and can also be an important 
factor in determining firm’s exports. In the context of the factor endowment theory 
of trade, relative factor intensity directly determines trade pattern. Hence a firm’s 
capital intensity shall play a role in its exports. In addition, a firm’s capital intensity 
can also proxy for its innovation activities, for which a few empirical studies , for 
example Wakelin (1998) and Roper and Love (2002), have found positive impact on 
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exports as innovation activities such as R&D are usually quite capital intensive. 
Hence higher capital intensity is positively related to more active innovation, which 
predicts a positive relationship between capital intensity and exports, as the 
innovation leads to either production of new products or reduction of production 
costs which enhances the firm’s competitiveness in the world market. In empirical 
studies, Athukorala et al. (1995) find that capital intensity has a positive and 
significant impact on a firm’s export participation decision, but an insignificant 
impact on firm’s export level. In the meantime, the impact of capital-labour ratio on 
firm exports will depend on a country’s factor endowment. In a country with rich 
capital endowment, a firm with high capital-labour ratio will have comparative 
advantage compared with a firm with low capital-labour ratio, which makes it easier 
to export and be more competitive in the world market. In a country with rich labour 
endowment, the situation will be the opposite. 
The production cost can be expected to play an important role in firm’s exports. 
Firms with lower production costs are more likely to export as they have 
comparative advantages over other firms. In reality, firm’s production costs are not 
easily observed, particularly capital costs. Thus in empirical studies, production 
costs are proxied by different variables. Wakelin (1998) uses two labour cost 
variables to proxy for production costs: the unit labour cost and the average wage. 
Unit labour cost is the total remuneration of employees divided by total sales, and 
will be negatively related to exports. The average wage, which is equal to the total 
remuneration of employees divided by the total number of employees, on the one 
hand indicates a firm’s skill level and hence can have a positive effect on exports, 
and on the other hand proxies for costs and can have a negative effect on exports. 
Wakelin’s (1998) empirical results confirm that the average wage has positive 
impact on exports in the UK, and unit labour cost is negatively correlated with 
exports for non-innovating firms. Another proxy for production costs is total factor 
productivity (TFP). A higher TFP implies a lower production cost for a given output 
level, and hence should have a positive impact on exports. Alvarez (2006) uses TFP, 
the logarithmic difference between value-added and weighted inputs with the weight 
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obtained from a semi-parametric estimation of firms’ production function, in testing 
the determinants of export performance in Chilean manufacturing plants, and finds a 
significant and positive impact. 
The composition of a firm’s employment can also affect export behaviour. Some 
empirical studies find that the quality of a firm’s employees is positively related to 
its exports (Roberts and Tybout, 1997, Alvarez, 2006). There are different proxies 
for this factor. For example, Alvarez (2006) uses the fraction of white-collar wages 
in the total wage bill to capture labour quality. The average wage can also proxy for 
labour quality. If the labour market is competitive, then the average difference in 
wages across firms reflects the differences in skill level. Some empirical studies find 
a significant and positive impact of firm innovation on their exports (e.g. Roper and 
Love, 2002, Basile, 2001, Wakelin, 1998). Intuitively, innovation can be important 
in determining exports, as innovation leads to either the production of new products 
or lowering the production costs of current products. In both cases firms’ exports 
may be promoted. There are also different variables used in empirical studies to 
capture different aspects of innovation, for example R&D expenditure which is an 
indicator of investment in the resource base of the firm, the number of innovations 
used, and the number of innovations produced.  
Other factors include a firm’s marketing expenses, past exporting experience, 
ownership structure, and regional heterogeneity. A firm’s marketing expenses 
clearly reflect its sales strategy. If firms put lots of money into successful marketing, 
then it is likely that they will export more. Past exporting experience is also 
important in that it indicates the entry costs to exporting have been paid and hence 
exporting is more likely. Firm ownership structure may also play a role, as privately-
owned firms and state and collectively-owned firms may behave differently in 
exporting. However, the sign of the impact of ownership structure on exports cannot 
be pre-determined, as on the one hand privately-owned firms may have more 
incentive to export than state and collectively-owned firms, while on the other hand 
state and collectively-owned firms have more resources to help them to export, for 
example by being more capable in obtaining bank loans. Hence, there is no reason a 
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priori to expect private firms to export more than state and collectively-owned firms 
or vice versa. Regional heterogeneity is also an important factor to consider. Firms 
located in different regions tend to behave systematically differently, owing to 
region-specific factors such as regional corporate culture and transportation costs. In 
China, the coastal region has been more open to the world market than the western 
and central regions. Hence it is reasonable to expect firms located in the coastal 
region to be more likely to export than firms located in western and central regions. 
Industry characteristics 
Different from firm characteristics, industry characteristics are those that are the 
same across firms in the same industry 22 , but different across industries. By 
definition, industry characteristics have the same impact on exports for firms in the 
same industry. Industry characteristics include the penetration of FDI in the industry, 
the degree of competition or concentration in an industry, and industry heterogeneity 
in export behaviour. 
In respect of the impact of FDI on exports of domestic firms, it is generally argued 
that the presence of FDI in the industry usually promotes domestic firm’s exports 
(Alvarez, 2006), that is, there exist positive export spillovers. Compared with 
domestic firms, FDI invested firms usually possess some advantages (Dunning et al., 
1990); for example, they are technologically superior and have expertise in 
international business and knowledge about foreign market. These advantages to 
some extent can spill over to domestic firms via the mobility of labour or domestic 
firm’s learning. Hence the export costs, particularly the entry costs, of domestic 
firms can be lowered by the presence of FDI, and subsequently their exports are 
promoted. However, whether these export spillovers will occur and to what extent 
these spillovers occur will also depend on a domestic firm’s absorptive capacity. In 
empirical studies, Alvarez (2006) finds a positive and significant impact of foreign 
capital on firms’ exports in Chilean manufacturing industry, and Athukorala et al. 
(1995) find a positive impact of ‘third-world’ multinationals on firms’ export 
decisions in Sri Lankan manufacturing industry. 
                                                 
22 In this chapter, the industry is at the two-digit aggregation level. 
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Another industry characteristic is the extent of competition or concentration in the 
market. In an industry where the market is competitive, domestic competition may 
force firms to explore the international market. In contrast, in an industry where 
some firms have market power, then the profit maximization incentive urges these 
firms to exploit market power in the domestic market, and hence they are less 
willing to export. So firms’ exports may be negatively correlated with domestic 
market concentration. A proxy for the market structure of an industry market can be 
either the n-firm concentration ratio or the Herfindahl Index.  Firms’ export 
behaviour, namely the way they export their products, can be systematically 
different across industries, that is, there exists industry heterogeneity. This is 
intuitive, for example a firm’s export behaviour in an industry that exports heavy 
machinery must be significantly different from an industry that exports software 
services.  
Institutional factors 
Institutional factors that affect a firm’s export behaviour include the export 
promotion or import substitution policy, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, exchange 
rate policies, and domestic tax refund schemes for exports.  
In countries that adopt export promotion policies, policies commonly directed at 
promoting exports in certain industries, particularly in some high value-added 
manufacturing industries such as the electronics industry. This will obviously 
encourage firms in those industries to export, although there is no guarantee that 
such policies will work. In contrast, import substitution policies will discourage 
firms from exporting in certain industries. The tariff rate and non-tariff barriers, such 
as some technological standards, aim to discourage imports and thus protect 
domestic markets from foreign competition. These protective measures reduce 
domestic competition and hence reduce domestic firms’ incentive to export. The 
exchange rate, including both its mean level and its volatility, will have an 
immediate and direct effect on firm’s exports, as changes in the exchange rate will 
directly affect firm’s export revenue in domestic currency. High volatility of the 
exchange rate will increase a firm’s export risk and thus make firms less willing to 
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export, while a stable exchange rate system is likely decrease this uncertainty. Even 
though this exchange rate risk can be covered to a significant extent, covering such 
risk increases a firm’s export costs.  In addition, domestic tax refunds for exports, a 
common practice in many countries, will also positively affect firm’s exports. The 
rate and coverage of domestic tax refunds will directly affect firm’s export costs. 
Higher rates of refund reduce export costs. The procedure of tax refund also plays a 
role, for example whether the tax refund is paid back before exports or after exports 
has different implication for firm export costs. 
A Simple Model of Firm Export Behaviour 
In order to capture the impact of FDI on domestic firm’s export activity, namely the 
export spillovers of FDI, a simple model of firm export behaviour is developed in 
this section. In an industry that contains N firms, which include ( )γ−1N  domestic 
firms and γN  FDI invested firms, where γ  denotes the foreign presence in the 
industry. The FDI invested firms are able to choose their output quantity and export 
intensity independently from their parent firm23; that is, they can act like a domestic 
firm. All firms are homogenous and can sell their products in both the domestic 
market and foreign market. In the domestic market, firms play a Cournot, and have 
inverse demand functions as follows: 
( )Qpp = , 0' <p  
where Q  is the domestic demand and ∑
=
−=
N
i
ii qsQ
1
)1( ,  is  is firm i’s export 
intensity, namely the share of exports in total output, and iq  denotes firms i’s output. 
The world market is a competitive market, and firms are faced with world price P. 
Costs are incurred in the course of production and exporting. For the production 
process, firm i's cost function is ( )iqC  with ( ) 0' >iqC . For the export process, firm 
                                                 
23 By this, we can abstract away from the parent firm’s decision. However this is not a strong assumption, as the 
world market is competitive and the FDI parent firms earn zero profit there and hence the FDI parent firm’s 
global profit maximization is equivalent to the domestic market profit maximization.  
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i's export cost function is ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
=
γN
j
jii qqsEE
1
,  with 0'1 >E , 0''11 >E , 0'2 <E , 
0''22 <E , and 0''12 <E . 0'1 >E , 0''11 >E  shows that the cost of a firm’s exports is 
rising in its export quantity, and the speed is increasing. 0'2 <E , 0''22 <E  shows that 
for a given firm’s export quantity, the cost of its exports is decreasing in FDI 
invested firms’ activities in the industry, but the speed of the fall in cost is also 
decreasing. 0''12 <E  states that if FDI invested firms’ activities in the industry 
increase, then '1E  decreases, which means that for a given fixed increase in export 
quantity, the increase in export costs will be smaller due to the increased activities of 
FDI invested firms. Increased activities by FDI invested firms make it more likely 
that their export knowledge is passed on to domestic firms and hence reduce the 
marginal cost of exports for domestic firms.  If firm i is a domestic firm, then it 
enjoys export spillovers from FDI invested firms as its export cost is reduced by the 
presence of FDI invested firms. The channels of such benefits can vary; for example 
domestic firms can learn from FDI invested firms’ export behaviour and 
subsequently reduce the transaction costs in exporting and other input costs. These 
channels for domestic firms’ learning to export are assumed to be exogenous and 
hence are not modelled here. 
Firm i's problem is to choose its output quantity and export intensity to maximize its 
profit, given all the other firms’ output quantities and export intensities, as follows: 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−=Π ∑∑
==
γN
j
jiiiii
N
i
iiiiisq
qqsEqCPqsqspqs
ii 11,
,11max  
Then a domestic firm’s FOCs are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 '1''2 =−−+−+− EsqCPspqsps iiiiii  
( ) 01 '1'2 =−+−−− EqPqpqspq iiiii  
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An FDI invested firm’s FOCs are: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 '2'1''2 =−−−+−+− EEsqCPspqsps iiiiii  
( ) 01 '1'2 =−+−−− EqPqpqspq iiiii  
By symmetry, all domestic firms choose the same output quantity and export 
intensity, and all FDI invested firms choose the same output quantity and export 
intensity. But FDI invested firms’ choices of output quantity and export intensity are 
different from domestic firms’ choices. Let a domestic firm’s choice be ( )dd sq ,  and 
an FDI invested firm’s choice be ( )ff sq , . The FOCs become: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 ',1''2 =−−+−+− ddddddd EsqCPspqsps    (5.1) 
( ) 01 ',1'2 =−+−−− dddddd EqPqpqspq      (5.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 ' ,2',1''2 =−−−+−+− ffffffff EEsqCPspqsps   (5.3) 
( ) 01 ',1'2 =−+−−− ffffff EqPqpqspq      (5.4) 
where ',1 dE  is the first derivative of the export cost function with respect to its first 
argument, evaluated at domestic firms’ output quantity and export intensity, and 
'
,1 fE  and 
'
,2 fE  are those evaluated at FDI invested firms’ choice. 
Multiplying equation (5.2) by 
d
d
q
s−1
 and add to equation (5.1), we obtain: 
( ) 0',1' =−− dd EqCP         (5.5) 
Multiplying equation (5.4) by 
f
f
q
s−1
 and add to equation (5.3), we obtain: 
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( ) 0' ,2',1' =−−− fff EEqCP        (5.6) 
The first observation about equations (5.5) and (5.6) is that ( ) ( )ffdd sqsq ,, ≠ , that 
is, domestic firms and FDI invested firms have different equilibrium choices of 
output quantity and export intensity, which occurs due to the asymmetric impact of 
foreign presence on firms’ export costs. Furthermore, if FDI invested firms have 
same production capacity as domestic firms, namely df qq = , then FDI invested 
firms will always export more than their counterparts. This point can be showed by 
plugging fd qq =  into equations (5.5) and (5.6): 
0' ,2
'
,1
'
,1 =−− ffd EEE  
which implies ',1
'
,1 fd EE <  as 0' ,2 <fE . Since 0''11 >E , fd ss < . 
Totally differentiate equation (5.5) and (5.6), holding N, dq , and fq  constant, we 
obtain: 
0''
,11
''
,12 >×−=
d
f
d
dd
q
Nq
E
E
d
ds
γ  
N
EE
EE
d
ds
ff
fff ×+
+−= ''
,12
''
,11
''
,22
''
,12
γ  
which shows that for an increase in foreign presence γ , domestic firms will 
unambiguously increase their export intensity, while in contrast its impact on FDI 
invested firms’ export intensity is undetermined and depends on how their activities 
affect the export cost function. 
This is a stylized model, as it makes simplifications in several respects. For example, 
all firms in the model are homogenous, and FDI invested firms here can act without 
any constraint from their parent firms, which seems a little unrealistic in reality. 
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Second, the entry of FDI invested firms is not modelled explicitly, and in the total 
differentiation above the total number of firms in the industry, N, is held constant, 
which implicitly assumes that FDI can only enter the industry by acquiring domestic 
firms.  However, this assumption is not strong for the subsequent empirical testing in 
that the empirical testing uses cross-sectional data and no actual firm entry or exit 
takes place, and hence the number of firms can be reasonably held constant. 
It is also likely that FDI can reduce production costs for firms, in which technology 
spillovers will occur if the technology is cost-reducing. To accommodate this 
possibility, a firms’  cost function can be specified as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∑
=
γN
j
ji qqC
1
,  with 0'1 >C , 
0'2 <C , and 0''12 <C , and then 0''
,11
''
,12
''
,12 >×+−=
d
f
d
ddd
q
Nq
E
EC
d
ds
γ , where 
''
,12 dC  is the 
cross-derivative of a firm’s cost function with respect to its first and second 
arguments evaluated at the domestic and FDI firms’ equilibrium choice of quantity. 
Hence, the results of the model do not change even if cost-reducing technology 
spillovers are accounted for.  
In the model, we assume that both domestic firms and FDI firms share the same 
production and export cost functions. Even if we allow for the possibility that they 
are different, namely the production and export cost functions for domestic firms 
being ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∑
=
γN
j
ji qqC
1
,  and ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∑
=
γN
j
jii qqsE
1
,  respectively and those for FDI firms being 
( )iqc  and ( )iiqse  respectively with similar assumptions on the first, second and 
cross derivatives, the result of the model, namely domestic firms’ export intensity 
will be promoted unambiguously by an exogenous increase in foreign presence, 
remains unchanged.  
  109
The Econometric Specification and Estimation Strategy 
Econometric specification 
The theoretical model predicts that if the presence of FDI reduces other firms’ 
export costs, then the presence of FDI will promote other firms’ exports.  Hence, to 
test whether there exist export spillovers, the following econometric model is set up: 
εβββββ +×++++= XfpfpIXs 43210      (5.7) 
where s denotes firm export intensity, namely firm’s export value divided by its total 
sale; X  is a vector of firm characteristics, which includes firm size, capital intensity, 
unit production costs, average labour wage, marketing expense, ownership structure, 
regional dummies, and a dummy that indicates firm’s past exporting experience; I is 
a vector of the industry characteristics (excluding FDI) that can affect firm’s exports, 
including industry concentration (Herfindahl index) and a set of industry dummies 
that capture industry hetereogeneity in exports; and fp denotes the foreign presence 
that proxies for activities of FDI in host country. X, and I serve as control variables, 
and fp is the variable of interest.  
Moreover fp is interacted with firm characteristics X, which allows for export 
spillovers to vary across firms, that is, firm characteristics are determinants of 
spillovers. This is reasonable, as we expect that firms with certain characteristics, 
such as bigger firms, are generally more capable of absorbing spillovers from FDI 
invested firms. The marginal impact of fp on firm’s mean export intensity is: 
[ ] X
fp
sE
43 ββ +=∂
∂         (5.8) 
Hence, testing for the existence of export spillovers from FDI follows three steps. 
First, test the joint significance of the coefficient of fp and coefficient of the 
interaction terms. If they are jointly insignificant, then export spillovers do not exist. 
Second, test the joint significance of the interaction terms. If the interaction terms 
are jointly significant, then export spillovers depend on firm characteristics. Third, 
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compute the marginal effect of fp (equation 5.8) and evaluate at relevant value of 
firm characteristics. If the evaluated marginal impact of fp is positive, then there 
exist positive export spillovers from FDI invested firms. If the evaluation is negative, 
then the presence of FDI in domestic industry actually does harm to domestic firms’ 
exports. In addition, the impact of certain firm characteristics on its capacity to 
absorb spillovers from FDI invested firms can be measured as:  
[ ]
i
ixfp
sE
,4
2
β=∂∂
∂          (5.9) 
where ix  is the ith firm characteristic in the firm characteristic vector X. A 
significant and positive estimate of the coefficient implies that the firm characteristic 
helps the firm to absorb spillovers from FDI invested firms. Otherwise if the 
coefficient is significantly negative, then firm characteristics keep firms from 
benefiting from spillovers from FDI invested firms. For example, if the coefficient 
of fp’s interaction with firm size is significantly positive, then it indicates that a 
bigger firm is more capable of exploiting spillovers from FDI invested firms.  
As in previous chapter, fp here is also proxied by FDI invested firms’ 
output/employment/assets share in the industry respectively, in recognition of the 
inherent pitfalls of each of these three measurements.  
Equation (5.7) aims at testing the impact of FDI on domestic firm’s exports. 
However, if FDI tends to flow into the industry with higher domestic exports, which 
can occur if the incentive of FDI is export-oriented, then there is a potential 
endogeneity problem. In China, the inflow of export-oriented FDI exhibits two 
characteristics: first export-oriented FDI concentrates within certain industries (so 
called processing industries), like the textile industry; second most of them are 
located in coastal China, due to transportation costs. Regional dummies and industry 
dummies in equation (5.7) control for the potential endogeneity of FDI. 
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Estimation strategy 
One characteristic of the dependent variable s is that a large number  of s may take a 
value of zero as it is reasonable to expect many firms do not export at all. This 
makes OLS estimation of equation (5.7) problematic as it will produce biased and 
inconsistent estimates.  
One widely used approach to handle this problem is the censored Tobit model. The 
advantage of the Tobit model is that it makes the use of all available information 
from the explanatory variables, and in particular it accounts for the fact that a large 
number of observations of dependent variable are zero. However, the Tobit model 
incorporates two decisions into one model, namely the decision to participate and 
the decision on the level of participation, which implicitly assumes that the 
explanatory variables will have the same impact on both decisions. In the case of 
exports here, the Tobit model imposes a constraint that the impact on each firm’s 
decision on whether to export by the explanatory variables is equal to the impact on 
the firm’s decision on how much to export. This may not necessarily be true, in 
which case the Tobit model is mis-specified and this kind of misspecification may 
have an undesirable impact on the estimation (Basile, 2001). This constraint can be 
relaxed by separating the problem into two steps: first look at each firm’s decision 
on whether to export, and then explore each firm’s decision on how much to export, 
conditioned on the fact that the firm has already decided to export. The validity of 
this kind of relaxation of the constraint can be tested (see Lin and Schmidt, 1984, for 
details). 
Cragg (1971) proposes a two-stage specification that relaxes the constraint of Tobit 
model. In Cragg’s specification, the first stage is to estimate a Probit model in which 
the dependent variable is the firm’s decision on whether to export, namely a binary 
variable that takes a value of one when firms export. In the second stage, the 
estimation is made only over the firms that do export, in which the dependent 
variable is the export intensity and a truncated estimation procedure is applied.  
However, Cragg’s specification implicitly assumes that the two stages are 
independent of each other.  If this is not true, then the truncated estimation at the 
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second stage will be biased, not only for the true whole population but also for the 
group of population that has been selected (Basile, 2001). The possibility of 
correlation between two stages can be accounted for by the sample selection model, 
in which the first stage is carried out using the Probit model, while in the second 
stage the sample selection bias is dealt with either through Heckman’s procedure 
using either OLS or maximum likelihood estimation.  
In the context of firm’s exports in this study, the bivariate sample selection model 
can be written as an export participation equation and an export intensity equation: 
11
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where I is a binary indicator variable which takes a value of one if the firm exports 
and zero otherwise, s is firm export intensity, *y  and *s  are latent variables, 1Z  and 
2Z  are factors listed in equation (5.7), and 1Z  is the union of 2Z  and firm past 
export experience, that is, firm past export experience does not appear in the export 
intensity equation. This kind of exogenous variable restriction enables model 
identification in practice. In addition, it is reasonable to say that a firm’s past export 
experience signals some fixed cost in establishing the export channel, and hence as 
soon as the export channel has been established, the firm is more likely to participate 
in exporting. However, as the cost of establishing the export channel has been 
incurred and becomes sunk cost, it will not affect firm’s decision on how much to 
export.  
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Because it is reasonable to say a firm’s decision on whether to export is correlated 
with their decision on how much to export,  the error terms in equations (5.10) and 
(5.11) are set to be joint normally distributed and homoskedastic, with 
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Then the likelihood function for this bivariate sample selection model can be written 
as: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]∏
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− >>≤=
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***1* 0Pr00Pr  
where ( )⋅f  is the conditional density of *s . The maximization of the likelihood 
function gives the MLE estimate of both the export participation equation and the 
export intensity equation. 
The sample selection model of equations (5.10) and (5.11) can also be estimated 
using Heckman two-step procedure, which uses the inverse Mills ratio to correct for 
the sample selection bias. The inverse Mills ratio is computed from estimating the 
binomial probit model (the export participation equation), which is then plugged into 
the estimation of the export intensity equation to correct for the sample selection 
bias. Even though the two-step estimator is consistent and computationally easier, 
the maximum likelihood estimator is more efficient. 
The Data and Variable Construction 
Variable construction 
The data set used is the same as that in Chapter 4. From the data set, two categories 
of variables are constructed, namely firm characteristics and industry characteristics, 
such as capital intensity, firm age, foreign presence, ownership structure dummy, 
regional dummies, and industry dummies. Institutional factors, such as the rate of 
exports tax refund, are not included, due to lack of variation of these variables. For 
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example, most firms are subject to a 13 per cent rate of export tax refund. In addition, 
a dummy variable for firm past export experience, is also constructed for the purpose 
of identifying the sample selection model in the estimation. 
Firm characteristics include firm size, which is proxied by a firm’s output; firm age; 
capital intensity, which is equal to total assets divided by firm’s number of 
employees; unit production cost, which is equal to a firm’s total production and 
operation costs divided by its output; the average wage, which is equal to firm’s total 
wages divided by the number of its employees and can proxy for the composition of 
labour structure in the firm, namely human capital; the unit labour cost , which is 
equal to total wage divided by firm’s output; marketing expenses, which is equal to a 
firm’s total marketing expenses divided by its total sales revenue; and ownership and 
regional heterogeneity, as defined in Chapter 4. Ownership is a dummy variable, 
which takes a value of one if the firm is privately owned and zero otherwise. 
Regional heterogeneity is captured by two regional dummies that take a value of one 
if a firm is located in west or central China. 
We expect firm size, firm age, capital intensity, production cost, average wage, unit 
labour cost and marketing expense to positively affect firm’s exports. For regional 
heterogeneity, it is expected that firms located in the coastal region are more likely 
to export than firms located in central China and western China, due to both the 
transportation cost and different levels of economic development in these regions. 
However, as these variables interact with foreign presence, fp, their impact depends 
on foreign presence in the industry, and thus no prior expectation on the sign of the 
coefficients of these variables can be made.  
Industry characteristics include the Herfindahl index, which is calculated at the four 
digit industry level and equal to the sum of squared firm’s share in the industry total 
sale; the foreign presence, which proxies activities of FDI in the industry; and 
industry heterogeneity (a set of industry dummies).  Industry heterogeneity is 
computed at the two digit level (see Chapter 4), as it is reasonable to believe that 
firms within the same two digit industry have same export behaviour.  The sign of 
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coefficient of Herfindahl index is expected to be negative, as the Herfindahl index 
proxies for domestic market concentration and with a higher Herfindahl index firms 
have power over domestic market and are hence less willing to export. For the 
foreign presence, which is the focus of this study, it is also expected positively affect 
firm’s exports, which is demonstrated in the above theoretical model.  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables constructed from the data 
set. For domestic firms’ exports intensity, 2,281 firms have a missing value, which 
occurs because they report zero sales. For the rest of the firms, the average export 
intensity is 15.1 per cent, and 73.8 per cent of firms do not export, as expected. 
There are five industries that do not have any exports, namely artificial oil 
production, tire retread processing, asbestos and cement products manufacturing, 
nuclear and nuclear radiation measurement equipment manufacturing, and nuclear 
radiation processing industry, which means that 153 firms have missing values.  For 
production cost, 2,389 firms have missing values, which is again due to these firms 
having zero output. As production cost is equal to firm’s production and operation 
expenditure divided by output, a value of production cost that is bigger than 1 
indicates the firm is suffering loss. Of the total 143,161 domestic firms, 15.1 per cent 
of firms suffer losses, which significantly increases the mean and standard deviation 
of the distribution of production cost. On capital intensity and average wages, 820 
domestic firms report zero employees, which makes the corresponding variables 
missing values. For marketing expenses, which is the ratio of total marketing 
expense against its sales revenue, it can be seen that most firms spend heavily in 
marketing, with an average value of 0.89. The average Herfindahl index and its 
standard deviation are rather low (0.0002 and 0.0059 respectively), indicating that 
most markets are quite competitive. Only two industries are monopolized, namely 
the nuclear radiation processing and the agricultural, forestry, and fishery specialized 
equipment and instrument manufacturing. In the former industry, the monopoly firm 
does not export, while in the latter industry the monopoly firm exports 72.3 per cent 
of its output.  In respect of foreign presence, as discussed in Chapter 4, the three 
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measurements appear to give a consistent proxy on true FDI invested firms’ 
activities in domestic industry, since their means are well within one standard 
deviation of each other.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Exports intensity 140880 0.1517  0.3234  0 1 
Firm size 143161 0.0684  0.5470  0 54.8566  
Firm age 143161 11.5010  12.9647  0 403 
Capital intensity 142341 0.2663  3.6387  0 874.735 
Unit Production 
cost 140772 5.6480  1406.3910 0 527000 
Average wage 142341 10.6462  9.7689  0 772.2802
Unit labour cost 140772 0.2992  46.1190  0 17138.5 
Marketing expense 140796 0.8923  0.6232  0 174.25 
Herfindahl index 143161 0.0002  0.0059  0 1 
Fpo 143161 0.3305  0.1811  0 0.9744  
Fpe 143161 0.2635  0.1842  0 0.9333  
Fpa 143161 0.3478  0.1796  0 0.9379  
      
Dummy variables  per cent 
Dummy 
variables  per cent 
Dummy 
variables  per cent
Ownership 0.5187  d21 0.0109  d32 0.0237  
Western 0.1201  d22 0.0315  d33 0.0193  
Middle 0.1895  d23 0.0235  d34 0.0534  
Past exporting 
experience 0.1926  d24 0.0117  d35 0.0734  
d14 0.0255  d25 0.0076  d36 0.0415  
d15 0.0182  d26 0.0792  d37 0.0480  
d16 0.0016  d27 0.0235  d39 0.0575  
d17 0.0801  d28 0.0050  d40 0.0288  
d18 0.0472  d29 0.0113  d41 0.0133  
d19 0.0219  d30 0.0437  d42 0.0210  
d20 0.0191  d31 0.0942  d43 0.0006  
Note: (1) fpo/fpe/fpa is the foreign presence measured in terms of output/employee/assets share 
in the industry;  (2) Variables starting with letter d are the industry dummies, for example d14 
denotes whether the firm is in Industry 14;  (3) Percentage for dummy variables denotes the 
proportion of firms that take value 1, for example for dummy Western, 12.01 per cent of 
domestic firms are located in western China. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Enterprise Data, National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing  
 
The bottom panel of Table 5.1 is a set of dummy variables that are used in the 
estimation, and the percentage is the proportion of firms in the sample that take a 
value of one for the variable. For example, 51.9 per cent of all domestic firms are 
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privately owned, and 19.3 per cent of domestic firms have export experience in the 
previous year.  Regional dummies indicate that 69.0 per cent of domestic firms are 
located in coastal China, which obviously implies the gap of regional development.  
Table 5.2 presents the correlation matrix for key variables. From the table, we see 
that for most variables the correlation is rather low, except for unit production cost 
and unit labour cost. The correlation between unit production cost and unit labour 
cost is as high as 0.9917, which, nevertheless, does not present a multicollinearity 
problem in empirical exercises owing to the large sample size. The three proxies of 
FDI presence are highly correlated with each other, which is expected and desired. 
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Table 5.2 Correlation Matrix for Key Variables 
  Firm size 
Firm 
age 
Capital 
intensity 
Unit 
Production 
cost 
Average 
wage 
Unit 
labour 
cost 
Marketing 
expenditure Herfindahl 
exports 
concentration fpo fpe fpa ownership western middle
past 
exporting 
experience 
Firm size 1                
Firm age 0.0511 1               
Capital intensity 0.1338 
-
0.0052 1              
Production cost -0.0005 0.008 0.0003 1             
Average wage 0.1263 
-
0.0237 0.285 -0.0022 1            
Unit labour cost -0.0007 0.0083 -0.0006 0.9917 -0.0014 1           
Marketing 
expenditure 
-
0.0041 
-
0.0097 -0.0017 -0.0038 -0.0174 
-
0.0034 1          
Herfindahl 0.0997 0.0215 0.0223 -0.0001 0.0306 
-
0.0002 -0.0022 1         
exports 
concentration 0.0687 0.0145 0.02 -0.0001 0.033 
-
0.0002 -0.0014 0.1796 1        
fpo 0.0201 
-
0.1292 0.0242 -0.002 0.1027 
-
0.0024 0.006 0.0023 -0.0179 1       
fpe 0.0048 
-
0.1493 -0.0047 -0.0024 0.0805 
-
0.0024 0.0096 0.0022 -0.0182 0.9185 1      
fpa 0.0046 
-
0.1533 0.0044 -0.0029 0.0756 -0.003 0.0087 -0.003 -0.0213 0.9532 0.918 1     
ownership -0.0244 
-
0.3811 0.0003 -0.0037 0.0727 
-
0.0039 0.0052 -0.0159 0.0003 0.1737 0.2008 0.1956 1    
western -0.0057 0.0971 -0.0069 0.0085 -0.0766 0.0093 -0.0076 -0.0007 0.0023 -0.151 
-
0.1661 
-
0.1616 -0.1388 1   
middle -0.0062 0.0818 -0.0385 -0.0012 -0.1478 
-
0.0019 -0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0057 
-
0.1636 
-
0.1786 
-
0.1698 -0.1287 -0.1766 1  
past exporting 
experience 0.0867 0.0384 0.0197 -0.0018 0.1142 
-
0.0019 0.0021 0.0239 0.0554 0.2064 0.2558 0.2083 0.1006 -0.1079 -0.14 1 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
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Export intensity in the manufacturing sector 
 
Table 5.3 Summary Statistics for Export Intensity by Industries 
Industry 
Code 
Number 
of firms Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
per cent 
of firms 
with 0 
exports 
intensity
per cent 
of firms 
with 1 
exports 
intensity 
per 
cent of 
firms 
with 
missing 
value 
13 11193 0.11 0.29 0 1 79.66 4.09 2.90 
14 4636 0.12 0.29 0 1 72.35 3.88 3.21 
15 3194 0.05 0.19 0 1 85.82 1 2.44 
16 255 0.01 0.04 0 0.53 76.86 0 3.92 
17 14863 0.24 0.37 0 1 60.61 7.93 1.31 
18 9717 0.52 0.46 0 1 37.31 28.37 0.55 
19 4518 0.50 0.46 0 1 39.35 30.01 0.73 
20 3501 0.18 0.36 0 1 74.06 9.08 1.43 
21 2046 0.30 0.43 0 1 60.70 16.32 1.12 
22 5570 0.05 0.19 0 1 87.97 1.80 1.65 
23 4084 0.04 0.19 0 1 90.40 1.91 1.71 
24 2516 0.60 0.44 0 1 27.31 36.37 0.64 
25 1323 0.01 0.09 0 1 91.38 0.30 2.12 
26 13803 0.08 0.23 0 1 78.90 2.09 1.48 
27 4063 0.08 0.22 0 1 78.12 1.33 1.80 
28 937 0.06 0.20 0 1 83.14 1.81 0.53 
29 2016 0.15 0.31 0 1 71.28 5.75 1.29 
30 8382 0.19 0.36 0 1 71.14 9.60 0.70 
31 16245 0.07 0.23 0 1 86.01 3.30 1.52 
32 4119 0.03 0.15 0 1 89.39 1.02 1.97 
33 3367 0.07 0.20 0 1 81.68 1.49 1.34 
34 9746 0.20 0.37 0 1 69.24 7.94 1.09 
35 12546 0.12 0.27 0 1 74.45 3.04 0.97 
36 7129 0.07 0.20 0 1 78.73 1.54 1.66 
37 8281 0.09 0.24 0 1 78.95 2.46 1.29 
39 10400 0.18 0.35 0 1 68.89 7.58 1 
40 5857 0.32 0.41 0 1 49.02 13.95 1.33 
41 2515 0.28 0.41 0 1 56.78 12.49 1.31 
42 4259 0.56 0.46 0 1 33.79 36.82 0.66 
43 107 0.02 0.11 0 1 95.33 0.93 0.93 
Note: (1) Table 1 presents the name of corresponding Industry Code.  
          (2) The mean and standard deviation are computed excluding missing values. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2003 
 
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics for exports intensity over the data used in 
the estimation, and it indicates that on average domestic firms’ export intensity is 
quite low (15 per cent). In this sub-section, we will examine the distribution of all 
firms’ export intensity, including both domestic and FDI invested firms, which will 
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present a picture of China’s exporting in the manufacturing sector in 2003. Table 5.3 
presents the summary statistics for firm export intensity by two digit industry 
category. Several conclusions about export intensity can be drawn. 
First, there are four industries with average export intensity higher than 50 per cent, 
namely cultural, educational, sporting products manufacturing (24), crafts and other 
products industries (42), textile garments, shoes and hats manufacturing (18), and 
leather, fur, feathers (cashmere) and apparel industry, in all of which China has 
comparative advantage. Second, except for the tobacco industry (16), all the other 
industries have firms that are completely specialized in exports, that is, with 100 per 
cent export intensity. The highest percentage of firms that are completely specialized 
in exports is 36.8 per cent in the crafts and other products industries (42), and in 
contrast the lowest percentage is 0 in the tobacco industry (16). Third, there are five 
industries with average export intensity is lower than 5 per cent, namely printing and 
reproduction of recorded media industry (23), smelting and rolling of ferrous metals 
industry (32), waste resources and recycling materials processing industry (43), oil 
processing, coking and nuclear fuel processing industry (25), and tobacco industry 
(16).  Fourth, the distribution of export intensity across industries displays a rather 
similar pattern, that is, a large proportion of firms have zero export intensity.  
Empirical Results 
Equation (5.7) is estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator, with robust 
standard errors computed to account for potential heteroskedasticity. Table 5.4 
reports the estimation of the sample selection model, using output share as a proxy 
for foreign presence (fpo), and Tables 5.5 and 5.6 report the estimation results using 
the employment (fpe) and assets (fpa) share respectively. 
The estimated correlation ( ρ  in Table 5.4) between the Probit export participation 
equation and the export intensity equation is -0.148, which is significant at the 5 per 
cent level. This indicates that a firm’s decision on whether to export is not 
independent of its decision on how much to export. Hence Cragg’s specification of 
the Tobit model, which assumes the independence between firm’s export 
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participation decision and export intensity decision, is inappropriate here. In addition, 
the significance of athrho and lnsigma confirms the existence of sample selection 
bias, and the computed inverse mills ratio is -0.048. Furthermore, the Tobit 
restriction, that is, explanatory variables have equal effect on both firm’s export 
participation and export intensity decisions, is tested. The test statistics for Tobit 
restriction are 4090.78, which rejects the null that the Tobit restriction is appropriate 
at the 1 per cent significance level.  
In summary, diagnostic tests suggest that firms with sales abroad cannot represent 
the sample of exporting firms, and the explanatory variables have different effects 
on firms’ decision on whether to export and how much to export.  
Existence of export spillovers from FDI and their determinants 
As mentioned earlier, testing for the existence of export spillovers from FDI to 
domestic firms is made in three steps: first to test the joint significance of foreign 
presence and its interaction terms; second to test the joint significance of the 
interaction terms, which is also a test for the determinants of export spillovers; third 
to compute the marginal effect of foreign presence, which is a function of the 
determinants and indicates that different firms can benefit differently from FDI. This 
marginal effect is then evaluated at sample average, which tells on average how FDI 
affects firms’ exports, and at individual firm’s value of these determinants, which 
reveals how FDI affects particular individual firm’s exports, respectively.  
The test statistics for joint significance of foreign presence and its interaction terms 
are 413.7 with p-value of 0 in the export intensity equation and 712.4 with p-value 
of 0 in the export participation equation, which is a necessary condition for the 
existence of spillovers. Second, the test statistics for joint significance of interaction 
terms are 271.2 with p-value of 0 in the export intensity equation and 302.1 with p-
value of 0 in the export participation equation, which confirms that whether the 
export spillovers will occur depends on domestic firms’ characteristics. Third, the 
marginal effect of foreign presence in the export intensity equation, obtained by 
differentiating estimated equation (5.7) with respect to foreign presence (fpo), is: 
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This marginal effect formula indicates that domestic firm size, age, capital intensity, 
unit production cost, average wage, unit labour cost, marketing expense, ownership 
structure and geographical location determine the extent of export spillovers from 
FDI. Firm size, capital intensity, and unit labour cost have positive impacts on 
export spillovers. In contrast, firm age, unit production cost, average wage, and 
marketing expenses have negative impact on export spillovers. State and 
collectively-owned firms benefit more from foreign presence in the industry than 
privately owned firms, and firms located in coastal China are more capable of 
absorbing such export spillovers than firms located in central and western China.  
If the marginal effect formula is evaluated at the sample average, we obtain Table 
5.7, which shows that for an average domestic firm, foreign presence need not 
necessarily benefit its exporting. If the average domestic firm is privately owned and 
located in western China, then a 1 per cent increase in foreign presence will decrease 
its export intensity by 0.12 per cent. If a privately owned average domestic firm is 
located in central China, its export intensity will decrease by 0.19 per cent. For state 
and collectively owned average domestic firms, foreign presence also harms their 
exports. A 1 per cent increase in foreign presence will lower the firm’s export 
intensity by 0.069 per cent if it is located in western China, and by 0.13 per cent if it 
is located in central China. Firms located in coastal China appear to benefit from 
foreign presence. For an average firm located in coastal China, a 1 per cent increase 
in foreign presence will increase 0.16 per cent of its export intensity if it is privately 
owned, and 0.21 per cent if it is state or collectively owned.  In regard to the export 
participation equation, Table 5.4 shows that the marginal effect of foreign presence 
on the probability of domestic firms’ participating in exports depends negatively on 
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their age, unit production cost, average wage, and geographical location, and 
positively on their ownership structure.  
If we evaluate the marginal effect of foreign presence at the value of individual firm 
characteristics, we then can obtain the distribution of the marginal effect, as in 
Figure 5.1. Figure 5.1 shows that the marginal effect of foreign presence for most 
domestic firms is located between –0.5 and 0.5, and there are more firms that have 
positive marginal effect than firms that have negative marginal effects as the 
distribution appears to be positively biased.   
Figure 5.1 Distribution of Marginal Effect of Foreign Presence on Export 
Intensity 
0
1
2
3
4
5
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
Note: marginal effect computed from the estimation using output share as proxy for FDI.
 
 
In summary, the following conclusion can be drawn about export spillovers of FDI 
in China. Export spillovers of FDI in China exist, but the scale of the spillovers 
depends on a variety of factors firm characteristics such as domestic firm’s size, age, 
capital intensity, unit production cost, average wage, unit labour cost, marketing 
expense, ownership structure and geographical location. 
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Impact of other factors on firm export behaviour 
In addition to the foreign presence (fpo) and its interaction terms, there are 11 
additional variables and 29 industry dummies included in the estimation (see Table 
5.4), of which 7 variables in the export intensity equation and 16 variables in the 
export participation equation are insignificant at the 5 per cent level. In the export 
intensity equation, the insignificant variables are domestic firms’ average wage, a 
regional dummy (western), and five industry dummies. Even though the average 
wage and the regional dummy are insignificant themselves, their interaction terms 
with foreign presence are still significant, which indicates that they do have an 
impact on firm’s decisions on how much to export. An F-test for joint significance 
of these individually insignificant variables in the export intensity equation obtains a 
test statistic of 10.81 with a p-value of 0.15, which fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of joint insignificance at the 5 per cent level and rules out the possibility that 
multicollinearity causes these variables to be individually insignificant.  
In the export participation equation,  capital intensity, unit production cost, unit 
labour cost, marketing expense, the Herfindahl index, seven industry dummies, and 
foreign presence’s (fpo) interaction terms with firm size, capital intensity, unit 
labour cost, and marketing expense are insignificant individually at the 5 per cent 
level. However, an F-test for joint significance of these variables obtains a test 
statistic of 36 with a p-value of 0.0018, which rejects the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance at 5 per cent level and suggests that there is multicollinearity among 
these variables. To identify the source of multicollinearity, we first test the joint 
significance of capital intensity, unit production cost, unit labour cost, and marketing 
expense, and obtain an F-test statistic of 6.28 with a p-value of 0.18, which fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at the 5 per cent level. Then we test 
the joint significance of the other individually insignificant variables, namely the 
Herfindahl index, seven industry dummies, and foreign presence’s (fpo) interaction 
terms with firm size, capital intensity, unit labour cost, and marketing expense, and 
obtain an F-test statistic of 18.78 with a p-value of 0.09, which also fails to reject the 
null hypothesis of joint insignificance at the 5 per cent level. This suggests that 
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multicollinearity occurs between some variables in capital intensity, unit production 
cost, unit labour cost, and marketing expense and some variables in the Herfindahl 
index, 7 industry dummies, and foreign presence’s (fpo) interaction terms with firm 
size, capital intensity, unit labour cost, and marketing expense. By examining their 
correlation, we find that capital intensity, unit labour cost, and marketing expense 
are highly correlated with their interaction terms with foreign presence (0.8578, 
0.9950, and 0.8676 respectively). Hence we re-estimate the model by dropping these 
three variables’ interaction terms with foreign presence in the export participation 
equation, and the F-test is conducted to test the joint significance of individually 
insignificant variables in the re-estimated model. It is found that these individually 
insignificant variables are jointly insignificant at the 5 per cent level, ruling out the 
multicollinearity problem. Compared with these two estimations, we find the 
estimated coefficients do not appear to be significantly different, except for capital 
intensity and unit labour cost. The coefficient for the capital intensity in the re-
estimated model is -0.0381 with a robust standard error of 0.012, and the coefficient 
for the unit labour cost is now -0.0134 with a robust standard error of 0.005. Both of 
them are significant at the 5 per cent level. However, even though dropping the three 
variables eliminates the multicollinearity problem, it may introduce a 
misspecification problem. Hence, we decide to keep these three variables, and 
meanwhile bear in mind that capital intensity and unit labour cost do have 
significant impact on domestic firms’ decision on whether to export. The 
multicollinearity problem does not affect our testing for export spillovers, as the 
coefficients estimated do not significantly change after dropping the three variables. 
In regard to the size of domestic firms, the coefficients for size itself and its 
interaction term with foreign presence are -0.0313 and 0.0377 respectively, which 
are both significant at the 5 per cent level.  This indicates that the impact of firm size 
on the decision on how much to export depends on the activity of FDI in the industry. 
In an industry with average foreign presence (0.3305) (hereafter called an average 
industry), the marginal impact of firm size on export intensity is -0.0189, indicating 
that a 1 per cent increase in firm size will decrease export intensity by -0.0189 per 
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cent. However, regarding export participation, firm size has a positive impact, 
namely big firms are more likely to participate in export activities. Bigger firms have 
more resources available for covering the fixed costs of exporting, and hence are 
more likely to enter export activity. However, as China’s comparative advantage lies 
in labour-intensive goods and bigger firms are usually more capital-intensive, bigger 
firms tend to export less.   
Firm age has a significant and negative impact on domestic firm’s export intensity, 
and on average a year’s increase in firm age will decrease export intensity by 0.39 
per cent. It also negatively affects a firm’s decision on whether to export, and older 
firms are less likely to participate in exports in an average industry, indicating that 
young firms are more active in extending their market coverage.  
Capital intensity has a negative impact on export intensity, namely in an average 
industry the increase of capital intensity by 1 per cent will decrease the export 
intensity by 0.6 per cent.  Table 5.4 shows both the capital intensity and its 
interaction term with foreign presence are insignificant in the export participation 
equation. However as suggested above this is due to the multicollinearity problem. 
Re-estimation, dropping the interaction terms, shows the capital intensity has a 
significant and negative impact on a firm’s decision on whether to export. Again, 
this is due to the comparative advantage. China is a country with a rich labour 
endowment, which makes firms with lower capital intensity more likely to export 
and more competitive in the world market. 
We expect that production cost has a negative impact on both a firm’s decision on 
whether to export and how much to export, and the estimation confirms our prior 
expectation. In an average industry, a 1 per cent increase of unit production cost will 
decrease a firm’s export intensity by 0.006 per cent. It also negatively affects the 
likelihood to export, as shown in Table 5.4. 
The average wage is a proxy for human capital, with higher average wages 
indicating higher human capital assets. The coefficient for average wage in the 
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export intensity equation itself is insignificant at the 5 per cent level (-0.001 with a 
p-value of 0.07), but the coefficient of its interaction term with foreign presence (-
0.0049) is negative and significant, which indicates that firms with higher average 
wage will export less. In the export participation equation, the coefficients for 
average wage and its interaction term are both significant, the former being positive 
(0.0102) the latter being negative (-0.0147). Thus in an average industry, the net 
impact of average wages on the likelihood of exporting is positive, namely the 
labour quality matters. 
The coefficient of unit labour cost in the export intensity equation is significantly 
negative (-0.175), however the coefficient of its interaction term is significantly 
positive (0.812). Thus in an average industry, the marginal effect of unit labour costs 
on a firm’s export intensity is positive with a 1 per cent increase in the unit labour 
cost producing a 0.093 per cent increase in export intensity. In the export 
participation equation, the coefficients for both unit labour cost and its interaction 
terms are insignificant, which is due to the multicollinearity problem. In the 
regression that drops the interaction terms in the export participation equation, we 
find that unit labour cost has a significant and negative impact on the probability that 
firms participate in exports.  
Marketing expense has a coefficient that is significant and positive (0.1288), while 
the coefficient of its interaction term is significant and negative (-0.2058), which 
makes its net marginal impact on firms’ export intensity positive in an average 
industry, namely a 1 per cent increase in marketing expense will increase export 
intensity by 0.061 per cent. Marketing expenses appear not to play a role in a firm’s 
decision on whether to export, even after accounting for the multicollinearity 
problem. 
The Herfindahl index has a negative impact on export intensity, which is consistent 
with the prior expectation, as firms with domestic market power are more willing to 
exploit such market power than export. Table 5.4 shows that a 1 per cent increase in 
Herfindahl index will decrease firm’s export intensity by 0.781 per cent. In contrast, 
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the domestic market structure appears not to affect a firm’s decision on whether to 
export, as the coefficient of Herfindahl index in the export participation equation is 
insignificant.  
Domestic firm’s ownership structure also has a significant impact on both firm 
export participation and intensity. The coefficients of ownership and its interaction 
term are significant, with the former being positive (0.114) and the latter being 
negative (-0.054). Hence in an average industry, the net marginal impact of 
ownership is positive, that is, the export intensity of privately owned firms is 0.096 
higher than that of state and collectively owned firms. The coefficients of ownership 
and its interaction term in the export participation equation are both significantly 
positive, indicating privately owned firms are more likely to export. Compared with 
state and collectively owned firms, privately owned firms are more labour intensive, 
which gives them a comparative advantage in the world market.  
Transportation cost is one important factor that affects international trade, with 
exports from coastal China incurring less transportation cost than exports from 
central and western China. In addition, the level of development and infrastructure in 
coastal China is better than those in central and western China. Hence we expect 
firms located in coastal China will be more likely to export and will export more 
than firms located in central and western China. The estimation presented in Table 
5.4 confirms this prior expectation. In the export participation equation, the 
coefficients of regional dummies (middle and western) and their interaction terms 
are all significantly negative. In the export intensity equation, the coefficient of 
western is insignificant, but the coefficient of its interaction term is significantly 
negative (-0.283); the coefficient of middle is significantly positive (0.081), but the 
coefficient of its interaction term is significantly negative (-0.347), which makes the 
net marginal impact of western negative (-0.034) in an average industry.  
In summary, the estimation results reported in Table 5.4 confirm a variety of factors 
that affect domestic firms’ export participation and intensity.  
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Sensitivity analysis 
We have shown that FDI affects domestic firms’ export participation and intensity, 
which in turn depends on firm characteristics. To what extent is this result due to the 
way we measure the FDI? Conventionally, there are three proxies to measure FDI in 
an industry, namely the FDI invested firms’ output, employment, and assets share in 
the industry.  In Chapter 4, we have shown the three proxies measure the FDI 
consistently in the sense that they are highly correlated with each other and rank the 
two-digit industries consistently, even though the employment share appears to be 
different from the output and assets share. 
Our previous analysis was based on estimation using output share as the proxy for 
FDI. To see whether the result is sensitive to the measurement of FDI, we re-
estimate the model using the employment and asset share as proxy for FDI 
respectively. Table 5.5 and 5.6 present the estimation results.  
The estimated correlation between the export participation equation and export 
intensity equation are -0.147 and -0.148 for the regression using employment and 
assets share as proxy for FDI respectively, which is not significantly different from 
the estimated correlation in the regression using output share as proxy for FDI (-
0.149). Sample selection bias also exists in these two regressions, as the athrho and 
lnsigma are both significant. The Tobit restriction is also rejected at the 5 per cent 
level in both regressions.  
Comparing the coefficient estimates, we can find that the estimated coefficients are 
consistent with each other in the sense that their sign does not change and generally 
one estimate is within one or two standard deviations of another estimate. For 
example, for the coefficient of firm size, the three estimates are -0.031 (with robust 
standard error of 0.005), -0.03 (with robust standard error of 0.005), and -0.031 
(with robust standard error of 0.005). One exception is the coefficient of foreign 
presence. The coefficient of output share foreign presence is 0.472 with robust 
standard error of 0.086; the coefficient of assets share foreign presence is 0.372 with 
robust standard error of 0.035; in contrast the coefficient of employment share 
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foreign presence is 0.725 with robust standard error of 0.031, which is higher than 
other two estimates.  
If we evaluate the marginal impact of foreign presence, computed from the three 
regressions, at the sample average, we obtain Table 5.7. From Table 5.7, we can see 
the estimation using assets share as proxy for FDI presents a similar picture as the 
estimation using output share as proxy for FDI. In contrast, the marginal impact in 
the estimation using employment share as proxy for FDI is higher than the other two.  
Considering the fact that FDI invested firms are usually more capital intensive than 
their domestic counterparts and hence the employment share will tend to under-
represent the activities of FDI in the industry, the other two estimations are more 
credible.  
Conclusions 
This chapter analysed export spillovers from FDI and their determinants, using a 
firm level cross-sectional micro-data set that consists of over 140 thousand domestic 
firms in the manufacturing sector in China in 2003. The chapter first showed in a 
theoretical model that if FDI invested firms can reduce domestic firm’s export costs, 
for example via knowledge spillovers, then domestic firms will benefit from the 
presence of FDI in the domestic industry unambiguously in the sense that their 
exports will be promoted. This hypothesis was then tested empirically using the 
Heckman sample selection model in which firm’s decisions about whether to export 
and how much to export are dependent on each other. The Heckman sample 
selection model is estimated using a full information maximum likelihood estimation. 
This estimation found that FDI in the manufacturing sector generates export 
spillovers, and furthermore that the scale of spillovers depends positively on firm 
size, capital intensity, and unit labour cost, and negatively on firm age, unit 
production cost, average wage, marketing expense, ownership structure and 
geographical location. 
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Table 5.4 Estimation Results Using Output Share as Foreign Presence 
 Exports Intensity Exports Participation 
Variables Coefficient 
Robust 
Std.Err. Coefficient 
Robust 
Std.Err. 
firm size -0.0313  0.0047  0.3575  0.0594  
firm age -0.0029  0.0003  0.0019  0.0009  
capital intensity -0.0621  0.0146  -0.0345*  0.0289  
unit production 
cost 0.0089  0.0020  0.0012*  0.0009  
average wage -0.0010*  0.0005  0.0102  0.0022  
unit labour cost -0.1749  0.0276  -0.0211*  0.0264  
marketing 
expense 0.1288  0.0424  -0.1042*  0.0624  
Herfindahl index -0.7811  0.3328  -0.9255*  0.6766  
ownership 0.1138  0.0107  0.1483  0.0236  
western -0.0159*  0.0152  -0.1644  0.0347  
middle 0.0810  0.0145  -0.1557  0.0307  
fpo 0.4724  0.0863  0.9331  0.1338  
fpo ×firm size 0.0377  0.0069  -0.1266*  0.1326  
fpo ×firm age -0.0028  0.0009  -0.0224  0.0026  
fpo ×capital 
intensity 0.0679  0.0159  -0.0057*  0.0430  
fpo ×unit 
production cost -0.0448  0.0094  -0.0184  0.0058  
fpo ×average 
wage -0.0049  0.0011  -0.0147  0.0044  
fpo ×unit labour 
cost 0.8123  0.1048  0.0171*  0.0525  
fpo ×marketing 
expense -0.2058  0.0871  0.1972*  0.1127  
fpo ×ownership -0.0537  0.0246  0.3846  0.0614  
fpo ×western -0.2825  0.0421  -0.3805  0.1040  
fpo ×middle -0.3467  0.0377  -0.6525  0.0891  
d14 -0.0198*  0.0173  0.0208*  0.0376  
d15 -0.1267  0.0242  -0.1433  0.0463  
d16 -0.0796*  0.0421  -0.2979*  0.2032  
d17 -0.0138*  0.0108  0.3360  0.0259  
d18 0.1316  0.0109  0.5667  0.0318  
d19 0.1133  0.0122  0.6062  0.0393  
d20 0.1049  0.0165  0.1731  0.0399  
d21 0.0693  0.0172  0.2044  0.0474  
d22 -0.1692  0.0201  -0.4199  0.0384  
d23 -0.1368  0.0287  -0.4707  0.0483  
d24 0.0791  0.0132  0.6718  0.0535  
d25 -0.1350  0.0409  -0.4817  0.0959  
d26 -0.1268  0.0120  0.0253*  0.0269  
d27 -0.1195  0.0158  0.1338  0.0366  
d28 -0.2266  0.0325  -0.2037  0.0727  
  132
d29 -0.1068  0.0195  0.0523*  0.0491  
d30 -0.0443  0.0136  -0.0497*  0.0314  
d31 -0.0200*  0.0134  -0.0695  0.0270  
d32 -0.1156  0.0224  -0.2881  0.0462  
d33 -0.1246  0.0185  0.0908  0.0411  
d34 0.0545  0.0120  0.1716  0.0286  
d35 -0.1067  0.0119  0.1514  0.0269  
d36 -0.2270  0.0135  0.0733  0.0319  
d37 -0.1567  0.0135  0.0105*  0.0311  
d39 -0.0731  0.0121  0.0844  0.0290  
d40 -0.1061  0.0138  0.0902  0.0390  
d41 -0.0458  0.0164  0.2735  0.0443  
d42 0.1846  0.0116  0.8374  0.0387  
d43 -0.0093*  0.2580  -0.4010*  0.2715  
Past exports experience  2.4345  0.0130  
constant 0.4396  0.0425  -1.8156  0.0700  
     
Observations 140,335    
Log 
pseudolikelihood -49623.77    
athrho -0.1487  0.0085    
lnsigma -1.1238  0.0030    
rho -0.1476  0.0083    
sigma 0.3251  0.0010    
lambda -0.0480  0.0027    
Test for Tobit 
Restriction (chi2) 4090.78       
Note: * denotes insignificance at the 5 per cent level; figures are rounded 
at the 4 digit level. 
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Table 5.5 Estimation Results Using Employment Share as Foreign Presence 
 Exports Intensity Exports Participation 
Variables Coefficient
Robust 
Std.Err. Coefficient
Robust 
Std.Err. 
firm size -0.0302  0.0045  0.3511  0.0606  
firm age -0.0030  0.0003  0.0026  0.0009  
capital intensity -0.0548  0.0128  -0.0219*  0.0249  
unit production cost 0.0079  0.0017  0.0011*  0.0010  
average wage -0.0009*  0.0005  0.0108  0.0022  
unit labour cost -0.1508  0.0254  -0.0211*  0.0279  
marketing expense 0.2149  0.0226  0.0925*  0.0637  
Herfindahl index -0.8290  0.3228  -1.0843*  0.6355  
ownership 0.1187  0.0105  0.1870  0.0236  
western -0.0342  0.0150  -0.1735  0.0339  
middle 0.0643  0.0140  -0.1633  0.0299  
fpe 0.7252  0.0307  1.7066  0.0852  
fpe ×firm size 0.0389  0.0063  -0.0753  0.1370  
fpe ×firm age -0.0020  0.0008  -0.0233*  0.0026  
fpe ×capital intensity 0.0660  0.0158  -0.0231*  0.0432  
fpe ×unit production 
cost -0.0399  0.0082  -0.0181  0.0059  
fpe ×average wage -0.0043  0.0010  -0.0159  0.0043  
fpe ×unit labour cost 0.7040  0.0945  0.0159*  0.0552  
fpe ×marketing 
expense -0.3774  0.0403  -0.1758*  0.1052  
fpe ×ownership -0.0706  0.0239  0.2553  0.0610  
fpe ×western -0.2054  0.0415  -0.2933  0.1018  
fpe ×middle -0.2807  0.0367  -0.5796  0.0868  
d14 0.0180*  0.0167  0.0704  0.0378  
d15 -0.0646  0.0237  -0.0678*  0.0471  
d16 -0.0283*  0.0408  -0.2551*  0.2005  
d17 0.0098*  0.0107  0.3327  0.0264  
d18 0.1105  0.0107  0.4155  0.0332  
d19 0.0638  0.0121  0.4023  0.0413  
d20 0.1288  0.0165  0.1721  0.0402  
d21 0.0416  0.0173  0.0419*  0.0482  
d22 -0.1069  0.0199  -0.3337  0.0390  
d23 -0.1001  0.0287  -0.4534  0.0487  
d24 0.0308  0.0131  0.4697  0.0552  
d25 -0.1043  0.0401  -0.4574  0.0963  
d26 -0.0498  0.0122  0.1398  0.0277  
d27 -0.0698  0.0158  0.1774  0.0370  
d28 -0.1734  0.0331  -0.1637  0.0725  
d29 -0.0938  0.0193  0.0141*  0.0498  
d30 -0.0577  0.0134  -0.1367  0.0326  
d31 0.0307  0.0134  -0.0046*  0.0276  
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d32 -0.0550  0.0222  -0.2042  0.0465  
d33 -0.0736  0.0186  0.1474  0.0414  
d34 0.0774  0.0119  0.1745  0.0291  
d35 -0.0425  0.0121  0.2290  0.0274  
d36 -0.1691  0.0136  0.1373  0.0324  
d37 -0.0616  0.0139  0.1495  0.0320  
d39 -0.0632  0.0120  0.0324*  0.0297  
d40 -0.0900  0.0137  0.0095*  0.0396  
d41 -0.0070*  0.0163  0.3215  0.0454  
d42 0.1427  0.0115  0.6636  0.0402  
d43 0.1001*  0.2601  -0.2610*  0.2719  
Past exports 
experience   2.4222  0.0130  
constant 0.3333  0.0210  -2.0460  0.0524  
     
Observations 140,335    
Log pseudolikelihood -49053.7    
athrho -0.1478  0.0086    
lnsigma -1.1334  0.0031    
rho -0.1468  0.0084    
sigma 0.3219  0.0010    
lambda -0.0472  0.0027    
Test for Tobit 
Restriction (chi2) 4138.74       
Note: * denotes insignificance at the 5 per cent level; figures are rounded at 
the 4 digit level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Estimation Results Using Assets Share as Foreign Presence 
 Exports Intensity Exports Participation 
Variables Coefficient
Robust 
Std.Err. Coefficient 
Robust 
Std.Err. 
firm size -0.0314  0.0047  0.3551  0.0595  
firm age -0.0030  0.0003  0.0013*  0.0009  
capital intensity -0.0606  0.0153  -0.0294*  0.0306  
unit production cost 0.0097  0.0018  0.0011*  0.0009  
average wage -0.0011  0.0005  0.0096  0.0020  
unit labour cost -0.1782  0.0280  -0.0201*  0.0250  
marketing expense 0.0755  0.0247  -0.2645  0.0515  
Herfindahl index -0.7467  0.3335  -0.9023*  0.6709  
ownership 0.1096  0.0106  0.1265  0.0231  
western -0.0173*  0.0151  -0.1770  0.0343  
middle 0.0838  0.0144  -0.1662  0.0303  
fpa 0.3724  0.0350  0.5771  0.0856  
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fpa ×firm size 0.0387  0.0067  -0.1150*  0.1331  
fpa ×firm age -0.0025  0.0008  -0.0202  0.0025  
fpa ×capital intensity 0.0708  0.0187  -0.0150*  0.0490  
fpa ×unit production 
cost -0.0484  0.0084  -0.0182  0.0058  
fpa ×average wage -0.0044  0.0010  -0.0130  0.0040  
fpa ×unit labour cost 0.8282  0.1046  0.0151*  0.0499  
fpa ×marketing expense -0.1020  0.0446  0.4895  0.0934  
fpa ×ownership -0.0458*  0.0241  0.4442  0.0598  
fpa ×western -0.2673  0.0419  -0.3345  0.1031  
fpa ×middle -0.3436  0.0374  -0.6136  0.0883  
d14 -0.0005*  0.0174  0.0391*  0.0375  
d15 -0.1164  0.0243  -0.1286  0.0465  
d16 -0.0803*  0.0412  -0.3169*  0.2029  
d17 -0.0081*  0.0107  0.3396  0.0259  
d18 0.1438  0.0109  0.5826  0.0317  
d19 0.1148  0.0121  0.6056  0.0393  
d20 0.0985  0.0165  0.1515  0.0400  
d21 0.0760  0.0172  0.2076  0.0474  
d22 -0.1794  0.0201  -0.4359  0.0385  
d23 -0.1205  0.0290  -0.4553  0.0483  
d24 0.0728  0.0131  0.6646  0.0536  
d25 -0.1365  0.0409  -0.4862  0.0959  
d26 -0.1152  0.0120  0.0381*  0.0270  
d27 -0.1060  0.0157  0.1473  0.0369  
d28 -0.2269  0.0321  -0.2171  0.0729  
d29 -0.1123  0.0195  0.0433*  0.0493  
d30 -0.0520  0.0135  -0.0616*  0.0316  
d31 -0.0122*  0.0135  -0.0755  0.0270  
d32 -0.0913  0.0223  -0.2562  0.0465  
d33 -0.1145  0.0187  0.0960  0.0411  
d34 0.0588  0.0120  0.1705  0.0286  
d35 -0.0990  0.0119  0.1528  0.0269  
d36 -0.2095  0.0136  0.0918  0.0321  
d37 -0.1360  0.0136  0.0349*  0.0313  
d39 -0.0594  0.0121  0.1047  0.0291  
d40 -0.0586  0.0143  0.1621  0.0394  
d41 -0.0039*  0.0167  0.3391  0.0452  
d42 0.1859  0.0115  0.8388*  0.0387  
d43 -0.0675*  0.2448  -0.4559  0.2714  
Past exports experience   2.4334  0.0130  
constant 0.4717  0.0244  -1.6599  0.0523  
     
Observations 140,335    
Log pseudolikelihood -49574.8    
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athrho -0.1481  0.0085    
lnsigma -1.1252  0.0030    
rho -0.1471  0.0083    
sigma 0.3246  0.0010    
lambda -0.0477  0.0027    
Test for Tobit 
Restriction (chi2) 4104.33       
Note: * denotes insignificance at the 5 per cent level; figures are rounded at 
the 4 digit level. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7 Marginal Effect of Foreign Presence on Export Intensity 
  Western China Central China Coastal China 
  fpo fpe fpa fpo fpe fpa Fpo fpe fpa 
Privately owned -0.1224 0.0478 -0.1137 -0.1867 -0.0274 -0.1900 0.1600 0.2533 0.1536
State/Collectively 
owned -0.0687 0.1185 -0.0679 -0.1330 0.0432 -0.1442 0.2137 0.3239 0.1994
Note: The marginal effect is evaluated at sample average. 
          The fpo/fpe/fpa denotes the marginal effect is computed from the estimation using output/employment/assets 
share as proxy for FDI. 
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6. Industrial Evidence of FDI Spillovers  
Firms across different industries are heterogeneous. Some industries, and the firms 
within them, are more export oriented and some are not. The presence of foreign 
investment in different industries is very different. One way of controlling for these 
differences is to focus on one industry and look at how the firms in that industry are 
affected by the presence of FDI in the industry.  
In Chapters 4 and 5, we examined technology and export spillovers of FDI in the 
whole manufacturing sector at a point of time, namely 2003. This chapter focuses on 
the FDI spillovers in a two-digit industry, the cultural, educational, and sporting 
product manufacturing industry (hereafter the industry), in which there are 
significant export activities and high level of FDI and the observations of behaviour 
in the industry spread over four years. For example, in 2003 the average export 
intensity in this industry was as high as 60 per cent and the average foreign presence 
measured in terms of output/assets/employment share was also rather high, from 59 
to 65 per cent depending on which measure is used (see Table 4.1 and 5.3 for 
details). Focusing on an industry alleviates the firm heterogeneity and endogeneity 
problem of FDI that is caused by the possibility that FDI tends to flow into 
industries with higher productivity and export intensity. It is reasonable to assume 
firms within the same two-digit industry have similar export behaviour when firms 
decide to export, as products of these firms are usually similar to each other and 
hence their exporting activity, export costs, such as the transportation and insurance 
costs, and the government's export policy, are similar, and leads to a similar export 
behaviour.  
The chapter is organized into seven sections. In the first section, labour productivity 
and the export intensity of firms, and activities of FDI in the industry are described, 
providing background for the subsequent empirical exercise. Then we present two 
empirical models, namely a panel data model to test technology spillovers and a 
Heckman sample selection model to test export spillovers, and construct variables 
used in the estimation in the subsequent two sections. Empirical results from testing 
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technology and export spillovers are reported, and their robustness, that is, whether 
the results are sensitive to three different measurements of foreign presence, is 
verified. The last section concludes the chapter. 
Table 6.1 Distribution of Firms across Four-digit Industry 
Number of Firms Industry 
Code  Industry Name 2000 2001 2002 2003
24 
Cultural, Educational, and Sporting Product 
Manufacturing Industry 1,879 2,024 2,327 2,814
2411 Stationery manufacturing 175 193 215 242 
2413 Book and pamphlet manufacturing  119 112 126 298 
2415 Pen manufacturing 158 185 223 244 
2417 Teaching model manufacturing  29 36 38 41 
2419 Other cultural product manufacturing 69 63 63 67 
2421 Sporting balls manufacturing 82 93 98 115 
2423 Sporting equipment manufacturing 110 113 137 134 
2429 Other sporting product manufacturing 112 139 190 322 
2431 Chinese musical instrument manufacturing 16 17 20 23 
2433 Western musical instrument manufacturing 68 80 83 85 
2435 Electric musical instrument manufacturing 10 16 25 31 
2439 
Other musical instrument and product 
manufacturing 
18 20 23 27 
2440 Toy manufacturing 850 881 1,015 1,133 
2450 Entertainment equipment manufacturing 17 22 24 19 
2490 Others not included elsewhere  46 54 47 33 
Note: Since 2003, the Industry Classification Code System has been changed from version 1994 to 
version 2002. The table adopts the Industry Classification Code version 1992, and the 2003 data is 
converted to the 1992 version.  
 
The cultural, educational and sporting product manufacturing industry is a two digit 
industry (24), which includes 14 four digit industrial sub-categories.  Table 6.1 
presents the decomposition of the two-digit industry and number of firms in the 
industries24 . Two points can be observed from this table. First, the industry is 
expanding quickly in terms of the number of firms in it. In 2001, 2002, and 2003, the 
number of firms in the industry grew by 8.6 per cent, 15.1 per cent, and 14.3 per cent 
respectively. The number of firms in most of the 14 four-digit industries has 
increased, except for the sporting equipment manufacturing industry (2423) in 2003, 
                                                 
24 The data used in this chapter are an unbalanced panel data in the Industry from 2000 to 2003, which comes 
from the National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing. 
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other cultural product manufacturing (2419) in 2001, entertainment equipment 
manufacturing (2450) in 2003, and other products not included elsewhere (2490) in 
2002 and 2003. Second, most firms are concentrated in the toy manufacturing 
industry (2440). In 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, firms located in the toy 
manufacturing industry account for 48.3 per cent, 46.1 per cent, 46.1 per cent, and 
45 per cent of the industry respectively. 
Firm Productivity, Exports, and FDI in the Industry 
Firm labour productivity in the industry 
This subsection describes the picture of firm labour productivity, proxied by the 
logarithm of sales per employee in the industry from three aspects, namely the 
distribution across all four-digit industries, its evolution over time, and whether FDI 
invested firms’ labour productivity is different from that of domestic firms, whether 
the productivity of privately owned firms is distributed differently from that of state 
and collectively owned firms, and whether the labour productivity distributions 
exhibit regional heterogeneity.  
Figure 6.1 presents a general picture of the distribution of firm labour productivity.  
Table 6.2 describes distributions across four-digit industries. In Figure 6.1 we 
observe that the distribution of firms’ labour productivity (the solid curve) roughly 
has the same mean as a normal distribution (the dashed curve), but its standard 
deviation appears to be smaller.  
Table 6.2 presents the mean and standard deviation of firm productivity across four-
digit industries in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. From the table, we can see 
considerable variation of labour productivity across different industries. For example, 
in 2000, the highest logarithm labour productivity is 5.26 in the electric musical 
instrument manufacturing industry (2435), and in contrast the lowest is 3.99 in the 
entertainment equipment manufacturing industry (2450), with the former being 1.27 
higher than the latter which if transformed back to the non-logarithm form means the 
former is 3.5 times the latter. Ranking labour productivity across four-digit 
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industries25, we can see that even though there is variation in the ranking, industries 
that are ranked at the top tend to remain at the top. One exception is the 
entertainment equipment manufacturing industry (2450). In 2000 it is ranked 
number 14, while in 2003 its rank jumps to number 2, possibly due to technology 
accumulation or economies of scale.  
Figure 6.1 Distribution of Firm Labour Productivity 
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25 In 2000 the top five industries are electric musical instrument manufacturing (2435), other sporting product 
manufacturing (2429), stationery manufacturing (2411), others not included elsewhere (2490), and sporting 
equipment manufacturing (2423); in 2001 the top five industries are electric musical instrument manufacturing 
(2435), other sporting product manufacturing (2429), others not included elsewhere (2490), entertainment 
equipment manufacturing (2450), and stationery manufacturing (2411); in 2002, the top five industries are other 
sporting product manufacturing (2429), others not included elsewhere (2490), electric musical instrument 
manufacturing (2435), pen manufacturing (2415), and stationery manufacturing (2411); in 2003, the top five 
industries are electric musical instrument manufacturing (2435), entertainment equipment manufacturing (2450), 
other sporting product manufacturing (2429), other musical instrument and product manufacturing (2439), and 
stationery manufacturing (2411). 
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Table 6.2 Summary of Firm Labour Productivity in Four-digit Industries 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Industry 
Code No. of 
obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. 
No. of 
obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. 
No. of 
obs. Mean
Std. 
Dev. 
No. of 
obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
2411 169 4.58 1.03 193 4.62 0.96 211 4.61 0.93 233 4.70 0.90 
2413 113 3.79 1.08 107 3.96 1.18 119 4.27 1.21 284 4.28 1.36 
2415 148 4.36 1.12 176 4.46 0.99 218 4.63 0.78 236 4.70 0.86 
2417 27 4.19 0.98 36 4.11 1.05 38 4.34 1.06 40 4.55 1.16 
2419 65 4.13 1.10 62 4.22 0.95 61 4.33 0.95 64 4.56 0.76 
2421 81 4.28 0.88 92 4.31 0.94 97 4.36 0.93 115 4.58 0.84 
2423 109 4.36 1.00 112 4.57 0.95 137 4.55 1.23 132 4.68 0.76 
2429 110 4.78 1.06 137 4.88 0.88 185 4.91 0.86 311 4.77 1.15 
2431 16 4.30 0.81 17 3.96 1.55 20 4.14 0.95 23 4.32 0.84 
2433 65 4.11 0.90 80 4.29 0.95 81 4.29 0.79 80 4.46 0.95 
2435 10 5.26 1.23 16 5.04 1.17 24 4.67 1.08 31 4.93 1.14 
2439 17 4.33 0.74 20 4.37 0.74 23 4.45 0.64 27 4.74 0.77 
2440 843 4.18 1.03 878 4.22 1.00 1004 4.30 0.95 1106 4.34 0.95 
2450 16 3.99 1.56 21 4.76 1.20 23 4.47 0.96 19 4.86 1.20 
2490 44 4.56 1.14 53 4.86 1.06 47 4.82 0.85 33 4.54 0.86 
Total 1833 4.27 1.06 2000 4.36 1.03 2288 4.44 0.97 2734 4.50 1.02 
Note:  The firm labour productivity is in logarithm form. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
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Table 6.2 also reveals the time trend of average labour productivity in different 
industries, as the figures in the table are all in constant price. Overall, average firm 
labour productivity increases over time. In 2000, average firm labour productivity is 
4.23, and grows to 4.5 in 2003. For different industries, we can also see that almost 
every industry exhibits this positive trend. One exception is the electric musical 
instrument manufacturing industry (2435). In 2000, its logarithm labour productivity 
is 5.26, and it declines to 5.04 in 2001 and 4.67 in 2002. In 2003, logarithm labour 
productivity in this industry increases to 4.93, which is still lower than its level in 
2000.  From 2000 to 2003, the standard deviations of labour productivity in different 
industries appear to have quite small changes. For example, for the electric musical 
instrument manufacturing industry (2435), the standard deviations in 2000, 2001, 
2002, and 2003 are 1.23, 1.17, 1.08, and 1.14 respectively. Combining this 
information about both mean and standard deviation, we can see that the distribution 
of firm labour productivity is moving to the right with little change in the spread of 
the distribution.  
One important question in exploring firm labour productivity is whether the FDI 
invested firms have higher labour productivity than their domestic counterparts. 
Figure 6.2 presents the distribution of labour productivity for both FDI invested 
firms and domestic firms. These data show that that the two distributions do not 
appear to be significantly different from each other. A two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test is carried out to test for equality of these two distributions. The 
combined K-S obtained is 0.0233 with a p-value of 0.181, which confirms the 
similarity of these two distributions. In this industry, there is more FDI that comes 
from overseas multinational enterprises (MNEs) than from non-overseas MNEs. In 
2003, the ratio of non-overseas MNE FDI invested firms against overseas MNE FDI 
invested firms is 0.92 for the whole manufacturing sector, while in contrast this ratio 
is 0.69 for this industry. Previous studies that focused on the source of FDI have 
found that the FDI from overseas MNEs tends to generate less, even no, productivity 
spillovers to domestic firms (Li et al., 2001, and Buckley et al., 2002). Hence it is 
perhaps not that surprising to see the distribution of labour productivity of FDI 
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invested and domestic firms to be not significantly different from each other in the 
industry26. 
Figure 6.2 Distribution of Labour Productivity of Domestic and FDI Firms 
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Even though FDI invested firms appear to have the same labour productivity 
distribution as that of domestic firms, the distribution of state and collectively owned 
firms appears to be significantly different from that of privately owned firms. Figure 
6.3 presents the two distributions. Apparently the distribution of privately owned 
firms is biased towards the right, compared with that of state and collectively owned 
firms, which indicates that the mean labour productivity of privately owned firms is 
higher than that of state and collectively owned firms.  The two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also rejects the hypothesis that the two distributions are 
not different from each other, with the combined K-S being 0.1063 and a p-value 
being 0.  
 
                                                 
26 The empirical exercise later finds no evidence of technology spillovers from FDI, further confirming this point. 
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Figure 6.3 Distribution of Labour Productivity by Ownership 
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The distribution of firm labour productivity also exhibits regional heterogeneity. 
Figure 6.4 presents the labour productivity distributions in western, central, and 
coastal China. The distributions of central and western China do not appear to be 
very different from each other. The distribution of coastal China is significantly 
biased to the right compared with the other two distributions, indicating firms in 
coastal China are more likely to have higher labour productivity than firms located 
in western and central China.  
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Figure 6.4 Distribution of Labour Productivity by Regions 
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Firm exports in the industry 
One common feature in manufacturing more generally is that many firms do not 
export. However in this industry, firms’ export activities are much more significant 
than in other industries. In the industry, on average 67.3 per cent of all firms export27.  
For those firms that do export, the average export intensity is 82 per cent, 84 per cent, 
82 per cent, and 83 per cent, in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 respectively. 
Furthermore, there are a number of firms that specialize entirely in exports. In 2000, 
2001, 2002, and 2003, there are 671, 697, 764, and 923 firms with export intensity 
of 100 per cent respectively. They accounted for 53.3 per cent, 51.3 per cent, 47.2 
per cent, and 49.9 per cent of all exporting firms.  Hence, we observe a pattern 
where many firms do export, and furthermore the exporting firms export a 
significant proportion of their outputs.  
                                                 
27 In 2000, 1,258 firms were exporting. They accounted for 67 per cent of the total of 1,879 firms. In 2001, 1,360 
firms out of the 2024 firms exported, accounting for 67.2 per cent. In 2002 and 2003, 1,619 and 1,848 firms 
exported, accounting for 69.6 per cent and 65.7 per cent of the total 2,327 and 2,814 firms respectively. 
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There are 4,112 firms in the industry across the four years. All together there are 
2,704 exporting firms 28 , which can be classified into two types: sporadically 
exporting firms and frequently exporting firms.  In terms of the data set used in this 
chapter, the frequently exporting firms are defined as firms which have export 
records every year and all the other exporting firms are hence sporadically exporting 
firms. According to this classification, 2,321 firms are frequently exporting firms, 
accounting for 85.6 per cent of all exporting firms and 56.4 per cent of all firms. 
Hence, the majority of exporting firms export frequently. 
Table 6.3 presents the distribution of the number of exporting firms across the four-
digit industries. Many exporting firms are concentrated in the toy manufacturing 
industry (2240). Furthermore, firms in this industry are more likely to export, and if 
they export they tend to be frequent exporters29. For firms in the other industries, the 
variation in the number of firms is much smaller. 
                                                 
28 646 firms have export records in all four years, accounting for 23.9 per cent of total exporting firms, 434 firms 
have export records in three years, accounting for 16.1 per cent, 575 firms export in two years, accounting for 
21.3 per cent, and 1,049 firms only export in one years, accounting for 38.8 per cent. 
29 In terms of firm number, 1,681 firms of the total 4,112 firms are located in the toy manufacturing industry, 
accounting for 40.9 per cent. In contrast in the 2,321 frequent exporting firms 52.0 per cent of them are 
concentrated in the toy manufacturing industry. For firms that export four/three/two/one times, 53.7/50/50.1/50.3 
per cent of them are concentrated in the toy manufacturing industry, which is significantly higher than the 
average industry proportion of 40.9 per cent. For the non-exporting firms, 21.4 per cent is located in the toy 
manufacturing industry, and for the sporadically exporting firms 26.5 per cent of them are located in the toy 
manufacturing industry. Even though this is a higher proportion than that of other industries, it is much lower 
than the proportion in the industry overall, of 40.9 per cent. 
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Table 6.3 Distribution of Exporting Firms across Four-digit Industries 
[0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [frequent] [sporadic] [all] Industry 
Code Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % Number % 
2411 137 9.73 79 7.53 57 9.91 45 10.37 48 7.43 187 8.06 179 9.99 366 8.90 
2413 352 25 20 1.91 16 2.78 9 2.07 8 1.24 39 1.68 366 20.44 405 9.85 
2415 124 8.81 69 6.58 55 9.57 35 8.06 58 8.98 178 7.67 163 9.1 341 8.29 
2417 49 3.48 4 0.38 4 0.70 0 0 3 0.46 8 0.34 52 2.9 60 1.46 
2419 82 5.82 26 2.48 9 1.57 5 1.15 9 1.39 44 1.9 87 4.86 131 3.19 
2421 39 2.77 37 3.53 18 3.13 16 3.69 39 6.04 90 3.88 59 3.29 149 3.62 
2423 50 3.55 68 6.48 40 6.96 31 7.14 42 6.50 157 6.76 74 4.13 231 5.62 
2429 111 7.88 151 14.39 52 9.04 34 7.83 42 6.50 251 10.81 139 7.76 390 9.48 
2431 19 1.35 4 0.38 4 0.70 2 0.46 6 0.93 13 0.56 22 1.23 35 0.85 
2433 41 2.91 27 2.57 10 1.74 17 3.92 28 4.33 66 2.84 57 3.18 123 2.99 
2435 14 0.99 4 0.38 3 0.52 3 0.69 7 1.08 15 0.65 16 0.89 31 0.75 
2439 26 1.85 6 0.57 1 0.17 4 0.92 3 0.46 11 0.47 29 1.62 40 0.97 
2440 301 21.38 528 50.33 288 50.09 217 50 347 53.72 1206 51.96 475 26.52 1681 40.88 
2450 18 1.28 3 0.29 9 1.57 5 1.15 1 0.15 13 0.56 23 1.28 36 0.88 
2490 45 3.20 23 2.19 9 1.57 11 2.53 5 0.77 43 1.85 50 2.79 93 2.26 
Total 1408 100 1049 100 575 100 434 100 646 100 2321 100 1791 100 4112 100 
Note: [4]/[3]/[2]/[1] denote the number of firms that have export records in 4/3/2/1/all years; [0] denotes non-exporting firms; [all] denotes all firms; [frequent] denotes 
frequent exporters; and [sporadic] denotes sporadic exporters. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
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FDI in the industry 
FDI in the industry will be examined from three perspectives: first the number of 
FDI invested firms in the industry; second, the acquisition of domestic firms and sale 
of firms to domestic owners by FDI in the industry; third, foreign presence measured 
by the output/assets/employment share of FDI invested firms in each four-digit 
industrial sub-sector. 
From 2000 to 200330, the number of FDI invested firms has increased by 38.4 per 
cent. Due to growth of the industry as a whole, the share of FDI in the industry has 
nonetheless decreased a little. In terms of number of firms, the proportion of FDI 
invested firms in the industry has stabilized at around 45 per cent, which is certainly 
big enough to exert a significant impact on the whole industry.  
In entering the market, the FDI parent firm can either set up a new firm or acquire an 
existing domestic firm. Similarly, to exit the market the FDI parent firm can either 
shut down the firm or sell the firm to domestic parties. If FDI parent firm tends to 
acquire domestic firms with higher export intensity and/or higher labour productivity 
or sell firms with lower export intensity and/or lower labour productivity to domestic 
parties, then testing the spillover effect from the FDI will suffer from an endogeneity 
problem if both the domestic firms and FDI invested firms are included in the 
regression. In our subsequent estimation only domestic firms are included, so that 
this type of endogeneity is avoided. For example, if a firm with a higher export 
intensity and/or a labour productivity is acquired by an FDI invested firm, then it 
drops out of the regression; and if a FDI invested firm with a lower export intensity 
and/or a lower labour productivity is sold to domestic parties, then it is included in 
the regression. In addition, the number of domestic firms that are acquired by the 
FDI and the number of FDI invested firms sold to domestic parties are quite small 
                                                 
30 In 2000 there were 894 FDI invested firms, accounting for 47.6 per cent of total 1,879 firms; in 2001 there 
were 923 FDI invested firms, accounting for 45.6 per cent of total 2,024 firms; in 2002 there were 1,071 FDI 
invested firms, accounting for 46 per cent of total 2,327 firms; in 2003 there were 1,237 FDI invested firms, 
accounting for 44 per cent of total 2,814 firms. 
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relative to our sample size, and only accounts for around 1-2 per cent of total 
number of firms31.  
Table 6.4 Foreign Presence across Four-digit Industries 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Industry 
code fpo fpa fpe fpo fpa fpe Fpo fpa fpe fpo fpa fpe 
2411 0.60  0.64  0.60 0.45 0.52 0.54 0.48 0.54  0.59  0.60  0.64  0.58 
2413 0.45  0.37  0.40 0.48 0.41 0.45 0.51 0.49  0.46  0.49  0.41  0.46 
2415 0.52  0.52  0.35 0.52 0.54 0.37 0.45 0.50  0.38  0.43  0.50  0.40 
2417 0.02  0.03  0.06 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.06  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.00 
2419 0.25  0.21  0.19 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.19  0.22  0.22  0.35  0.28 
2421 0.74  0.69  0.70 0.70 0.70 0.66 0.62 0.61  0.63  0.57  0.56  0.68 
2423 0.79  0.82  0.77 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.76 0.81  0.79  0.72  0.76  0.77 
2429 0.60  0.62  0.60 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.71  0.63  0.70  0.72  0.71 
2431 0.31  0.24  0.26 0.44 0.34 0.28 0.47 0.44  0.25  0.39  0.36  0.26 
2433 0.46  0.44  0.41 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.31  0.40  0.48  0.40  0.49 
2435 0.96  0.91  0.89 0.82 0.73 0.46 0.95 0.93  0.86  0.85  0.74  0.68 
2439 0.29  0.35  0.24 0.25 0.32 0.27 0.40 0.46  0.41  0.33  0.41  0.38 
2440 0.71  0.80  0.73 0.69 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.77  0.73  0.64  0.74  0.70 
2450 0.31  0.38  0.28 0.77 0.85 0.72 0.77 0.81  0.69  0.73  0.57  0.65 
2490 0.39  0.33  0.48 0.46 0.41 0.51 0.29 0.29  0.37  0.32  0.34  0.38 
Note: fpo/fpa/fpe are the foreign presence measured in terms of output/assets/employment share. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
 
Again we use three measurements for activities of FDI in the industry (foreign 
presence), namely the FDI invested firms’ output/employment/assets share. Table 
6.4 shows the foreign presence measured in terms of three different proxies, and 
indicates that the industry average foreign presence is quite high 32 , no matter 
whether it is measured in terms of output share, assets share or employment share. 
However there is considerable variation across different industries. For example in 
2003 foreign presence measured in terms of assets share in the toy manufacturing 
industry (2240) is as high as 74 per cent, or over seven times that of the teaching-
model manufacturing industry (2417). In addition, it can be observed from Table 6.4 
                                                 
31 From 2000 to 2001, the FDI acquires 26 domestic firms, and meanwhile 38 FDI invested firms are sold to 
domestic parties, which only accounts for 1.4 per cent and 2 per cent of the total number of firms in 2000. From 
2001 to 2002, 32 domestic firms are acquired by the FDI, accounting for 1.6 per cent of the number of firms in 
2002, and 24 FDI invested firms are sold by the FDI to domestic parties, accounting for 1.2 per cent of the 
number of firms in 2002. From 2002 to 2003, the FDI acquire 34 domestic firms and 29 FDI invested firms are 
sold to domestic parties, which accounts for 1.5 per cent and 1.2 per cent of the number of firms in 2002. 
32 On average the foreign presence in 2000 is 0.49/0.49/0.47, in 2001 is 0.51/0.51/0.47, in 2002 is 0.51/0.53/0.5, 
and in 2003 is 0.5/0.5/0.49, measured in terms of output/assets/employment share respectively. 
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that the foreign presence in different industries tends to remain stable across the four 
years, as the variation across four years is small33.  
In addition to the variation in different industries, the three measurements of foreign 
presence also present different pictures. The measurement of employment share 
tends to be smaller than those of output and assets share, reflecting the fact that FDI 
invested firms are usually more capital intensive than their domestic counterparts. 
However the ranking of the industries by all three measurements is weakly 
consistent in the sense that industries ranked top/bottom in one measurement stay on 
top/bottom in the other two measurements (see Table 6.5). In addition, the three 
measurements are highly correlated with each other, with a correlation between the 
output share and the asset share of 0.95, a correlation between the output share and 
the employment share of 0.93, and a correlation between the assets share and the 
employment share of 0.95. 
Table 6.5 Ranking of Foreign Presence across Four-digit Industries 
2000 2001 2002 2003 Industry 
code fpo fpa fpe fpo fpa fpe fpo fpa fpe fpo fpa fpe 
2411 5  5  5  10 8  6  8  7  7  6  5  7  
2413 9  10  9  8  10 9  7  9  8  8  9  9  
2415 7  7  10 7  7  11 10 8  11 10  8  10  
2417 15  15  15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15  15  15  
2419 14  14  14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14  13  13  
2421 3  4  4  4  5  5  6  6  5  7  7  5  
2423 2  2  2  3  2  1  3  2  2  3  1  1  
2429 6  6  6  6  6  4  4  5  6  4  4  2  
2431 12  13  12 11 12 12 9  11 13 11  12  14  
2433 8  8  8  12 11 10 11 12 10 9  11  8  
2435 1  1  1  1  4  8  1  1  1  1  3  4  
2439 13  11  13 13 13 13 12 10 9  12  10  11  
2440 4  3  3  5  3  3  5  4  3  5  2  3  
2450 11  9  11 2  1  2  2  3  4  2  6  6  
2490 10  12  7  9  9  7  13 13 12 13  14  12  
Note: fpo, fpa, and fpe are the foreign presence measured in terms of 
output/assets/employment share. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 
2002, and 2003 
 
                                                 
33 An exception is the entertainment equipment manufacturing industry (2450) in 2000. From 2000 to 2001, the 
foreign presence in this industry jumps from 0.31/0.38/0.28 to 0.77/0.85/0.72 measured in terms of the 
output/assets/employment share. 
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Empirical Models 
To test both the technology and export spillovers from the FDI in this industry, we 
deploy the empirical models used. In the following, a fixed effect model is set up to 
test technology spillovers, and the Heckman sample selection model is set up to test 
export spillovers. 
The fixed effect panel model 
Technology spillovers from FDI are most commonly examined by regressing the 
domestic firm’s technology, usually proxied by the labour productivity or value 
added, against the foreign presence, a measurement of activities of FDI in domestic 
industry, and other control variables such as capital intensity and intermediate inputs, 
for example Chuang and Hsu (2004) and Hu and Jefferson (2002). Following this 
line of study, we set up the following model: 
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where ln denotes natural logarithm; the subscript i denotes firm; the subscript t 
denotes time and t=2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003; lp denotes firm labour productivity, 
and is proxied by firm’s sale per employee, as firms generally have substantial 
inventory and hence the value added per employee measurement is not adopted 
(Chuang and Hsu, 2004); kl denotes capital intensity, and is equal to firm’s total 
assets divided by the number of employee; lq denotes labour quality, proxied by 
firm’s average wage; age denotes firm’s age, and its squared term is also added to 
capture the potential nonlinear relationship; ownership captures firm’s ownership 
structure, and is equal to 1 if the firm is privately owned; middle and western are two 
regional dummies, which intend to capture the regional heterogeneity in firm’s 
labour productivity distribution and are equal to 1 if the firm is located in central or 
western China respectively; scale denotes the economies of scale in the industry, as 
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defined in Chapter 4; herfindahl is the Herfindahl index, intended to capture the 
domestic market structure; dindustry are a set of 14 four-digit industry dummies, 
which controls the industry heterogeneity at the four-digit level that presumably 
shall be very small as we already focus on the two-digit industry; fp is foreign 
presence, the proxy for FDI which is measured by the FDI invested firms’ output 
share in the four-digit industry, and furthermore foreign presence is interacted with 
such firm characteristics as capital intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, 
labour quality, age, regional location, and ownership (this assumes the technological 
impact of FDI depends on firm characteristics and hence allows the impact to vary 
across different firms and industries, namely the heterogeneity of spillover effect); 
dyear is a set of three time dummies, which controls the time effect; τ  is the 
unobserved firm fixed effect; and ε  is the i.i.d. normal error term. 
The impact of explanatory variables on firm labour productivity has been discussed 
in Chapter 4. The variable, foreign presence (fp), is the interest of this study. It is 
interacted with firm characteristics, allowing the impact of foreign presence to vary 
across firms and industries. As in Chapter 4, testing the impact of FDI follows three 
steps: first test the joint significance of 12α , 13α , 14α , 15α , 16α , 17α , 18α , and 19α , 
and if they are jointly insignificant then there is no technology spillovers from the 
FDI; second, if they are jointly significant, then test the joint significance of 13α , 
14α , 15α , 16α , 17α , 18α , and 19α , and a joint insignificance of these terms implies 
the impact of FDI does not depend on firm characteristics; third, evaluate the 
marginal impact of fp, namely the partial derivative of equation (6.1) with respect to 
fp, at firms’ level of firm characteristics (capital intensity, intermediate inputs per 
employee, labour quality, age, ownership structure, and geographical location). If 
the evaluated marginal impact is positive, then FDI has positive technology 
spillovers to this firm, and if it is negative the firm actually suffers from the presence 
of FDI.   
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The Heckman sample selection model 
As discussed in Chapter 5, one characteristic of firm exporting is that many firms do 
not export. This makes their export behaviour unobservable. In our sample, there are 
2,402 observations from domestic firms have zero value of export, accounting for 
48.8 per cent of total observations from domestic firms. The impact of this 
unobserved export behaviour needs to be accounted for in the estimation. The large 
proportion of zero export observations comes from the fact that many firms decide 
not to export. Actually, each firm’s export behaviour involves a two-step decision: 
first they decide whether to export and then they determine how much to export 
conditioned by the export participation decision. Hence we observe firm’s export 
behaviour over a firm self-selected sample. In addition these two decisions are 
usually correlated with each other.  
To account for selectivity bias, the Heckman sample selection model (Heckman, 
1979) is employed.  The following presents the selection model used to test the 
export spillovers from FDI: 
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where equation (6.2) is the export participation equation and equation (6.3) is the 
export intensity equation;  ePART denotes firm’s decision to participate in the export; 
eINT is export intensity, and equal to the proportion of firm’s export in its total sale; 
firmsize denotes firm size, and is equal to firm’s output in constant price; kl denotes 
capital intensity defined as above;  upcst is the unit production cost, which is equal 
to firm’s total production and operation cost divided by the number of employees; 
ulcst is the unit labour cost, which is equal to a firm’s total salaries payable divided 
by the output; averagewage is firm’s average wage and equal to firm’s total salary 
payable divided by the number of employees; me is the  ratio of sale cost against sale 
revenue, which shows firm profitability and a value higher than 1 indicates that the 
firm suffers from loss; ownership denotes firm’s ownership structure; age is firm age; 
western and middle are two regional dummies that control for the regional 
heterogeneity in firm’s exports, which is potentially important as firms located in 
different regions must undertake different export cost such as transportation cost; 
herfdindahl is the Herfindahl index that captures the domestic market structure; 
scale is an index that captures economies of scale in the industry; fp is the foreign 
presence, proxy for the FDI, and as above it is interacted with firm level 
characteristics such as firm size, capital intensity, and unit production cost etc. to 
allow for the impact of FDI to vary across firms; dindustry is a set of 14 industry 
dummies that capture the industrial heterogeneity in export; dyear is a set of three 
year dummies that control for time effect in the estimation; noofex is the number of 
firm’s exports in the four years and ranges from 0 to 4, which only appears in the 
firms’ export participation equation (equation 6.2) for the purpose of model 
identification in the estimation. The number of a firm’s exports in the four years 
signals the fixed export cost, and hence the more frequent the firm participates in 
exporting the more likely it will continue to export. Nevertheless as fixed export cost 
has been paid and is sunk, it should not affect how much the firm is willing to export. 
Hence excluding the number of firm export in the four years from the export 
intensity equation (equation 6.3) is reasonable;  u and v are two correlated error 
terms, and ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
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variables in firm’s exports. Following Chapter 5, foreign presence (fp) is interacted 
with firm level characteristics, and testing for export spillovers adopts the same 
three-step procedure.  
Variable Construction  
Definitions for explanatory variables follow those in Chapters 4 and 5. All variables 
are deflated by the implicit deflator obtained from firm output in current prices and 
in constant prices reported in the original data set. As this chapter aims at examining 
the impact of FDI on domestic firms, only domestic firms are included in the 
estimation. Table 6.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
technology spillover estimation, and Table 6.7 presents the descriptive statistics for 
variables used in the export spillover estimation. Six observations can be found from 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7.  
First, there exist missing values. Some firms report either zero employment, zero 
output, or zero sale revenue. This leaves missing values in constructing labour 
productivity, export intensity, capital intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, 
average wage (labour quality), unit production cost, unit labour cost, and the ratio of 
sale cost against sale revenue. Besides, taking the logarithm also leaves variables 
with zero value missing. Compared with the sample size, the proportion of missing 
values is small and furthermore these missing values do not exhibit a systematic 
pattern. Hence they are not likely to affect the estimation results significantly.  
Second, all variables appear to have significant variations, for example for the firm 
size in Table 6.7, the mean value is 22.5447 while the standard deviation is 62.6309, 
2.78 times that of mean value. In addition, taking the logarithm appears to reduce the 
variation, for example for average wage (labour quality), the standard deviation is 
73.85 per cent of its mean value, but after taking the logarithm the standard 
deviation is reduced to 42.11 per cent of its mean value. Compared with Tables 6.6 
and 6.7, we can find that common variables appear in both technology spillover and 
export spillover estimations. For variables used in the export spillover estimation, no 
logarithm is taken, as the dependent variable (export intensity) is not in logarithm 
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form, while variables used in the technology spillover estimation, the capital 
intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, and labour quality are in logarithm form, 
as the dependent variable (labour productivity) is in logarithm form.  
Third, from Table 6.6, we can see that different firms appear in different years. This 
comes from two sources: firm entry into and exit from the industry, and firms' 
leaving and entering the sample. As the data set covers all state-owned and non-
state-owned firms above a designated size, the possibility that different firms appear 
in different years due to the latter source is small. Hence it is reasonable to believe 
that different firms appear in different years as firm enter and exit the industry.  
Fourth, the activities of FDI in the industry are quite significant, no matter whether 
measured in the output, assets, employment share, or weighted capital share in the 
industry. However, sfdi, the proportion of foreign contributed capital in total 
received capital, weighted by firms’ sale share in the four-digit industry constructed 
following Hu and Jefferson (2002), appears to have a lower value than the other 
three.  
Fifth, domestic firm exports are quite active -- on average they export 40 per cent of 
their total sales -- but there exists large variation in the standard deviation, as large 
as 0.4463. Sixth, the market appears to be quite competitive as the Herfindahl index 
is quite small, on average about 50 per cent of firms are privately owned, and the 
majority of domestic firms are located in coastal China.  
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present the correlation matrix for variables used in the technology 
spillover estimation and export spillover estimation respectively. From the two 
tables, we can see that the correlation among most of variables is low, except for the 
correlation between Herfindahl index and the four measurements of FDI (fpo, fpa, 
fpe, and sfdi), which is around 0.6. Hence potential multicollinearity may not be a 
problem for these variables. In addition, the correlations among the four 
measurements of FDI are positive and rather high, which is desirable.  
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Table 6.6 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Technology Spillover Study 
 2000 2001 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnspe 940 4.1667  1.1205  -0.6931 7.6027 1079 4.3048  1.0682  -0.8437 7.3470 
lnkl 937 3.8925  1.1052  -1.4899 8.0021 1076 3.8973  1.0314  -0.9555 8.2823 
lnml 937 3.9306  1.1697  -1.6094 7.2086 1074 4.0755  1.1170  -3.7842 7.2657 
lnlq 938 1.7854  0.7518  -3.1781 4.0810 1068 1.8660  0.7054  -1.7227 4.3405 
age 985 15.3127 14.9198  1 106 1096 12.9051 14.6523  1 161 
scale 985 0.8590  0.1642  0.4321  1.1571 1101 0.8975  0.1599  0.4141  1.2888 
herfindahl 985 0.0599  0.0814  0.0150  0.4661 1101 0.0622  0.0569  0.0108  0.2324 
fpo 985 0.5737  0.1759  0.0162  0.9551 1101 0.5554  0.1741  0.0478  0.8186 
fpa 985 0.5991  0.2178  0.0271  0.9146 1101 0.5797  0.1876  0.0890  0.8477 
fpe 985 0.5516  0.2002  0.0642  0.8883 1101 0.5536  0.1890  0.0250  0.7587 
sfdi 985 0.4480  0.1584  0.0084  0.7193 1101 0.4380  0.1707  0.0322  0.7119 
ownership 985 0.2873     1101 0.4342     
western 985 0.0670     1101 0.0527     
middle 985 0.1279     1101 0.1262     
  2002 2003 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lnspe 1223 4.4577  0.9445  -0.8422 7.2900 1519 4.5213  1.0276  -0.7810 8.4485 
lnkl 1220 3.9642  1.0571  0.0434  8.4073 1508 4.0926  1.0245  0.5705  7.7121 
lnml 1219 4.2069  1.0056  -0.9004 7.0617 1518 4.2511  1.1235  -5.7591 8.4471 
lnlq 1211 1.9718  0.6392  -2.0217 3.7994 1518 1.9954  0.6826  -1.7080 4.3354 
age 1252 11.9888 13.7089  0 162 1325 10.6657 11.9649  1 139 
scale 1256 0.9449  0.2258  0.4734  1.4680 1577 0.9849  0.2106  0.0796  1.2192 
herfindahl 1256 0.0531  0.0551  0.0097  0.2470 1577 0.0448  0.0621  0.0229  0.3939 
fpo 1256 0.5613  0.1740  0.0447  0.9504 1577 0.5514  0.1487  0.0066  0.8501 
fpa 1256 0.6037  0.1955  0.0641  0.9275 1577 0.5859  0.1724  0.0100  0.7644 
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fpe 1256 0.5698  0.1846  0.0578  0.8603 1577 0.5666  0.1672  0.0027  0.7735 
sfdi 1256 0.4466  0.1783  0.0173  0.7263 1577 0.4400  0.1602  0.0017  0.7965 
ownership 1256 0.5231     1577 0.7096     
western 1256 0.0406     1577 0.1769     
middle 1256 0.1131     1577 0.0900     
Note: for the dummy variables, ownership, western, and middle, the figure is the percentage of firms that take value 1, for 
example in 2000 60.4% of firms are privately owned; fpo, fpa, and fpe are the FDI invested firms’ output, assets, and 
employment share in the 4-digit industry; sfdi is the firm’s proportion of foreign contributed capital in the total received 
capital, weighted by firms’ sale share in the four-digit industry. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
 
 
Table 6.7 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Export Spillover Study 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
export intensity 4810 0.4004 0.4463 0 1
firm size 4919 22.5447 62.6309 0 1384.444
capital intensity 4800 94.5131 176.6642 0 4479.6270 
upcst 4802 0.8032 13.9311 0 901.1000 
ulcst 4802 0.1531 0.8849 0 51.8
average wage 4800 8.2889 6.1214 0 76.74276
me 4798 0.8527 0.1736 0 7.5224 
age 4658 12.5309 13.8361 0 162.0000 
scale 4919 0.9299 0.2015 0.0796 1.468
herfindahl 4919 0.0538 0.0641 0.0097 0.4661 
fpo 4919 0.5593 0.1669 0.0066 0.9551 
fpa 4919 0.5917 0.1917 0.0100 0.9275 
fpe 4919 0.5615 0.1836 0.0027 0.8883 
sfdi 4919 0.4428 0.1670 0.0017 0.7965 
whetherexport 4919 0.5117    
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ownership 4919 0.5158    
western 4919 0.0923    
middle 4919 0.1116       
Note: for the dummy variables, whetherexport, ownership, western, and middle, the 
figure is the percentage of firms that take value 1, for example 51.58% of firms are 
privately owned; fpo, fpa, and fpe are the FDI invested firms’ output, assets, and 
employment share in the four-digit industry; sfdi is the firm’s proportion of foreign 
contributed capital in the total received capital, weighted by firms’ sale share in the 
four-digit industry. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 
2002, and 2003 
 
 
Table 6.8 Correlation Matrix for Variables Used in Technology Spillover Study 
  lnkl lnml lnlq age scale herfindahl ownership western middle fpo fpa fpe sfdi 
lnkl 1             
lnml 0.4197 1            
lnlq 0.3965 0.3784 1           
age 0.119 -0.25 0.0034 1          
scale -0.0631 0.0183 0.014 -0.0707 1         
herfindahl 0.158 -0.0165 0.0364 0.1148 -0.431 1        
ownership -0.1103 0.1888 0.0409 -0.3806 0.136 -0.1725 1       
western -0.0334 -0.1845 -0.1405 0.1486 -0.0827 0.1021 -0.1941 1      
middle -0.0876 -0.1926 -0.2495 0.0606 -0.0313 0.0318 -0.0754 -0.0719 1     
fpo -0.1793 0.0485 -0.0424 -0.1358 0.2729 -0.6065 0.1609 -0.1239 -0.0937 1    
fpa -0.2056 0.066 -0.0306 -0.171 0.2925 -0.6239 0.2107 -0.1628 -0.0963 0.9637 1   
fpe -0.2061 0.0706 -0.0267 -0.1548 0.2191 -0.5449 0.1873 -0.1411 -0.1067 0.938 0.9497 1  
sfdi -0.1922 0.0552 -0.0325 -0.1338 0.2394 -0.5102 0.1685 -0.1262 -0.0957 0.9427 0.9281 0.9443 1
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
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Table 6.9 Correlation Matrix for Variables Used in Export Spillover Study 
  firmsize capitalintensity upcst ulcst averagewage me age scale 
firmsize 1        
capitalintensity 0.106 1       
upcst -0.0135 0.0255 1      
ulcst -0.0312 -0.0082 0.8403 1     
averagewage 0.1147 0.3116 -0.0235 -0.0048 1    
me -0.0089 -0.0017 -0.0659 -0.0604 0.0124 1   
age 0.0206 0.0695 0.0697 0.1035 0.0339 -0.076 1  
scale -0.0253 -0.0231 -0.0081 -0.0022 0.0248 0.0774 -0.0752 1
herfindahl 0.0487 0.0539 0.0272 0.0239 0.0094 -0.1436 0.1166 -0.4336
ownership -0.0165 -0.0972 -0.0382 -0.0625 -0.0011 0.0976 -0.3821 0.1359
western -0.0631 -0.0393 0.0227 0.0428 -0.1061 -0.1593 0.1527 -0.0941
middle -0.0454 -0.032 -0.0024 -0.0002 -0.1749 -0.0552 0.0594 -0.0318
fpo 0.0028 -0.0657 -0.0157 -0.0065 -0.0094 0.1333 -0.1382 0.2787
fpa 0.0125 -0.0784 -0.0168 -0.0062 -0.0034 0.145 -0.1732 0.2988
fpe 0.0251 -0.0878 -0.012 0 0.0008 0.1263 -0.157 0.225
sfdi 0.0159 -0.0851 -0.0138 -0.0014 0.0008 0.1219 -0.1367 0.246
  herfindahl ownership western middle fpo fpa fpe sfdi 
herfindahl 1        
ownership -0.1735 1       
western 0.1045 -0.1989 1      
middle 0.0366 -0.0758 -0.074 1     
fpo -0.6081 0.162 -0.1264 -0.0964 1    
fpa -0.6248 0.2116 -0.165 -0.0987 0.9637 1   
fpe -0.5458 0.1888 -0.1428 -0.109 0.9379 0.9497 1  
sfdi -0.5112 0.17 -0.1304 -0.0976 0.9427 0.9285 0.9446 1
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
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Empirical Results 
This section reports the estimation results for equations (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3). For the 
technology spillover estimation (equation 6.1), a fixed effect estimator is employed. 
Before the estimation, the Wooldridge (2002) test for first order autocorrelation is 
conducted. The test statistic obtained is 2.74, with a p-value of 0.098. Hence we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation at the 5% significance 
level. Then we test for group-wise heteroskedasticity in the residuals using a 
modified Wald statistic (following Greene, 2000) which is robust to the violation of 
normality assumption. The test statistic obtained is fairly large ( 34104.7 × ), which 
rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at the 5% significance level. Hence 
the robust standard error that accounts for heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form is 
computed in the fixed effect estimation. Another potential problem is the impact of 
firm entry and exit, which will be discussed in the following subsection.  For the 
export spillover estimation (equations 6.2 and 6.3), following the estimation strategy 
of Greenaway et al. (2004), we pool the four year data together, using time and 
industry dummies to control for time and industry invariant effects. Treating the data 
as a large cross-section eliminates concerns about the impact of firm entry and exit, 
as now we essentially view the observations as being one random draw from the 
population. 
Firm entry and exit 
Firm entry and exit may affect testing for technology spillovers, and hence before 
turning to empirical results we have to check firm entry and exit first. As shown in 
Table 6.1, from 2000 to 2003 the number of firms in the industry is increasing. 
Hence there must be firm entry and possibly firm exit during this period. Table 6.10 
presents a picture of firm entry and exit in the industry. As shown in Table 6.10, 947 
firms appear in the four years, which accounts for 23 per cent of all 4,112 firms. 
Hence to construct a balanced panel we would have to exclude the remaining 77 per 
cent of firms. This would mean a substantial loss of information and thus is not done 
in this study. Besides, there are a considerable number of firms that only appear in 
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one year34.This would drop out in the fixed effect estimation for the technology 
spillover estimation but not in the pooled regression for the export spillover 
estimation.  In addition, there are also a few firms that only appear in two or three 
years35.  
Table 6.10 Firm Entry and Exit 
  No. of Firms % No. of Obs % 
Firms only appear in one year 
in 2000 497 12.09 497 5.5 
in 2001 124 3.02 124 1.37 
in 2002 153 3.72 153 1.69 
in 2003 927 22.54 927 10.25 
Firms appear in two years 
in 2000 and 2001 193 4.69 386 4.27 
in 2000 and 2002 9 0.22 18 0.2 
in 2000 and 2003 25 0.61 50 0.55 
in 2001 and 2002 139 3.38 278 3.08 
in 2001 and 2003 13 0.32 26 0.29 
in 2002 and 2003 458 11.14 916 10.13 
Firms appear in three years 
in 2000, 2001, and 2002 183 4.45 549 6.07 
in 2000, 2001, and 2003 6 0.15 18 0.2 
in 2000, 2002, and 2003 19 0.46 57 0.63 
in 2001, 2002, and 2003 419 10.19 1,257 13.9 
Firms appear in all four years 
 947 23.03 3,788 41.88 
Total 4112 100 9,044 100 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 
2002, and 2003 
So it appears that firm entry and exit is not random. Then what determines firm entry 
and exit in the industry? To examine this, we hypothesize that firm entry and exit 
depends on the previous year’s foreign presence, four-digit industry export intensity, 
and four-digit industry labour productivity. Firm entry is a dichotomous variable, 
and is defined as taking a value of one if the firm appears in this year but not in 
previous year, and taking a value of zero otherwise. Firm exit is also a dichotomous 
                                                 
34 In 2000, there are 497 such firms; in 2001, there are 124 this kind of firm; in 2002, there are 153 such firms; 
and in 2003 there are 927 such firms. Altogether they account for 41.4 per cent of total number of firms and 18.8 
per cent of all observations. 
35 458 firms only appear in 2002 and 2003, accounting for 11.1 per cent of total number of firms and 10.13per 
cent of all observations. 419 firms only appear in 2001, 2002, and 2003, accounting for 10.2 per cent of total 
number of firms and 13.9 per cent of total observations. 
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variable, and is defined as taking a value of one if the firm appears in this year but 
not in next year and taking a value of zero otherwise. Four-digit industry export 
intensity is equal to the four-digit industry’s total exports divided by the industry’s 
total sales. Four-digit industry labour productivity is proxied by the industry’s total 
sales divided by the total number of employees. All explanatory variables are 
industry level variables, as is reasonable to believe firm’s entry and exit depends on 
the industry environment. Table 6.11 presents the Probit estimation results. From the 
table, we find that foreign presence has significantly positive impact on a firm’s 
entry decision and significantly negative effect on a firm’s exit decision, namely the 
more FDI the more likely firms will enter the market and the less likely firms will 
leave the market. Even though more FDI usually means more competition in the 
market, this may happen if firms are trying to learn from FDI or activities of are 
positively correlated with unobserved factors that increase the probability of a firm’s 
entry and decreases its probability of exit. The industry export intensity has 
significantly negative impact on a firm’s decision to enter the industry and 
significantly positive impact on a firm’s exit decision, reflecting the impact of 
industry competition. For industry labour productivity, firms are more likely to enter 
and less likely to leave an industry if they have high labour productivity. 
Table 6.11 Determinants of Firm Entry and Exit 
  Entry Exit 
Variables coef. Robust std.err. coef. 
Robust 
std.err. 
foreign presence 2.3710 0.2292 -1.7558 0.2037 
industry export intensity -1.4993 0.1881 0.9592 0.1766 
industry labour productivity 0.3895 0.0506 -0.2831 0.0582 
Constant -3.2533 0.2408 0.5598 0.2928 
     
Log pseudo likelihood -5750.4163  -4233.7823  
Number of obs 12336  12336  
Pseudo R2 0.0321  0.0158  
Wald chi2(3) for overall 
significance 328.57   121.95   
Note: the estimation is Probit model over pooled data, and robust standard errors are 
computed; As there are 4112 firms, the total observations are 12336 for three years. 
One year is dropped due to the lag in explanatory variables; foreign presence is the 
output share measurement of FDI.  
Source: Author’s calculation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 
2002, and 2003 
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So we conclude that a firm’s entry and exit (panel attrition) in the industry is not 
random. The non-randomness of a firm’s entry and exit may affect the fixed effect 
estimation in the technology spillover study. Table 6.11 reveals that firm entry and 
exit is affected by foreign presence in the industry. Fortunately, as shown in 
Wooldridge (2002, pp578-581), the impact of foreign presence on firm entry and 
exit will not affect the validity of the fixed effect estimation, as the foreign presence 
is one explanatory variable in the technology spillover study (equation 6.1). For a 
linear unobserved effect model like itiitit ucxy ++= β , Tt ,,1 L= , where itx  is 
1×K and β  is the K×1 vector of interest, let ( )'1 ,, iTii sss L≡  denote the T×1 vector 
of selection indicators, where 1=its  if ( )itit yx ,  is observed and zero otherwise. 
Then we can treat ( ){ }Nisyx iii ,,2,1,,, L=  as a random sample from the population. 
Under the regular fixed effect model assumption, namely (a) ( ) 0,, =iiiit csxuE , 
Tt ,,2,1 L= , (b) ( )∑ =Tt ititit xxsE1 ' &&&&  is nonsingular, where ∑=−−≡
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itx&&  and iT  are defined as above. Assumption (a) ensures the consistency of the 
coefficient estimate; assumption (b) rules out the perfect collinearity; and 
assumption (c) is the homosekedasticity and no serial correlation assumption, which 
can be relaxed. In all three assumptions, the selection indicator is  is allowed to be 
correlated with explanatory variables ix . Hence the fact that firm entry and exit 
depends on foreign presence in the industry does not cause problems for the fixed 
effect estimation of equation (6.1).  
Nevertheless firm entry and exit also depends on variables that do not appear in 
equation (6.1), which can make the selection indicator is  correlated with the 
idiosyncratic error term in equation (6.1) and thus make the fixed effect estimation 
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problematic. If the selection indicator is  is correlated with the idiosyncratic error 
term, then assumption (a) in the above is violated and the coefficient estimate will be 
inconsistent. To test this, Nijman and Verbeek (1992) suggest a simple test in the 
context of random effect estimation, which according to Wooldridge (2002) is also 
applicable in the fixed effect estimation. The Nijman and Verbeek test adds a lagged 
selection indicator to the main equation, which is estimated by fixed effect estimator, 
and then under the null hypothesis that the selection indicator is uncorrelated with 
the idiosyncratic error term, the lagged selection indicator will be insignificant. 
Hence we first construct two lagged dummy variables of firm entry and exit, and 
then plug them into equation (6.1). Before estimating equation (6.1) augmented with 
firm entry and exit, the Wooldridge (2002) test for first order autocorrelation is 
conducted, with a test statistic of 3.157 with a p-value of 0.0765. Hence we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation at the 5% significance 
level. Then the augmented equation (6.1) is estimated using a fixed effect estimator 
and the robust standard errors are computed to account for possible 
heteroskedasticity. The estimated coefficient for the lagged firm entry dummy is -
0.0557 with a p-value of 0.07, and the estimated coefficient for the lagged firm exit 
dummy is 0.0438 with a p-value of 0.797. An F test for the joint significance of 
these two dummies obtains a test statistic of 1.75 with a p-value of 0.174. Hence, at 
the 5% significance level we fail to reject the null hypothesis that they are 
insignificant. So in the technology spillover study, we estimate equation (6.1) 
without considering firm entry and exit.  
Technology analysis 
Equation (6.1) is estimated using the fixed effect estimator, and Table 6.12 presents 
the estimation results. The [1] in Table 6.12 presents estimation results with the full 
set of explanatory variables. The test statistic for the significance of the unobserved 
fixed effect is 2.2, which rejects the null of hypothesis at the 5% level, and the fixed 
effect estimation is thus appropriate. In [1] of Table 6.12, only the logarithm 
intermediate inputs per employee (lnml) and two industry dummies (dindustry2 and 
dindustry13) are significant at the 5% level .  An F-test for the joint significance of 
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foreign presence and its interaction terms obtains a test statistic of 0.72, which fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that they are jointly insignificant at the 5% level. Hence 
the estimation [1] shows there are no technology spillovers from FDI.  
However, there may be a multicollinearity problem. Capital intensity (lnkl) and its 
interaction term with foreign presence (fpo_lnkl), are individually insignificant at the 
5% level but are jointly significant with an F-test statistic of 13.53 and p-value of 0. 
For the labour quality (lnlq) and its interaction term with foreign presence (fpo_lnlq), 
both of them are individually insignificant at the 5% level, but are jointly significant 
with an F-test statistic of 10.81 and p-value of 0. As the individual insignificance 
and jointly significance suggests existence of multicollinearity, we drop these two 
interaction terms (fpo_lnkl and fpo_lnlq) and re-estimate the model. The [2] in Table 
6.12 presents the regression results.   
For the estimation in [2], the test statistic for the existence of unobserved fixed 
effects is 2.18, which rejects the null of non-existence of fixed effects at the 5% 
level. Compared with [1], the coefficients of logarithm capital intensity (lnkl) and 
logarithm labour quality (lnlq) are both significant at the 5% level, and their 
magnitude is increased. The coefficient of labour quality increases from -0.0201 to 
0.0926. For the coefficient of logarithm intermediate inputs per employee, which is 
significant at the 5% level in both [1] and [2], the estimate is stable in the sense that 
one estimate is within one standard error of the other.  Then we test the joint 
significance of foreign presence and its interaction terms, and obtain an F-test 
statistic of 0.73 with a p-value of 0.62, which fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
joint insignificance. Hence the estimation in [2] concludes there are no technology 
spillovers from FDI. In [2], there are a few variables that are insignificant. An F-test 
for the joint significance of these individually insignificant variable obtains a test 
statistic of 1.09 with a p-value of 0.3404, which hence rules out the possibility that 
multicollinearity causes these variables to be individually insignificant.  
We drop all individually insignificant variables in [2], including the foreign presence 
and its interaction terms, and re-estimate the model. The [3] in Table 6.12 reports 
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these estimation results. Now all included variables are significant at the 5% level, 
and the test for significance of unobserved fixed effects (test statistic of 2.06) also 
rejects the null hypothesis of nonexistence at the 5% level. In [3] of Table 6.12, 
domestic firm capital intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, and labour quality 
positively affect their labour productivity, with a 1 per cent increase in capital 
intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, and labour quality leading to domestic 
firm’s labour productivity increase by 0.16 per cent, 0.62 per cent, and 0.1 per cent 
respectively.  
Compared with [2], the point estimate of coefficient of logarithm capital intensity 
(lnkl) is increased from 0.15 to 0.16, which however is within one standard error of 
each other; for the logarithm labour quality (lnlq), similarly the coefficient point 
estimate is increased from 0.09 to 0.1, which again is within one standard error of 
each other; for the logarithm intermediate inputs per employee, the coefficient point 
estimate is decreased from 0.79 to 0.62, with the former estimate being within three 
standard errors of the latter and the latter being within two standard errors of the 
former. However, we can reasonably conclude that dropping the insignificant 
variables does not result in drastic change in the coefficient estimate, and the foreign 
presence does not affect domestic firms’ labour productivity. 
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Table 6.12 Estimation Results for Technology Spillover Study 
  [1] [2] [3] 
  Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
Lnkl 0.0486  0.0689 0.1540* 0.0307 0.1617*  0.0380 
Lnml 0.8539*  0.1658 0.7934* 0.1386 0.6167*  0.0825 
Lnlq -0.0201  0.0868 0.0926* 0.0201 0.1044*  0.0279 
Age -0.0039  0.0056 -0.0049 0.0056   
Age2 0.000013  0.000015 0.000012 0.000015   
Scale -0.0479  0.0388 -0.0442 0.0388   
Herfindahl -0.1108  0.2294 -0.0997 0.2348   
Ownership 0.0490  0.0657 0.0754 0.0724   
Fpo 0.6335  0.9945 1.3334 1.3466   
fpo_lnkl 0.1766  0.1321     
fpo_lnml -0.3852  0.3408 -0.2836 0.2973   
fpo_lnlq 0.1900  0.1529     
fpo_age 0.0037  0.0086 0.0059 0.0085   
fpo_ownership -0.0828  0.1176 -0.1315 0.1317   
fpo_middle -0.1370  0.3956 -0.2565 0.4362   
fpo_western 0.6461  0.7163 0.4661 0.7565   
Dyear2 -0.0382  0.0200 -0.0384 0.0202   
Dyear3 0.0005  0.0216 -0.0015 0.0218   
Dyear4 0.0246  0.0236 0.0254 0.0242   
Dindustry2 0.4998*  0.2320 0.5017 0.2360   
Dindustry3 -0.1066  0.1387 -0.1399 0.1380   
Dindustry4 0.0472  0.1329 0.0021 0.1356   
Dindustry5 0.0328  0.1257 -0.0029 0.1312   
Dindustry6 0.0505  0.1141 0.0401 0.1201   
Dindustry7 0.0428  0.1121 0.0332 0.1170   
Dindustry8 0.0336  0.0986 0.0249 0.1046   
Dindustry9 -0.0087  0.3487 -0.0136 0.3138   
dindustry10 0.1035  0.2044 0.1324 0.1632   
dindustry11 0.7504  0.6133 0.7746 0.6291   
dindustry12 0.1281  0.2206 0.1479 0.1828   
dindustry13 0.9426*  0.1405 0.7820* 0.1395 0.9097*  0.0914 
dindustry14 0.2162  0.1632 0.2842 0.1906   
dindustry15 0.0751  0.1106 0.0266 0.1204   
Constant 0.3353  0.4863 -0.0124 0.6576 0.6725*  0.1614 
       
Number of obs 4468  4468  4711 
Overall R2 0.6657  0.7113  0.7045 
Overall significance 
F(33,2181) 2.0700E+08  2.4600E+08  379.7600 
Correlation between 
unobserved effect and 
explanatory variables 
-0.0987  -0.0162  -0.0258 
sigma_u 0.5780  0.5347  0.5509 
sigma_e 0.2546  0.2555  0.2611 
Rho 0.8375  0.8141  0.8166 
Test for joint significance 
of fp interaction terms 0.72  0.73   
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Test for significance of 
unobserved effects 2.2   2.18   2.06
Note: [1] is the estimation with full set of explanatory variables; [2] is the estimation without 
interaction terms between fpo and lnkl and lnlq; [3] is the estimation dropping jointly insignificant 
variables in [2]. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
Source: Author’s estimation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
Export analysis 
Equations (6.2) and (6.3) are estimated jointly by the maximum likelihood estimator 
with robust standard error computed to account for possible heteroskedasticity of 
arbitrary form. Table 6.13 reports the estimation results. The [1] in Table 6.13 is the 
estimation with full set of explanatory variables, which has a multicollinearity 
problem, since, for example, the variable firm size (firmsize) and its interaction term 
with foreign presence (fpo_firmsize) are individually insignificant (with p-value of 
0.225 and 0.549 respectively), while they are jointly significant (with an F-test 
statistic of 16.28 and a p-value of 0.0003). Hence the foreign presence’s interaction 
terms with firm size (firmsize), capital intensity (kl), average wage (averagewage), 
age (age), unit production cost (upcst), and unit labour cost (ulcst), together with 
other jointly insignificant variables except the time and industry dummies, are 
dropped and the model is re-estimated, which is presented in the [2] of Table 6.13. 
For both estimations, they are significant, and sample selection exits in that the 
inverse mills ratio (lambda in Table 6.13) is significant. In addition, the export 
intensity equation is significantly correlated with the export participation equation, 
as the test obtains a chi-square statistic of 35.48 in [1] and 35.79 in [2], which are 
both significant and rejects the null of insignificance. The existence of sample 
selection and correlation between two equations justify the application of Heckman 
sample selection model.  
Comparing the two estimations reported in Table 6.13, the coefficients of most 
variables are within one standard error of each other, except for the capital intensity, 
average wage, and age. For the coefficient of capital intensity (kl) in the export 
intensity equation, the point estimate in [1] is -0.0007 with a standard error of 
0.0003, and the point estimate in [2] is -0.0004 with a standard error of 0.0001, with 
the former being within three standard errors of the latter and the latter being within 
one standard error of the former. For the coefficient of average wage (averagewage) 
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in the export intensity equation, the point estimate in [1] is 0.0062 with a standard 
error of 0.0065, and the point estimate in [2] is 0.003 with a standard error of 0.001, 
with the former being within four standard errors of the latter and the latter being 
within one standard error of the former. Regarding the coefficient of age (age) in the 
export intensity equation, the point estimate in [1] is -0.0054 with a standard error of 
0.0024, and the point estimate in [2] is -0.0027 with a standard error of 0.0005, with 
the former being within eight standard errors of the latter and the latter being within 
two standard errors of the former. However, for all variables, including the capital 
intensity, average wage, and age, the coefficient estimates in the two estimations do 
not reveal any reversal of sign. Hence, we conclude that the two estimations are 
consistent with each other, but the estimation [2] is not subject to a multicollinearity 
problem.  Hence we base our interpretation of the results on the estimation of [2]. 
Testing the existence of export spillovers follows the three steps as described above. 
In the export intensity equation, we first test the joint significance of foreign 
presence and its interaction terms, and obtain an F-test statistic of 74.57 with a p-
value of 0, which rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at the 5% level. 
Then we test the joint significance of foreign presence’s interaction terms and obtain 
an F-test statistic of 73.86 with a p-value of 0, which also rejects the null hypothesis 
of joint insignificance. Then the marginal effect of foreign presence is computed by 
differentiating equation (6.2) with respect to foreign presence (fpo) as: 
middlewesternownershipme
fpo
eINT 8473.07306.143.08678.19819.1 +−−−=∂
∂  
Evaluating this marginal impact formula at the sample average, we obtain Table 6.14. 
From Table 6.14, we can find that domestic firms in western China suffer from the 
foreign presence, no matter whether they are privately owned or state and 
collectively owned. If they are privately owned, a 1 per cent increase in foreign 
presence is associated with a decrease of their export intensity by 1.77 per cent, and 
1.34 per cent if they are state and collectively owned. Firms in central China appear 
to benefit from foreign presence, no matter whether they are privately owned or state 
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and collectively owned. A 1 per cent increase in foreign presence is associated with 
a 0.77 per cent increase in export intensity if they are privately owned and a 1.2 per 
cent increase if they are state and collectively owned. For firms located in coastal 
China, privately owned firms suffer from foreign presence in the sense that a 1 per 
cent increase in foreign presence is associated with 0.04 per cent decrease in their 
export intensity, while in contrast the state and collectively owned firms benefit 
from the foreign presence with a 1 per cent increase in foreign presence leading to 
0.39 per cent increase in their export intensity.  
If we evaluate the marginal impact formula at domestic firms’ value of the sales cost 
and sales revenue ratio, ownership structure and geographical location, we obtain the 
distribution of the marginal effect, as shown in Figure 6.5. Figure 6.5 shows that the 
marginal impact mainly ranges from -0.5 to 0.5, and some firms benefit from the 
foreign presence while other firms suffer, which is consistent with findings of 
Chapter 5. Nevertheless it appears that there are more firms that benefit than firms 
that suffer.  
The marginal impact formula also shows that the sales cost and revenue ratio (me), 
ownership structure (ownership), and geographical location in western China 
(western) have negative impact on the scale of export spillovers, and the 
geographical location in central China (middle) has positive impact on the scale of 
export spillovers.  A 1 per cent increase of the sale cost and revenue ratio will result 
in 1.87 per cent decrease in the scale of export spillovers. The sale cost and revenue 
ratio captures the firm’s profitability, with higher ratio indicating lower profitability. 
Hence low profitability domestic firms are less capable of absorbing export 
spillovers from the FDI. Privately owned firms are less capable of benefiting from 
the FDI than the state and collectively owned firms, with the scale of export 
spillovers being 43 per cent less. This may result from the state and collectively 
owned firms have some policy privileges -- for example it is easier for them to get 
loan from the state owned banks -- that shield them from the direct competition with 
FDI invested firms. In regard to firm’s geographical location, firms located in 
western China are disadvantaged, which is intuitive as western China is less 
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developed compared with the rest of China and hence firms in western China are 
less capable of handling the challenge from FDI invested firms. However firms 
located in central China appear to benefit more from the FDI than firms in coastal 
China, with export spillovers being 85 per cent higher. This is somewhat surprising 
but may occur because they face less competition from FDI invested firms than their 
counterparts in coastal China. In our sample, there are only 68 observations that are 
FDI invested and located in central China, while in contrast there are 4,002 
observations that are FDI invested and located in coastal China. Hence domestic 
firms located in coastal China are confronted with much more competition from FDI 
invested firms than their counterparts in central and western China.  
Figure 6.5 Distribution of Marginal Effect of Output Share Foreign Presence on 
Export Intensity 
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
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Note: marginal effect computed from the estimation using output share as proxy for FDI.
 
In the export participation equation, the F-test for the joint significance of foreign 
presence and its interaction terms obtains a test statistic of 11.83 with a p-value of 
0.0372, which rejects the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at the 5% level. 
Then the F-test for the joint significance of interaction terms obtains a test statistic 
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of 9.35 with a p-value of 0.053, which is marginally significant at the 5% level. 
However foreign presence (fpo) and its interaction terms with the sales cost and 
revenue ratio (me), ownership structure (ownership), and geographical location in 
western China (western) are all individually insignificant at the 5% level, and an F-
test for their joint significance also fails to reject their joint insignificance with F-test 
statistic of 5.03 and a p-value of 0.2841. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between foreign presence and geographical location in central China (middle) is 
significantly positive. So, in respect of the domestic firm’s export participation 
decision, FDI only positively affects domestic firms in central China, but not other 
domestic firms. The higher is foreign presence, the more likely domestic firms that 
are located in central China will participate in export.  
 
Table 6.13 Estimation Results for Export Spillover Study 
  [1] [2] 
 Export Intensity Export Participation Export Intensity Export Participation 
Variables Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
firmsize -0.0002  0.0002 -0.0003 0.0016 -0.0003* 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0008 
kl -0.0007*  0.0003 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0004* 0.0001  -0.0004 0.0003 
upcst 0.0244  0.0144 0.0581 0.0466     
ulcst -0.4705  0.3357 -2.3119* 0.9737     
averagewage 0.0062  0.0065 0.0334 0.0262 0.0030* 0.0010  -0.0046 0.0069 
me 1.3290*  0.3152 -0.0147 0.7205 1.4592* 0.3100  -0.1563 0.6541 
age -0.0054*  0.0024 -0.0060 0.0087 -0.0027* 0.0005  -0.0004 0.0023 
ownership 0.2651*  0.0709 0.3384 0.2297 0.3228* 0.0635  0.4631* 0.2131 
western 0.9511*  0.2768 -0.4657 0.3368 0.9332* 0.2702  -0.6836* 0.3148 
middle -0.5328*  0.1203 -0.7848* 0.3319 -0.5138* 0.1206  -0.8795* 0.3141 
Herfindahl 0.0177  0.3292 -1.7845 1.3565     
scale -0.0569  0.0469 -0.1318 0.2128     
fpo 1.7068*  0.4948 -0.4174 1.6055 1.9819* 0.4538  0.3242 1.3068 
fpo_firmsize -0.0002  0.0004 -0.0001 0.0032     
fpo_kl 0.0005  0.0005 -0.0005 0.0021     
fpo_upcst -0.0521  0.0331 -0.0750 0.0762     
fpo_ulcst 0.7241  0.5141 3.2933* 1.3629     
fpo_averagwage -0.0053  0.0100 -0.0613 0.0426     
fpo_me -1.6811*  0.4805 1.2537 1.3404 -1.8678* 0.4736  1.1854 1.2587 
fpo_age 0.0049  0.0040 0.0117 0.0159     
fpo_ownership -0.3394*  0.1112 -0.2403 0.3904 -0.4300* 0.0990  -0.4229 0.3586 
fpo_western -1.7738*  0.4411 -1.0071 0.6118 -1.7306* 0.4284  -0.4414 0.5228 
fpo_middle 0.8473*  0.1812 1.0770 0.5730 0.8151* 0.1807  1.2438* 0.5450 
dyear2 0.0253  0.0191 -0.5169* 0.1194 0.0150 0.0178  -0.5241* 0.1185 
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dyear3 -0.0039  0.0216 -0.1714 0.1065 -0.0174 0.0186  -0.1611 0.1016 
dyear4 0.0217  0.0237 0.1078 0.1062 0.0077 0.0195  0.1281 0.0992 
dindustry2 -0.0763  0.0693 -0.9200* 0.2655 -0.0669 0.0664  -0.8316* 0.2475 
dindustry3 0.0707  0.0415 -0.0831 0.1848 0.0554* 0.0265  0.0319 0.1380 
dindustry4 0.1162  0.1437 0.2790 0.4370 0.1165 0.1347  0.2342 0.4410 
dindustry5 -0.0936  0.0965 0.1055 0.3638 -0.1086 0.0744  0.4193 0.2832 
dindustry6 0.0298  0.0449 -0.2931 0.2023 0.0298 0.0447  -0.2836 0.2023 
dindustry7 -0.0058  0.0570 0.1389 0.2446 -0.0037 0.0518  0.0093 0.2161 
dindustry8 0.0490  0.0427 0.1883 0.1781 0.0537 0.0422  0.1169 0.1756 
dindustry9 -0.2608*  0.0815 -0.2976 0.3762 -0.2782* 0.0790  -0.2857 0.3689 
dindustry10 0.0128  0.0428 0.1258 0.1771 -0.0032 0.0393  0.1513 0.1677 
dindustry11 -0.1945  0.1349 -0.2071 0.5349 -0.1807 0.1064  -0.6433 0.4156 
dindustry12 -0.1282  0.0753 -0.1472 0.3040 -0.1469* 0.0647  -0.0105 0.2748 
dindustry13 0.1630*  0.0337 0.0170 0.1463 0.1610* 0.0331  0.0303 0.1444 
dindustry14 0.0194  0.1115 -0.4837 0.3876 0.0133 0.1042  -0.7008* 0.3528 
dindustry15 0.0290  0.0679 0.0561 0.2914 0.0445 0.0629  0.2149 0.2651 
noofex   1.3376* 0.0491   1.3322* 0.0489 
Constant -0.5480  0.3293 -1.5253 0.9945 -0.7734* 0.2918  -2.0721* 0.7141 
         
Number of obs 4527    4527  
Log pseudo likelihood -1286.099    -1300.096  
Overall significance Wald chi2 1101.63 (0.0)   973.48 (0.0) 
athrho -0.3583* 0.0601   -0.3597* 0.0601 
lnsigma -1.2924* 0.0168   -1.2900* 0.0168 
rho -0.3437 0.0530   -0.3450 0.0530 
sigma 0.2746 0.0046   0.2753 0.0046 
lambda -0.0944 0.0150   -0.0950 0.0150 
Test for independence between 
export participation equation and 
intensity equation chi2(1)
35.48  (0.0)   35.79  (0.0) 
Note: [1] is the estimation with full set of explanatory variables; [2] is the estimation dropping jointly 
insignificant variables except year and industry dummies; * denotes significance at 5% level; figures in () is the p-
value. 
Source: Author’s estimation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
 
 
Table 6.14 Marginal Effect of Foreign Presence on Export Intensity 
  Coastal China Middle China West China 
Privately owned -0.0408 0.7743 -1.7714 
State and collectively owned 0.3892 1.2043 -1.3414 
Note: the foreign presence is measured in terms of output share. 
Source: Author’s estimation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 
2002, and 2003 
On the impact of the other factors on domestic firm’s export intensity, Table 6.13 
shows that firm size (firmsize), capital intensity (kl), and firm age (age) have 
significantly negative impact on domestic firm’s export intensity. The negative sign 
of firm size and age contradicts with findings in Chapter 5 for the whole 
manufacturing sector, reflecting export behaviour specific to the industry. For firm 
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size, an increase in the firm size by 1 million RMB will result in the decrease of 
export intensity by 0.03 per cent. The negative impact of firm size is also contrary to 
the findings of Wakelin (1998) and Barrios et al. (2003). On the one hand, bigger 
firms are usually more able to overcome export entry costs, but on the other hand, 
smaller firms in the industry tend to be more dependent on exports, and some even 
100 per cent depends on their export for survival. As firms get bigger, their 
dependence on export is reduced. Similarly, the capital intensity (kl) also has a 
significantly negative impact on domestic firm export intensity, with an increase of 1 
per cent leading to a decrease in export intensity by 0.0004 per cent. 
Domestic firm’s age also negatively affects its export intensity, as a firm grows older 
it become less and less dependent on export markets. The average wage 
(averagewage), a proxy for labour quality, has a positive impact on domestic firm’s 
export intensity, indicating firms with more capable staff are more able to export. 
For the intermediate inputs per employee (me), as it is interacts with the foreign 
presence, the impact on firm export intensity depends on the level of foreign 
presence. Evaluating the marginal impact of the intermediate inputs per employee at 
the sample average level of foreign presence, we obtain the marginal impact of 
0.4146, indicating a positive impact on firm’s export intensity. Similarly the impact 
of ownership structure and geographical location dummies also depend on the 
foreign presence, and if evaluated at the sample average level of foreign presence, 
the marginal effects obtained are 0.0823, -0.0347, and -0.0579 for the ownership, 
geographical location in western China and geographical location in central China 
respectively. This indicates that on average privately owned firms export more than 
state and collectively owned firms, and domestic firms located in western and 
central China export less than their counterparts in coastal China.  
For the export participation equation, the number of exports in the four years (noofex) 
and the ownership structure (ownership) have significantly positive impact on 
domestic firm’s export participation, indicating that the more frequent the firm 
exports the more likely it will continue to export, and privately owned domestic 
firms are more likely to export than their state and collectively owned counterparts. 
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The geographical location dummy (western) has a significantly negative coefficient, 
indicating domestic firms located in western China are less likely to export. For the 
variable middle, its marginal impact depends on foreign presence due to the 
interaction term, and evaluating its marginal impact at the sample average of foreign 
presence, we obtain -0.1839, which indicates that on average domestic firms located 
in central China are less likely to export than their counterparts in coastal China.  
Sensitivity 
Using the FDI invested firms’ output share in the four-digit industry, we find that 
FDI does not significantly affect domestic firm’s labour productivity, but they do 
affect domestic firm’s exports, with the scale of export spillovers positively 
depending on firm’s sales cost and revenue ratio and geographical location in central 
China and negatively depending on firm ownership structure and geographical 
location in western China. However, are our findings sensitive to the way we 
measure FDI? To examine this, we re-estimate the models using the FDI invested 
firms’ assets and employment share in the industry as proxy for FDI respectively. 
For the technology spillover study, the re-estimation is undertaken following the 
specification in the [2] in Table 6.12. For the export spillover study, the re-
estimation is made following the specification in the [2] in Table 6.13. Table 6.15 
reports the estimation results for the technology spillover study, and Table 6.16 
reports the estimation results for the export spillover study. 
Comparing Table 6.15 with the [2] in Table 6.12, the coefficient estimates are 
consistent with each other in the sense that the point estimate of most variables are 
within one standard error of each other. For example, for the logarithm capital 
intensity, the point estimates are 0.1555, 0.1536, and 0.1540 in the estimations using 
three different proxies of FDI, which are very close to each other. One exception is 
the coefficient of logarithm intermediate inputs per employee (lnml). The point 
estimates are 0.6244 with a standard error of 0.0862, 0.5694 with a standard error of 
0.0931, and 0.7934 with a standard error of 0.1386  in the estimation using assets, 
employment, and output share measurements of FDI respectively. The former two 
point estimates are significantly smaller than the latter one. The F-test for joint 
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significance of foreign presence and its interaction terms obtains a test statistic of 
0.56 with a p-value of 0.7593 in the estimation using assets share measurement of 
FDI, and a test statistic of 0.83 with a p-value of 0.5477, both of which fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of joint insignificance at the 5% level. Hence, with these two 
measurements, we still find no evidence of technology spillovers from FDI. 
Table 6.15 Estimation for Sensitivity Analysis in Technology Spillover Study 
  [1] [2] 
  Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
lnkl 0.1555* 0.0336 0.1536*  0.0327 
lnml 0.6244* 0.0862 0.5694*  0.0931 
lnlq 0.0966* 0.0221 0.0980*  0.0230 
age -0.0045 0.0059 -0.0019  0.0060 
age2 0.000010 0.000014 0.000008  0.000015 
scale -0.0426 0.0391 -0.0508  0.0410 
herfindahl -0.1949 0.2253 -0.2101  0.1857 
ownership 0.0629 0.0767 0.0608  0.0707 
fp 0.0434 0.8863 -0.1889  0.9393 
fp_lnml -0.0067 0.1883 0.0868  0.1971 
fp_age 0.0050 0.0084 0.0009  0.0091 
fp_ownership -0.1015 0.1283 -0.1075  0.1233 
fp_middle -0.0942 0.3824 0.5169  0.3734 
fp_western 0.7522 0.6943 0.3700  0.6672 
dyear2 -0.0424* 0.0209 -0.0413*  0.0190 
dyear3 -0.0067 0.0203 -0.0063  0.0191 
dyear4 0.0169 0.0216 0.0173  0.0202 
dindustry2 0.5479* 0.2463 0.5041  0.2423 
dindustry3 -0.1612 0.1494 -0.1687  0.1493 
dindustry4 0.0745 0.1311 0.1848  0.1592 
dindustry5 0.0286 0.1277 0.0680  0.1334 
dindustry6 0.0656 0.1152 0.0279  0.1210 
dindustry7 0.0534 0.1106 -0.0097  0.1075 
dindustry8 0.0544 0.0910 0.0107  0.0950 
dindustry9 -0.0754 0.3100 -0.1645  0.3176 
dindustry10 0.1050 0.1838 0.0119  0.1929 
dindustry11 0.8479 0.7750 0.7210  0.7512 
dindustry12 0.1390 0.1983 0.0606  0.2106 
dindustry13 0.8949* 0.1231 0.9179*  0.1303 
dindustry14 0.2135 0.1582 0.1309  0.1143 
dindustry15 0.0832 0.1158 0.0830  0.1065 
constant 0.6954 0.4656 0.8210  0.4524 
     
Number of obs 4468  4468 
Overall R2 0.6748  0.6382 
Overall significance 
F(33,2181) 2.5100E+08  1.0400E+09
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Correlation between 
unobserved effect and 
explanatory variables
-0.0428  -0.0834 
sigma_u 0.5652  0.5956 
sigma_e 0.2575  0.2576 
rho 0.8281  0.8424 
Test for joint significance of fp
 and interaction terms 0.56  0.83
Test for significance of 
unobserved effects 2.13   2.13
Note: [1] is the estimation using FDI invested firms' assets share in the industry 
as proxy for FDI; [2] is the estimation using FDI invested firms' employment 
share in the industry as proxy for FDI; * denotes significance at 5% level. 
Source: Author’s estimation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 
2001, 2002, and 2003 
The coefficient estimate presented in Table 6.16 shows only negligible difference 
with that of [2] in Table 6.13. Some coefficient point estimates even remain 
unchanged across three estimations, for example for the coefficient of firm size, the 
three estimations obtain the same point estimate (-0.0003). The F-test for the joint 
significance of foreign presence and its interaction terms obtains a test statistic of 
86.32 with a p-value of 0 in the estimation with assets share as proxy for FDI, and a 
test statistic of 118.96 with a p-value of 0, which both rejects the null hypothesis of 
joint insignificance at the 5% level. Then evaluate the marginal impact of foreign 
presence at both the sample average and domestic firm’s value of firm 
characteristics, we obtain Table 6.17, Figure 6.6 and 6.7.Comparing Table 6.17 and 
6.14, there are some variations in the magnitude, but the signs of marginal impacts 
do not change. Figure 6.6 and 6.7 also present a very similar picture to that of Figure 
6.5. Hence, we conclude our findings in testing export spillovers are not sensitive to 
different measurements of FDI. 
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Figure 6.6 Distribution of Marginal Effect of Assets Share Foreign Presence on 
Export Intensity 
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Note: marginal effect computed from the estimation using assets share as proxy for FDI.
 
 
Figure 6.7 Distribution of Marginal Effect of Employment Share Foreign 
Presence on Export Intensity 
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Note: marginal effect computed from the estimation using assets share as proxy for FDI.
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Table 6.16 Estimation for Sensitivity Analysis in Export Spillover Study 
  [1] [2] 
 Export Intensity Export Participation Export Intensity Export Participation 
Variables Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
Coef. 
Robust 
Std. 
Err. 
firmsize -0.0003  0.0001 -0.0002 0.0008 -0.0003 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0008 
capitalintensity -0.0004  0.0001 -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001  -0.0004 0.0003 
averagewage 0.0030  0.0010 -0.0046 0.0068 0.0030 0.0010  -0.0048 0.0068 
mexpense 1.5643  0.2763 -0.0400 0.4115 1.6059 0.2899  -0.1138 0.5191 
age -0.0026  0.0005 -0.0003 0.0023 -0.0025 0.0005  -0.0004 0.0023 
ownership 0.3573  0.0602 0.4331 0.2141 0.3720 0.0558  0.3616 0.2119 
western 0.9589  0.2328 -0.6874 0.2794 1.3773 0.1795  -0.9466 0.2539 
middle -0.4357  0.1166 -0.6311 0.2935 -0.3742 0.1134  -0.8537 0.3146 
Fp 2.0109  0.3844 0.9345 1.0203 2.1641 0.4344  0.5154 1.2862 
Fp_mexpense -1.8612  0.3843 1.0360 0.8453 -2.0397 0.4294  1.1503 1.0540 
Fp_ownership -0.4474  0.0852 -0.3442 0.3327 -0.4983 0.0838  -0.2472 0.3449 
Fp_western -1.7315  0.4003 -0.3767 0.4934 -2.5788 0.3563  0.1338 0.4754 
Fp_middle 0.6373  0.1592 0.7639 0.4750 0.5867 0.1644  1.1695 0.5250 
Dyear2 0.0171  0.0190 -0.4992 0.1190 0.0073 0.0172  -0.5460 0.1166 
Dyear3 -0.0181  0.0184 -0.1686 0.1004 -0.0282 0.0172  -0.2041 0.0989 
Dyear4 0.0067  0.0184 0.1146 0.0962 -0.0030 0.0168  0.0662 0.0951 
Dindustry2 -0.0423  0.0713 -0.5991 0.2629 -0.0498 0.0713  -0.7012 0.2715 
Dindustry3 0.0583  0.0278 0.0885 0.1400 0.0638 0.0482  0.2457 0.2223 
Dindustry4 0.1484  0.1402 0.5568 0.4658 0.1474 0.1500  0.3842 0.5553 
Dindustry5 -0.0977  0.0795 0.5980 0.2805 -0.1141 0.0886  0.5227 0.3496 
Dindustry6 0.0415  0.0409 -0.2043 0.1898 0.0395 0.0437  -0.2924 0.2054 
Dindustry7 -0.0045  0.0521 -0.0876 0.2103 0.0072 0.0543  -0.0233 0.2369 
Dindustry8 0.0551  0.0374 0.1192 0.1531 0.0616 0.0368  0.1585 0.1584 
Dindustry9 -0.2302  0.0898 -0.0458 0.4006 -0.2206 0.1000  0.0524 0.4546 
dindustry10 0.0401  0.0514 0.3832 0.2137 0.0169 0.0482  0.2457 0.2012 
dindustry11 -0.1655  0.0881 -0.6128 0.3717 -0.1518 0.0782  -0.4486 0.3360 
dindustry12 -0.1416  0.0651 0.0811 0.2689 -0.1400 0.0724  0.0871 0.3110 
dindustry13 0.1533  0.0384 -0.0898 0.1631 0.1647 0.0367  -0.0077 0.1665 
dindustry14 0.0163  0.1002 -0.6661 0.3493 0.0236 0.0991  -0.5858 0.3371 
dindustry15 0.0557  0.0720 0.4281 0.2930 0.0393 0.0631  0.2063 0.2660 
noofex   1.3314 0.0489   1.3281 0.0486 
constant -0.9053  0.2687 -2.5255 0.5765 -0.9250 0.2846  -2.2065 0.7030 
         
Number of obs 4527    4527  
Log pseudolikelihood -1291.867    -1282.299  
Overall significance Wald chi2 974.64    1009.81  
athrho -0.3692 0.0613   -0.3684 0.0613 
lnsigma -1.2924 0.0168   -1.2967 0.0169 
rho -0.3533 0.0536   -0.3526 0.0537 
sigma 0.2746 0.0046   0.2734 0.0046 
lambda -0.0970 0.0152   -0.0964 0.0152 
Test for independence between 
export participatio equation and 
intensity equation chi2(1)
36.31     36.11   
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Note: [1] is the estimation using FDI invested firms' assets share in the industry as proxy for FDI; [2] is the 
estimation using FDI invested firms' employment share in the industry as proxy for FDI. 
Source: Author’s estimation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
 
 
Table 6.17 Marginal Impact of FDI Estimated Using Assets and Employment 
Share Measurements 
  Coastal China Middle China Western China 
  [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] 
Privately owned -0.0236 -0.0735 0.6137 0.5133  -1.7551 -2.6522 
State and collectively owned 0.4238 0.4249 1.0612 1.0116  -1.3077 -2.1539 
Note: [1] is the estimation using FDI invested firms' assets share in the industry as proxy for FDI; [2] is 
the estimation using FDI invested firms' employment share in the industry as proxy for FDI. 
Source: Author’s estimation based on Enterprise Data, NBS, Beijing, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 
Conclusions 
This chapter explored both technology spillovers and export spillovers from the FDI 
in the cultural, educational, and sporting product manufacturing industry, where 
there are is significant proportion of FDI activities and firms are very active in 
exporting. We found no evidence of technology spillovers. However, we did find 
that there exist export spillovers from FDI, for which the scale positively depends on 
firm’s sales cost and revenue ratio and geographical location in central China and 
negatively depends on firm’s ownership structure and geographical location in 
western China.  
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7. Technology Spillovers of FDI in Gansu 
Province36 
FDI technology spillovers in a less developed region have the potential to 
accelerate economic development. A study of technology spillovers at the firm 
level, in Gansu province, a much less developed region in China where there are 
fewer FDI invested firms compared with the rest of China, potentially offers 
insight into the role of FDI in promoting economic development in less 
developed regions.   
Analysis of spillovers from FDI at the firm level also offers additional insight 
into the nature of technology spillovers. As shown by Caballero and Lyons 
(1989), the externality at one level of aggregation can become internal at a higher 
level of aggregation. This characteristic of spillovers means measuring their 
effects requires analysis at different level of aggregation.  
The rest of the chapter is organized into six sections. The first section deals with 
the background about the subject of this study, Gansu province. Then we present 
the analytical framework and estimation strategy, and construct variables used in 
the empirical study. The regression results and sensitivity analysis are discussed 
in the subsequent two sections. The last section concludes the chapter. 
Background 
Gansu province has two distinct underlying characteristics compared with China 
as a whole: it is relatively under-developed and it is rich in natural resources. 
Figure 7.1 compares GDP per capita in Gansu and China nationally. Since 1995, 
the GDP per capita of Gansu has been well below that of all China. In 2003, 
GDP per capita in Gansu was 5,012 RMB, while the national average was 9,101 
                                                 
36 The methodology and data in this chapter draws from Sun (2006), Technical Efficiency and Its 
Determinants in Gansu, West China, Pacific Economic Papers, no.355, 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/pep/pep-355.pdf 
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RMB; that is, Gansu’s GDP per capita was only about 55 per cent of the national 
average. From 1995 to 2003 GDP per capita in Gansu averaged only 54 per cent 
of the national level. Figure 7.2 compares Gansu’s GDP growth rate with the 
national average. Gansu’s GDP growth rate is no higher than the national 
average in most of years since 1995, implying that the gap in GDP per capita has 
not narrowed unless the population growth rate was lower than the national 
average, and that is unlikely. 
Figure 7.1 Comparison of GDP Per Capita (unit: RMB) 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues 
 
Figure 7.2 Comparison of GDP Growth Rate (unit: per cent) 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, various issues 
 
Gansu is well known for its high endowment of natural resources (see Figure 7.3 
for a distribution of major natural resources). It has reserves of 11 minerals that 
rank as China’s largest, 32 minerals that rank in China’s top five, and 51 
minerals that rank in China’s top 10. Reserves of nickel-cobalt ranks in the 
world’s top three, reserves of zinc ranks in China’s top three, and reserves of 
copper ranks in China’s top four. This resource endowment means that Gansu’s 
industry is heavily resource-based. Value added in the non-ferrous metals 
industry and the metallurgy industries accounts for 25 per cent of the total added 
 184 
 
value of industry. In 2003, the output of electrolytic aluminium was 500,000 
tonnes, which accounted for 9.3 per cent of provincial output. During the period 
of January–May 2005, the value added of the eight main industries (all resource-
based) accounted for 80 per cent of total provincial output. 
Figure 7.3 presents the geographical location of firms and the distribution of 
Gansu’s main resources. We find that firm concentration generally does not 
match the distribution of resources, even though Gansu’s industries are heavily 
resource-based, except for Baiyin and Longnan. Baiyin city has lead-zinc 
deposits and Longnan is very near to stibium, copper and gold deposits. These 
minerals are commonly located in mountainous areas unsuited to the 
establishment of manufacturing activities. 
Gansu has not attracted foreign investment to the same extent as other provinces. 
The FDI-GDP ratio is significantly below the national average (see Table 7.1). In 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, the FDI-GDP ratio in Gansu was 0.52 per cent, 0.57 
per cent, 0.44 per cent, and 0.15 per cent respectively, while over the same 
period, the national average was 2.41 per cent, 2.63 per cent, 2.61 per cent, 2.26 
per cent respectively. The gap appears to be growing, as in 2000 and 2001 the 
national average FDI-GDP ratio was about 4.6 times that of Gansu, but in 2002 
and 2003 the gap had risen to 6 and 15 times respectively. In terms of ranking 
across provinces, Gansu is ranked 27 in 2000, 25 in 2001, 27 in 2002, and 29 in 
2003 among all 31 provinces and cities.  
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Table 7.1 FDI-GDP Ratio across Provinces (per cent) 
Provinces 2000 2001 2002 2003
Beijing 5.62 5.14 4.44 4.95
Tianjin 5.89 9.60 6.38 5.19
Hebei 1.10 0.99 1.06 1.12
Shanxi 1.13 1.09 0.87 0.72
Inner Mongolia 0.62 0.57 0.83 0.34
Liaoling 3.62 4.14 5.36 3.89
Jilin 1.53 1.38 0.90 0.63
Heilongjiang 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.60
Shanghai 5.75 7.17 6.54 7.24
Jiangsu 6.20 6.02 7.93 7.02
Zhejiang 2.21 2.71 3.27 4.39
Anhui 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.77
Fujian 7.25 7.62 6.79 4.11
Jiangxi 0.94 1.51 3.65 4.71
Shandong 2.88 3.09 3.71 4.00
Henan 0.91 0.67 0.54 0.63
Hubei 1.83 2.11 2.44 2.40
Hunan 1.52 1.68 1.80 1.82
Guangdong 9.67 9.28 7.99 4.75
Guangxi 2.12 1.43 1.41 1.27
Hainan 6.88 7.08 7.09 5.20
Chongqing 1.27 1.21 0.82 0.96
Sichuan 0.90 1.09 0.94 0.63
Guizhou 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.28
Yunnan 0.54 0.26 0.41 0.28
Tibet 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Shannxi 1.44 1.58 1.42 1.15
Gansu 0.52 0.57 0.44 0.15
Qinghai 0.00 1.00 1.15 0.53
Ningxia 0.54 0.47 0.55 0.37
Xinjiang 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.07
Average 2.41 2.63 2.61 2.26
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2002, 2003, 2005 
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Figure 7.3 Distribution of Firms and Major Resources in Gansu 
 
 
 
It is clear that Gansu is a less developed province in terms of both aggregate 
GDP, GDP per capita, and its capacity to attract foreign direct investment. 
However its rich natural resource endowment is a source of advantage. This 
makes the study of technology spillovers and their determinants in Gansu 
province interesting not only for what tells us about technology spillovers, but 
also because of what it implies for economic development potential. 
Analytical Framework 
In earlier chapters the focus was on regression of labour productivity against the 
foreign presence to test technology spillovers. This chapter explores whether the 
foreign presence affects domestic firm technical efficiency. If FDI invested firms 
have a positive impact on domestic firms’ technical efficiency, then technology 
spillovers occur. Here the testing of spillovers is undertaken within the 
framework of a stochastic production frontier and technical inefficiency model. 
Note: (1) Stars in the map denotes 
locations of firms; (2) The 
number in the map is number of 
firms located in the region; (3) 
C—Copper, G—Gold, N—
Nickel-Cobalt, L—Lead-Zinc, 
S—Stibium, T—Tungsten  
Source:  MOF 2001, Gansu Yearbook 2005 
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This methodology does not require using a proxy of labour productivity for 
domestic firm technology and a consequent deficiency in the earlier analysis. The 
stochastic production frontier also reveals firm technical efficiency in Gansu 
province, itself of significant analytic and policy interest. This section lays out 
the analytical framework within which the study is undertaken.  
Technical efficiency and its measurement 
Farrell (1957) argues that total economic efficiency can be decomposed into two 
components: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency 
reflects a firm’s ability to maximize output for a given set of inputs (or operate at 
the boundary of a production possibility frontier), or the firm’s ability to 
minimize inputs used for a given set of outputs; and allocative efficiency reflects 
the firm’s ability to use inputs in optimal proportions given their market prices 
and the production technology used.  
The measurement of technical inefficiency falls into two categories: input-
oriented measures and output-oriented measures. Koopmans (1951) gives these 
measures formal definitions. This paper will use an output-oriented measure. Its 
formal definition is as follows: 
An output vector )(yLy∈  is technically efficient, if and only 
if, )(' yLy ∉  for yy ≥'  
This definition says that for given inputs and technology, any output that is 
higher than the current output is not available to the firm if the firm is already 
technically efficient. 
Many different methods have been adopted to estimate technical efficiency. The 
two main approaches are data envelopment analysis (DEA) and the stochastic 
production frontier model. The former involves mathematical programming, and 
the latter uses econometric methods. This chapter uses the latter approach. 
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Stochastic production frontier and technical inefficiency model 
The stochastic production frontier model is a widely used approach in measuring 
technical efficiency, as first proposed independently by Aigner, Lovell, and 
Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). This model says that a 
firm’s production process is subject to two disturbances: technical inefficiency 
and other random shocks that are outside of the firm’s control. If factors that 
affect these two disturbances are independent of each other, that is, the two 
disturbances can be separated, then the firm’s technical efficiency can be 
estimated accordingly.  The model can be summarized as: 
iiii uvxy −+= β)ln(    i=1, 2, … , N                       (7.1) 
where y is the output; x is the vector of inputs; β  is a vector of production 
parameters; the random error v (two-sided “noise” component) accounts for the 
effect of all random factors, such as the measurement error, the effects of 
weather, and luck. The iv s are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed as normal random variables with mean zero and constant variance 2vσ , 
and are also assumed to be independent of iu  and the inputs vector x. The iu s are 
non-negative random components and capture technical inefficiency, since the 
non-negative assumption of u  ensures that the firm’s actual production point 
always lies beneath the stochastic frontier and the gap thus measures technical 
inefficiency.  
Hence this model is also called an error component model, as the error term is 
actually composed of two components. The OLS estimate of the equation will 
have a consistent estimate of ( )kββ ,...,1  if the iu s are uncorrelated with the input 
vector, but not the intercept 0β  (unless the mean of iu  is zero). So in order to 
obtain the estimate of the production technology parameters vector, β , and to 
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estimate the technical efficiency of each firm, the distribution of iu  must be 
assumed. Commonly, iu  are assumed to be independently distributed as a non-
negative truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution ( )2, uimN σ . 
Each firm’s technical efficiency can be measured as the ratio of actual output 
against potential output, as follows: 
iu
iii
iii
i exuYE
xuYE
TE −=== ),0(
),(
 
Where u is zero, then the firm achieves its maximum output capacity and 
technical efficiency is 100 per cent. If we take expectation on both sides of 
equation (1), and plot the expectation of log output against the log capital input, 
holding everything else constant, we can see that the technical inefficiency term 
shifts the production schedule downward, as: 
Figure 7.4 Illustration of Technical Efficiency 
 
 
Furthermore, in order to obtain the specific factors that affect each firm’s 
technical efficiency, following Battese and Coelli (1995), the mean of u (the 
technical inefficiency term) can be specified as: 
iii wzm += δ                                            (7.2) 
E[ln y]
][ln][ln uEkCyE −+= β
E[u] 
ln k
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where iz  is a p×1 vector of firm-specific variables that may influence the 
technical efficiency of the firm, iw  is i.i.d. normal white noise, and δ  is the 
vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Thus, the mean log technical efficiency and log output of firm i 
are iiii wzxzxyE −−= δβ],[ln  and iii wzzxTEE −−= δ],[ln  respectively. The 
partial effect of the factor ikz  (the kth factor of vector iz ) is:  
k
ik
iii
z
zxyE δ−=∂
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Equation (7.1) is the stochastic production frontier model and equation (7.2) is 
the technical inefficiency model. They are linked to each other by the one-sided 
error term u. Battese and Corra (1977) parameterise the variance terms of u and v 
as 222 uv σσσ +=  and 22 σσγ u= , where 2σ  is the variance of output 
conditioned on inputs. This expression says that production uncertainty comes 
from two sources: pure random factors and technical inefficiency. Hence if γ , 
the proportion of uncertainty coming from technical inefficiency, is equal to zero, 
then there is no technical inefficiency. This can be used to test whether technical 
inefficiency is present in the firm. To estimate equations (7.1) and (7.2), a three-
step procedure is employed37. An OLS estimation is carried out to obtain the 
estimation of β  and σ  as the first step; then as the second step, the estimation of 
β  and σ  is adjusted to correct for the bias; as the third step, the Davidon-
                                                 
37 Here, Frontier 4.1 (Coelli 1996) is used to estimate equation (7.1) and (7.2). 
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Fletcher-Powell iterative maximisation routine is carried out to obtain the ML 
estimates. 
Estimation strategy 
To apply the stochastic frontier model and technical inefficiency model, we start 
from the following production function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) uvlkdldkddy klklllkk −++++++++= lnlnlnlnln 10101010 ββββββββ  (7.3) 
where y is the output value; k is the capital input; l is the labour input; d is a 12×1 
vector of industry dummies; v is the random error term that captures the effect of 
all other random factors on the production and is i.i.d. ( )2,0 vN σ ; and u is non-
negatively distributed, which is affected by exogenous factors, such as firm 
characteristics and the market structure.  
The industry dummy vector is intended to capture the industry heterogeneity, 
namely the possibility that firm production functions may differ across different 
industries, as different production functions in different industries mean the 
coefficients (both the intercept and slopes) will be different across industries. 
Failure to account for this possibility may lead to inconsistent and biased 
estimation. Suppose true production functions do differ across industries, and for 
simplicity only labour plays a role in production, that is, the true production 
function is ( ) vlddy ++++= lnln 3210 ββββ . If the production function is 
estimated without accounting for production function differences across 
industries, then essentially the production function is estimated as: 
εββ ++= ly lnln 20 , where vldd ++= ln31 ββε . Hence the estimation will 
be biased and inconsistent unless 03 =β . 
In order to study the impact of exogenous factors on firm technical efficiency, 
particularly foreign presence, the mean of u is set as a function of foreign 
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presence, geographical location dummy, the Herfindahl index which proxies for 
the market structure, employee training expenses, R&D expenses, expenses on 
labour insurance, firm age, expenses on introducing technology, dummy 
variables for whether the firm is resource based, firm size, and ownership (see 
Table 7.2 for a summary of variables used in the estimation), as: 
i
i
wXfpdmdbwpwrbiteyoo
yoolierdeeteherfindaledlocationfpm
+×+++++++
+++++++=
141312111098
76543210
2 δδδδδδδ
δδδδδδδδ
 (7.4) 
where X is the vector of all other factors38 (dlocation, herfindahl, ete, rde, lie, 
yoo, yoo2, ite, wrb, wfi, wp, db, and dm). The test for the presence of technology 
spillovers of FDI can be made by testing the joint significance of 1δ  and 14δ , and 
the significance of 14δ  will reveal the determinants of this kind of spillover. This 
equation is estimated by a general-to-specific approach, that is, insignificant 
variables are dropped sequentially and the likelihood ratio tests are made to test 
whether the dropping of variables is appropriate.  
In equation (7.4), we expect the sign of coefficient of dlocation to be negative, as 
when firms agglomerate they can usually learn from each other easily and share 
infrastructure. The sign of the coefficient of Herfindahl index is expected to be 
positive. On the one hand, a more competitive market, that is, a lower Herfindahl 
index, typically forces firms to perform better, while on the other hand, firms in a 
more concentrated market are better able to pay for fixed costs in improving their 
efficiency, such as R&D, personnel training, and introducing new technology. 
However, as we control for these factors, we expect the coefficient of Herfindahl 
index to be positive. For firm training expenses (ete), R&D expenses (rde), the 
expense of introducing new technology (ite), a positive effect on efficiency is 
expected, that is, the sign of the coefficients is expected to be negative, since 
                                                 
38 In the final estimation, the vector X only contains R&D expense (rde), as the likelihood ratio test rejects 
the significance of all other factors.  
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training is likely to make employees more skillful, and R&D will help to improve 
the firm’s technology level, while introducing technology will obviously improve 
the technology level of the firm, and thus possibly improve their technical 
efficiency. Expenditure on labour insurance (lie) is expected to have a negative 
effect on a firm technical efficiency since the insurance should have a negative 
influence on the employees’ incentive to work hard. The age of the firm (yoo) is 
considered to have a quadratic effect on firm technical efficiency since when 
firms are young, they may be too inexperienced to operate efficiently, and when 
firms are too old, inertia may make them unresponsive to adjustments to achieve 
the technical efficiency. 
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Table 7.2 Variables and Their Descriptions 
Variable 
Name 
Description 
lny The output of the firm, proxied by the sales income of the 
firm. (the log form of the output) 
lnk The capital input of the firm, proxied by fixed capital asset. 
(the log form of the capital) 
lnl The labour input of the firm, proxied by the number of 
average annual workers. (the log form of the labour force.) 
d A 12×1 vector of industry dummies, which include agrilcutal 
industry, mining industry, elestricity, gas and water supply 
industry, construction industry, prospecting and water 
management industry, transportation, storage, and postal 
service industry, wholesale, retail, and restaurant industry, 
financial, insurance service and real estate industry, social 
service industry, education, arts, and media industry, 
scientific research and technological service industry, and 
governments, parties, and social organization. 
fp Foreign presence, proxy for foreign direct investment, 
calculated as the share of FDI invested firm’s 
output/employment/assets in the whole industry. 
dlocation A dummy that takes value 1 if the firm is located in a Zip 
Code where over 40% firms are located. 
herfindahl The Herfindahl Index calculated at 4-digit industry level.  
ete  The employee’s training expenses by the firm (its log form). 
rde  The firm’s R&D expenses (its log form). 
lie  The firm’s expenses on labour insurance (its log form). 
yoo Years of operation of the firm. 
yoo2 The square of years of operation of the firm. 
ite The firm’s expenses on introducing the technology (its log 
form). 
wrb The dummy variable, indicating whether the firm is resource-
based. If the firm is resource-based, wrb=1. 
wp The dummy variable, indicating ownership structure, i.e. 
whether the firm is privately owned. If the firm is privately 
owned, wp=1. Otherwise, wp=0. 
db The dummy variable, indicating the firms’ size. If the firm is 
big in size, db=1. Otherwise, db=0. 
dm The dummy variable, indicating the firms’ size. If the firm is 
medium-sized, dm=1. Otherwise, dm=0. 
 
The data 
Data description and variable construction 
The data set is cross-sectional firm level micro-data, which comes from Ministry 
of Finance, China, 2001. It comprises 1,503 firms, of which 1,466 firms are 
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selected from the sample since the other 37 firms did not report the variables of 
capital or labour. This kind of selection does not affect the estimation results, as 
the selection criterion is exogenous. Altogether, 28 variables (see Table 7.2) are 
constructed from the data set.  
The agglomeration dummy (dlocation) is constructed by setting the value to be 1 
if the firm is located in the zip code 730030, 730050, 730000, 730060, 730900, 
and 741000. Zip codes in China have six digits, where the first two digits denote 
provinces, the third and fourth digits denote cities, and the fifth and sixth digits 
denote counties, towns or suburbs. For example, in the zip code 730000, ‘73’ 
denotes Gansu province, ‘00’ denotes Lanzhou city, and ‘00’ denotes the city 
area. Hence the zip code can reveal the geographical location of firms accurately. 
Some 40.6 per cent of firms are concentrated in these six zip codes. If 
geographical concentration has a positive impact on firm technical efficiency, 
then firms located in these six zip codes will be systematically more technically 
efficient than firms located outside, after controlling all other factors. Table 7.3 
shows a summary of the distribution of firms by zip code and their scale. Some 
910 firms (about 61 per cent) are concentrated between zip code 730000 and 
735000, and over 80 per cent of large scale firms (with log of sales not less than 
20) are located in this region. 
Table 7.3 Firm Geographical Locations and Output Scale 
   Ln(Sale) 
  ZIP Code [10, 15) [15, 20) [20, 25) Total 
[730000, 735000) 289 607 14 910 
   (19.23) (40.39) (0.93) (60.55) 
[735000, 740000) 63 107 3 173 
   (4.19) (7.12) (0.20) (11.51) 
[740000, 745000) 95 192 0 287 
   (6.32) (12.77) (0.00) (19.10) 
[745000, 750000) 54 79 0 133 
   (3.59) (5.26) (0.00) (8.85) 
Total 501 985 17 1503 
   (33.33) (65.54) (1.13) (100.00) 
Note: Number in bracket is the percentage. 
Source: MOF, 2001 
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Resource-based firms are defined as firms with either inputs or outputs that are 
related to natural resources, namely in the mining industry, the production and 
supply of electricity, gas, and water, and some parts of manufacturing, such as 
the petrol processing industry, and the steel industry. This criterion is used to 
construct the dummy variable wrb for resource based. The dummy variables of 
firm size (dm and db) are constructed according to the Chinese Standard 
Classification of Firm Size, which classifies firms by their output and number of 
employees. A firm with over 2,000 employees, sales of over 300 million RMB 
and total assets of over 400 million RMB is classified as a big firm, and a firm 
with employees between 300 and 2,000, sales of 30-300 million RMB, and total 
assets of 40-400 million RMB is classified as a medium-size firm. Herfindahl 
index, as in previous chapters, is calculated at the four-digit industry level. 
The original data set directly reports all the other variables. However, due to the 
accounting properties in the raw data set, variables such as ete (employee 
training expenses), rde (R&D expenses), lie (expenses on labour insurance), and 
ite (expenses on introducing technology) for some firms are reported to be 
negative. This indicates that the firm is delaying the payment of these expenses, 
and thus a value of zero is set to these variables when they are negative. For 
employee training expenses (ete), three firms’ values are set to zero; for R&D 
expenses (rde), one firm’s value is set to zero; the firm expenses on labour 
insurance (lie) has six firms’ values set to zero; and the firm expenses on 
introducing technology (ite) has one firm’s value set to zero. The setting of zero 
is made on the assumption that since the firm did not make actual payment on 
these accounts, this is equivalent to the firm having zero expenses on these items.  
Foreign presence in Gansu 
The presence of FDI in Gansu province in 2001 is rather low. In the total of 
1,503 firms, only 65 firms are foreign invested. This accounts for 4.3 per cent of 
all firms in the sample. These 65 firms are distributed across 44 four-digit 
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industries. The foreign presence is calculated in terms of the output share, the 
employment share, and the assets share in the whole four-digit industry, using the 
formula in set out in Chapter 4. Table 7.4 presents the results of the calculation. 
Table 7.4 Foreign Presence in Gansu Province, 2001 
Foreign Presence (per cent) Industry 
Code Industry Name output employment assets 
320 Poultry breeding  100 100 100 
1311 Rice milling  100 100 100 
1314 Assorted and mixed feeding stuff manufacturing 
100 100 100 
1319 Other feeding stuff manufacturing 100 100 100 
2224 Converted paper manufacturing 100 100 100 
2652 Dope manufacturing 100 100 100 
2654 Paint manufacturing 100 100 100 
3533 Pump manufacturing 100 100 100 
3564 Sintered metal product manufacturing 100 100 100 
3621 Specialized petroleum industry equipment manufacturing  
100 100 100 
4213 Optical instrument manufacturing  100 100 100 
6131 Textile wholesale 100 100 100 
6720 Snack food 100 100 100 
1390 Other food processing 99 93 98 
1890 Other fiber products manufacturing  97 35 66 
3151 Construction ceramics, sanitary ceramics industry 
95 71 18 
2661 Polyolefin plastics manufacturing 90 57 97 
3030 Plastic silk, woven goods manufacturing 89 44 99 
4021 Transformer manufacturing  89 85 80 
6220 Chemical material wholesale   85 87 100 
3619 Other special mechanical and electrical equipment manufacturing  
76 69 24 
1590 Other beverage manufacturing 73 33 31 
6710 Restaurant 64 18 74 
1513 Beer manufacturing 60 65 74 
2677 Additives manufacturing 54 30 66 
3321 Aluminum smelting industry 47 41 26 
2720 Chemical drug manufacturing 36 14 28 
7200 Real estate development and management industry 
34 8 52 
3020 Plastic plates and bar industry  33 6 8 
4411 Steam electric power generation  32 0.3 35 
1011 Limestone mining 30 8 5 
3134 Light building materials manufacturing 27 15 1 
8100 Entertainment industry 17 37 17 
9910 Enterprise management  10 5 0.01 
8310 Software development and consulting industry 7 2 3 
2671 Chemical reagents and auxiliary agent manufacturing  
4 3 7 
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6262 Ferrous metal material wholesale 3 23 6 
5310 Automobile transportation 3 8 6 
9020 Publishing 3 12 4 
8000 Tourism 2 6 11 
9990 Others 1 0.3 0.1 
4710 Housing construction  1 0.3 1 
2750 Biological products manufacturing 1 1 2 
8490 Others 1 1 0.5 
Note: all other industries have zero foreign presence 
Source: author's calculation 
The table shows that there are 13 industries in which firms are all foreign 
invested, and 9 out of all 13 industries are in the manufacturing sector. This is 
consistent with the fact that a large proportion of FDI flows into the 
manufacturing sector in China. Foreign presence measured in terms of output 
share, employment share, and assets share are highly and positively correlated 
with each other39. This indicates that if one index measures foreign activities 
correctly then the other two indices also tend to capture them correctly. However 
this is not enough to justify using one index over the other two in the regression 
analysis. As we can see from the table, these three indices do not rank the foreign 
activities across industries consistently40. The value of these three indices can 
also be extremely different from each other, for example in the housing 
construction industry (4710), the value of output share index is over three times 
of the value of employment share index. In addition, by comparing the value of 
the three indices across industries, we also find that the employment share 
measurement tends to have smaller value than those of the other two 
measurements. This reflects the fact that FDI invested firms are usually more 
capital intensive and have bigger production capacity than domestic firms. The 
examination of the table shows the necessity of using all the three measurements 
in the regression analysis, in order to recognize the inbuilt pitfalls of these 
measurements and obtain robust results. 
                                                 
39 The correlation between output share and employment share is 0.91, between output share and assets 
share is 0.91, and between employment share and assets share is 0.87. 
40 For example, in the other fibre products manufacturing industry (1890), the output share index is 0.97 and 
ranked 15, while the employment share index is 0.35 and ranked 24, and the assets share index is 0.66 and 
ranked 22. 
 199 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 7.5 sets out the descriptive statistics of variables. From this table, we can 
see that owing to the fact that the data set covers all kinds of firms in Gansu 
province, the values of variables used have comparatively large standard 
deviations compared with the sample average. For example, for output, the 
average is about 60 million RMB, while the standard deviation is about 736 
million RMB, and the maximum value is about 554,794 times of the minimum 
value.  
Another point about the data is that for R&D expenses and the expenses of 
introducing technology, a large proportion of firms reported zero values. For the 
former variable, 1,370 firms out of the total of 1,466 (93.5 per cent) did not have 
such expenses, and for the latter variable, 1,444 firms out of the total of 1,466 
(98.5 per cent) did not have such expenses.  
Table 7.5 Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Gansu Province, 2001 
Variable  Unit Average Stdev Min Max 
Output 100 
thousand 
RMB 
60.03  736.24  0.05  26,736.66  
Capital 100 
thousand 
RMB 
36.95  363.09  0.001  12,464.07  
Labour Persons 298.03  1,346.95  2  31,189  
Foreign Presence  
(output share) 
 0.053 0.177 0 1 
Foreign Presence 
(employment share) 
 0.036 0.146 0 1 
Foreign Presence  
(asset share) 
 0.056 0.186 0 1 
Herfindahl Index  0.389 0.302 0.033 1 
Expense on employee training thousand 
RMB 
39.86  316.46  0 8073.47  
R&D expense thousand 48.5  716.92  0 23531.35  
Expense on labour insurance thousand 573.2  6493.45  0 159306.9  
Years of operation Years 26.81  19.10  1  99  
Expense on introducing 
technology 
thousand 3  52.26  0 1685.25 
Source: Constructed from the data from Ministry of Finance, PRC, 2001 
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Correlation matrix 
Tables 7.6 and 7.7 present the correlation matrix of variables in the production 
function and the technical inefficiency model. In Table 7.6, we find that there 
does not appear to be a multicollinearity problem between industry dummies and 
labour and capital. The correlation between labour (in log form) and capital (in 
log form) is 0.73. However, since the sample size is large (1,466), there is 
unlikely to be a multicollinearity problem.  
Table 7.7 is the correlation matrix for variables in the technical inefficiency 
model. As expected, foreign presence measured in terms of the output share, 
employment share, and assets share are highly correlated with each other. These 
three measures of foreign presence are used separately in the empirical 
estimation because of the possible distortion that is inherent in these 
measurements. In addition, employee training expenses (ete) are also correlated 
with R&D expenses (rde) and labour insurance expenses (lie), with the 
correlation being 0.8 and 0.94 respectively, and the correlation between R&D 
expenses (rde) and labour insurance expenses (lie) is 0.8. Besides, the interaction 
terms are also highly correlated with interacted variables. These potential 
multicollinearity problems are taken account of in the general-to-specific 
sequential estimation search by checking the symptom that coefficients are 
individually insignificant while jointly significant. 
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Table 7.6 Correlation Matrix between Labour, Capital and Industry Dummies 
  lnk lnl dagriculture dconstruction deam degws dfinance dgpso dgpwm dmining dsale dsservice dst dtransportation 
lnk 1              
lnl 0.73  1             
dagriculture 0.03  0.00  1            
dconstruction 0.01  0.11  -0.03 1           
deam -0.01  -0.05  -0.01 -0.02 1          
degws 0.18  0.11  -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 1         
dfinance -0.08  -0.19  -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 1        
dgpso -0.10  -0.08  -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 1       
dgpwm 0.01  0.02  -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1      
dmining 0.10  0.13  -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 1     
dsale -0.18  -0.28  -0.07 -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.16 -0.03 -0.11 1    
dsservice -0.08  -0.09  -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.17 1   
dst -0.02  -0.02  -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04 1  
dtransportation 0.02  0.04  -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 -0.06 -0.03 1 
Note: variables starting with 'd' is industry dummies, e.g. dagriculture is agriculture industry dummy. 
Source: author's calculation 
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Table 7.7 Correlation Matrix between Variables in Technical Inefficiency Model 
  fpo fpe fpa dlocation Herfindahl ete rde lie yoo yoo2 ite wrb wp db dm 
fpo 1               
fpe 0.90  1              
fpa 0.94  0.82  1             
dlocation 0.14  0.10  0.16 1            
Herfindahl 0.10  0.15  0.05 0.07 1           
ete 0.00  0.00  -0.01 0.02 0.08 1          
rde -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 0.03 0.07 0.80 1         
lie -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.94 0.80 1        
yoo -0.05  -0.03  -0.05 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.07  1       
yoo2 -0.05  -0.03  -0.05 -0.10 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05  0.94 1      
ite 0.00  -0.01  0.00 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03  0.03 0.02 1     
wrb -0.03  -0.04  -0.09 -0.18 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.12  0.06 0.04 0.09 1    
wp 0.29  0.28  0.26 0.09 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01  -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 1   
db 0.00  0.00  -0.01 0.10 0.09 0.27 0.20 0.24  0.07 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.00 1  
dm 0.09  0.11  0.09 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02  0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.09 1 
Note: fpo is the foreign presence in terms of output share, fpe is in terms of employment share, fpa in terms of asset share. 
Source: Author's calculation 
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Table 7.8 Estimation Results with Three Measurements of Foreign Presence 
    Model 1: Output share Model 2: Employment share Model 3: Asset share 
Variables   coefficient S.E. t coefficient S.E. t coefficient S.E. t 
  beta0 12.85 0.39 32.85 12.04  0.36 33.38 11.83 0.35 33.87 
lnk1 beta1 0.18 0.02 7.82 0.17  0.02 7.17 0.19 0.03 7.60 
lnl1 beta2 0.51 0.04 13.83 0.52  0.04 13.49 0.50 0.04 12.10 
dagriculture beta3 -4.16 1.00 -4.16 -4.15  0.99 -4.19 -4.04 0.99 -4.07 
dagriculture_lnk1 beta4 0.63 0.12 5.21 0.64  0.12 5.19 0.62 0.12 5.07 
dagriculture_lnl1 beta5 -1.01 0.29 -3.54 -1.03  0.29 -3.48 -1.05 0.29 -3.57 
dmining beta6 0.09* 0.17 0.50 0.10*  0.18 0.55 0.07* 0.18 0.40 
degws beta7 -2.17 0.99 -2.18 -2.06  0.97 -2.14 -2.82 1.00 -2.83 
degws_lnk1 beta8 0.13 0.06 2.08 0.12  0.06 2.11 0.17 0.06 2.70 
dconstruction_lnk1 beta9 0.01* 0.01 1.31 0.01*  0.01 1.20 0.01* 0.01 0.74 
dgpwm beta10 -11.48 1.28 -8.98 -11.58  1.00 -11.53 -10.74 1.00 -10.76 
dgpwm_lnk1 beta11 0.76 0.09 8.49 0.77  0.07 10.41 0.70 0.07 9.40 
dtransportation beta12 -0.25* 0.18 -1.45 -0.24*  0.18 -1.35 -0.25* 0.18 -1.45 
dsale beta13 1.19 0.43 2.76 1.26  0.52 2.42 1.28 0.53 2.41 
dsale_lnk1 beta14 0.06* 0.04 1.44 0.06*  0.05 1.17 0.05* 0.05 0.90 
dsale_lnl1 beta15 -0.29 0.08 -3.38 -0.31  0.09 -3.59 -0.27 0.09 -3.02 
dfinance beta16 0.07* 0.15 0.49 0.11*  0.15 0.72 0.05* 0.15 0.37 
dsservice beta17 -0.65 0.13 -4.86 -0.69  0.13 -5.21 -0.69 0.13 -5.11 
deam beta18 -0.06* 0.36 -0.16 -0.16*  0.39 -0.41 -0.04* 0.36 -0.11 
dst beta19 -2.37 1.00 -2.36 -2.85  1.00 -2.85 -2.41 0.99 -2.42 
dst_lnk1 beta20 0.13* 0.07 1.82 0.16  0.07 2.31 0.13 0.07 1.85 
dgpso beta21 0.36 0.14 2.56 0.32  0.14 2.21 0.37 0.14 2.57 
doutlier     1.23  0.27 4.61    
 delta0 2.21 0.27 8.10 1.33  0.19 6.87 1.32 0.23 5.67 
dlocation4 delta1 -0.32 0.08 -4.08 -0.31  0.08 -3.67 -0.39 0.10 -4.12 
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herfindahl delta2 0.36 0.14 2.63 0.40  0.17 2.35 0.41 0.15 2.70 
ete delta3 -6101.5- ×  -7103.5×  -4.35 -6101.5- ×  -7101.3×  -11.34 -6101.7- ×  -7108.3×  -2.03 
lie delta4 -8104×  -8108.1 ×  2.25 -8104.5 ×  -8100.1 ×  5.24 -8103.4 ×  -8109.1 ×  2.25 
yoo delta5 -3101.3× * -3101.9×  0.70 -3101.6× * -3102.1×  0.75 -4108.6× * -3102.0×  0.44 
ite delta6 -6102.3- ×  -7107×  -4.49 -6106.1- ×  -7101.2 ×  -7.43 -6103.3- ×  -7100.5 ×  -6.63 
db delta7 -0.86 0.17 -5.01 -0.79  0.24 -3.33 -1.21 0.33 -3.70 
dm delta8 -0.65 0.09 -6.99 -0.66  0.12 -5.38 -0.77 0.17 -4.46 
fp delta9 -0.49 0.24 -2.04 -0.73  0.24 -3.01 -0.63 0.30 -2.13 
fp_rde delta10 -6106.2- × * -5101.2×  -0.51 -6103.0- ×  -7104.9×  -6.22 -6107.4- × * -6100.5 ×  -1.48 
 gamma 0.21 0.10 2.11 0.06  0.01 5.37 0.38 0.06 6.59 
 log likelihood function -2291.43     log likelihood function -2281.67  log likelihood function -2309.6 
Notes: The sample size is 1466. The shaded area is the estimation of the production frontier model. 
* indicates the coefficient is insignificant at 5% level.
** indicates the coefficient is significant at 10% level.
For Model 2, the outlier dummy, doutlier, is incorporated as the sensitivity test in the subsequent section confirms that the outliers have significant impact. 
Source: Estimation by Frontier 4.1 with data constructed from Ministry of Finance, China, 2001 
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Empirical Results 
The estimation is carried out using Frontier 4.1 developed by Coelli (1996). As 
described in the section on estimation strategy, the regressions are made sequentially, 
following a general-to-specific approach in search for the best fit parsimonious 
model. The sequential search is made by first only dropping insignificant variables 
in the production function, holding all variables in the technical inefficiency model, 
and then holding variables in production function, while dropping insignificant 
variables in the technical inefficiency model. The search is made using the foreign 
presence measure of output share, and after reaching the best fit parsimonious model, 
foreign presence measured in terms of the employment share and assets share are 
incorporated into the regression by replacing the measure of foreign presence in 
terms of output share. At every step, a likelihood ratio test is performed to determine 
whether the step is appropriate41 . The likelihood ratio test statistic used is the 
asymptotic version, since the sample size is as large as 1,466, as follows: 
( )cu LLLR lnln2 −=  
where L denotes the value of likelihood function, the subscript u denotes the 
unconstrained regression, and the subscript c denotes the constrained regression. If 
the likelihood ratio test rejects the step, then regression is re-made based on the 
previous step. This process is repeated until dropping of any variable results in a 
significant change of the value of likelihood function. 
Table 7.8 presents the final estimate of the model, using both the foreign presence of 
output share, employment share, and assets share. The following interpretation is 
based on the estimation using output share in Table 7.8, while estimations using the 
other two measurements are used by way of comparison. Table 7.9 provides the 
estimated results for the full model with foreign presence measured in terms of 
output share, presented here for comparison even though it is rejected in favour of 
estimated results in Table 7.8. Table 7.10 shows the relevant hypothesis tests, 
                                                 
41 The test results are not reported here to save space. However the results are available upon request. 
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namely the test for the presence of technical inefficiency and test for technology 
spillovers from FDI. 
Production frontier estimates 
The shaded area in Table 7.8 presents the estimate of the production function. The 
magnitude of the coefficients estimated is within a reasonable range. The coefficient 
of lnk is 0.18, and the coefficient for lnl is 0.51, which indicates that in the 
manufacturing sector the elasticity of output to capital is 0.18 and the elasticity of 
output to labour is 0.51. In respect of factor intensity, the factor elasticities estimated 
also give us a reasonable picture. As factor that is used more intensively will have a 
lower marginal product due to diminishing marginal product, and hence it will have 
a smaller elasticity. In the manufacturing sector, the capital elasticity is 0.18 and the 
labour elasticity is 0.51, implying that the manufacturing sector is capital intensive.  
If we compare the estimations across Model 1, 2, and 3 in Table 7.8, we find that the 
coefficients do not change significantly, as one estimate is within one standard 
deviation of other corresponding estimates. In addition, the significance of industry 
dummies in all the three models confirms the existence of industry heterogeneity.  
Technology spillovers of FDI 
Technology spillovers from FDI in this chapter are defined as a positive impact of 
foreign presence on firm technical efficiency. To test the presence of technology 
spillovers of FDI is equivalent to first test the joint significance of foreign presence 
(fp) and its interaction term with R&D expenses (fp_rde), and then check the sign of 
these two variables. If the coefficients of both variables have a negative sign and are 
significant, then technology spillovers occur as foreign presence positively affects 
firm technical efficiency, and firm R&D has positive impact on the magnitude of the 
spillovers. If both coefficients are significant, but one is negatively signed and the 
other is positively signed, then spillovers may occur, but depend on firm R&D input. 
If both coefficients are significant and positively signed, then foreign presence 
actually has a negative impact on firm technical efficiency. Finally, if both 
coefficients are insignificant, then no technology spillovers occur.  
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Table 7.10 (b) and (c) present the hypothesis tests for the presence of technology 
spillovers from FDI and the role of R&D. The results are somewhat mixed. For 
Model 1 and 2, which use FDI invested firms’ output share and employment share in 
the industry as the measure of foreign presence respectively, the null hypothesis of 
no technology spillovers from FDI is rejected at the 5% significance level. In 
contrast, Model 3, which uses assets share as the measure of foreign presence, the 
LR test statistics are negative, which indicates a strong support for the null, namely 
that there are no technology spillovers from FDI. The contrasting results suggest that 
different measurements of FDI do affect the outcome of empirical testing. 
Theoretically we expect R&D to exert a positive impact on technology spillovers, as 
the more R&D activities the firm conducts, the bigger capacity the firm will have to 
learn from FDI invested firms and compete with FDI invested firms. In the present 
context, this means that the sign of fp_rde coefficient should be negative. All three 
models give a negative sign, although the significance of the coefficient is mixed. 
For Model 3, as fp and fp_rde is jointly insignificant, hence it is meaningless to 
explore the significance of fp_rde individually. For Model 2, both the t test and LR 
test reject the null of insignificance at the 5% level. For Model 1, the t-statistic and 
LR test give contradictory results on the significance of fp_rde coefficient. The t test 
shows that coefficient of fp_rde is insignificant, while the LR test indicates that it is 
significant. 
In respect of the other variables in the technical inefficiency model, the estimate 
from Model 1 shows that geographical agglomeration has a positive impact on firm 
mean technical efficiency, with firms located in agglomerated area are 0.32 per cent 
more technically efficient than firms located in other areas. A competitive market 
structure improves firm technical efficiency in that a 1 per cent decrease in 
Herfindahl index is associated with 0.36 per cent increase in technical efficiency. 
Employee training expenses also positively affect firm technical efficiency, and 1 
million RMB more spending on employee training will increase technical efficiency 
by 1.5 per cent. In contrast, labour insurance expenses have a negative impact on 
firm technical efficiency with 100 million RMB spending leading to 4 per cent 
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decrease in technical efficiency. Compared with small firms, large and medium 
firms are more technically efficient with 0.86 per cent and 0.65 per cent more 
efficiency, and the impact of firm age appears to be insignificant. Looking across 
Models 1, 2, and 3, the estimates are consistent with each other in the sense that one 
estimate is within one standard deviation of another estimate, except for fp and 
fp_rde. The scale of these control variables suggests that the estimation is reasonable.  
Firm technical efficiency 
One major application of the stochastic production frontier model and technical 
inefficiency model is to measure firm technical efficiency. Hence it is worthwhile 
looking at the estimated technical efficiency of the firm sample. Table 7.11 presents 
the distribution of technical efficiency estimated in Models 1, 2, and 3. It shows that 
the technical efficiency estimated differs across Models 1, 2, and 3. Technical 
efficiency in Model 1 is lower than Model 2 and 3. Nevertheless, the general 
conclusion that can be drawn is that firm technical efficiency in Gansu province is 
generally not high. This conclusion is significant in that it points to the potential for 
large improvements in technical efficiency in Gansu firms.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
Impact of outliers 
The essence of stochastic production frontier model is to infer the production 
frontier from firms’ actual production activities. Hence, it may be sensitive to the 
outliers, particularly extremely large production point. This can be illustrated in 
Figure 7.5. In Figure 7.5, the red point represents an outlier, which may be caused by 
measurement error or even a firm’s exaggerated reporting. The red point may shift 
the production frontier significantly from the solid curve (the true production 
frontier) to the dashed curve, and hence the technical efficiency estimate may be 
lowered significantly, and subsequently affect estimation of technical inefficiency 
model. 
To examine this sensitivity, we first parameterize the outliers by constructing a 
dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the firm is an outlier and zero 
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otherwise. Then the outlier dummy is incorporated into the regression, and the 
significance of the outlier dummy is tested by LR test. If the coefficient of the outlier 
dummy is significant, then it shows that outliers have significant impact on the 
regression. Otherwise the estimation is robust to outliers. In this case, the 
construction of the outlier dummy is based on the log of output. If the firms’ log 
output is bigger than 20 or smaller than 11.4, then the outlier dummy takes value 1. 
Altogether 19 firms are identified as outliers.  
For Model 1, the value of LR test statistic is 4.27. For Model 2, the value is 43.07. 
For Model 3, the value is -28.35. With degree of freedom one, the 5% critical value 
of the test statistic is 3.84, and the 1% critical value of the test statistic is 6.38. 
Hence for Model 1, we can not reject the null that outlier dummy is insignificant, 
that is, outliers do not have a significant impact on the regression, at the 1% 
significance level, but the null is rejected at the 5% significance level. For Model 2, 
the null is rejected at both the 5% and 1% significance level42. For Model 3, as the 
value of LR test statistic is negative, it strongly supports the null of insignificance of 
the outlier dummy. 
Figure 7.5 Illustration of Sensitivity of Stochastic Production Frontier Model 
 
                                                 
42 The estimation results reported in Table 7.8 is based on the regression accounting for the impact of outliers. 
Output 
Input
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Conclusions 
This chapter explored technology spillovers from FDI in Gansu province, China. By 
using a firm level cross sectional data set, we found that if the FDI invested firms’ 
activities are measured in terms of output share and employment share, FDI invested 
firms do have a positive impact on other firms’ technical efficiency, namely 
technology spillovers exist, and domestic firm’s R&D spending plays a positive role 
in the scale of technology spillovers. However, this result is not robust to different 
measurements of FDI invested firms’ activities. When the foreign presence 
measured in terms of assets share, the impact of foreign presence on domestic firms’ 
technical efficiency becomes insignificant. Hence, even though we trust more the 
output measurement as both the employment and assets measurements can be prone 
to distortion, the finding of this chapter should be interpreted with caution.  
Nevertheless, the analysis does suggest the potential role of FDI in technology 
spillovers to domestic firms. The inflow of FDI into Gansu province, and more 
generally less developed regions in China, would seem to merit cautious 
encouragement and as does firm R&D activities, for example by tax instruments, as 
that would help domestic firms take better advantage of spillovers from FDI. In 
addition, since firms in Gansu are performing at a low level of technical efficiency, 
there is a big room for improvement of technical efficiency. The government can 
play a role in assisting firms to improve their technical efficiency gradually through 
learning by doing, for example, by encouraging firms to agglomerate through setting 
up high-tech parks, a measure that has been successfully adopted in other parts of 
China, as we find that firms located in areas where there is agglomeration of 
manufacturing are more technical efficient.  
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Table 7.9 Estimation Results with C-D Production and Full Set of Industry 
Dummies 
Variables   coefficient standard-error t-ratio 
  beta0 13.2 0.48 27.30 
lnk1 beta1 0.15 0.04 4.28 
lnl1 beta2 0.56 0.07 8.53 
dagriculture beta3 -4.21 1.02 -4.12 
dagriculture_lnk1 beta4 0.66 0.13 5.25 
dagriculture_lnl1 beta5 -1.06 0.30 -3.55 
dmining beta6 -0.38* 1.00 -0.38 
dmining_lnk1 beta7 0.14* 0.11 1.24 
dmining_lnl1 beta8 -0.34* 0.19 -1.75 
degws beta9 -2.47 0.97 -2.55 
degws_lnk1 beta10 0.2 0.08 2.58 
degws_lnl1 beta11 -0.18* 0.13 -1.41 
dconstruction beta12 -1.72* 1.00 -1.73 
dconstruction_lnk1 beta13 0.21 0.09 2.28 
dconstruction_lnl1 beta14 -0.22* 0.13 -1.73 
dgpwm beta15 -12.3 1.02 -12.10 
dgpwm_lnk1 beta16 0.97 0.31 3.11 
dgpwm_lnl1 beta17 -0.49* 0.95 -0.51 
dtransportation beta18 0.33* 1.01 0.33 
dtransportation_lnk1 beta19 0.06* 0.09 0.69 
dtransportation_lnl1 beta20 -0.32* 0.19 -1.69 
dsale beta21 1.12* 0.57 1.95 
dsale_lnk1 beta22 0.08* 0.06 1.48 
dsale_lnl1 beta23 -0.34 0.10 -3.25 
dfinance beta24 0.55* 0.99 0.55 
dfinance_lnk1 beta25 -0.08* 0.08 -0.96 
dfinance_lnl1 beta26 0.23* 0.15 1.54 
dsservice beta27 -0.85* 0.97 -0.87 
dsservice_lnk1 beta28 -0.0015* 0.09 -0.02 
dsservice_lnl1 beta29 0.08* 0.14 0.59 
deam beta30 -0.42* 1.10 -0.39 
deam_lnk1 beta31 -0.10* 0.25 -0.39 
deam_lnl1 beta32 0.53* 0.95 0.56 
dst beta33 -2.18 1.03 -2.12 
dst_lnk1 beta34 0.12* 0.13 0.91 
dst_lnl1 beta35 0.01* 0.28 0.05 
dgpso beta36 0.86* 0.97 0.89 
dgpso_lnk1 beta37 0.01* 0.08 0.14 
dgpso_lnl1 beta38 -0.15* 0.12 -1.23 
 delta0 2.4 0.28 8.56 
dlocation4 delta1 -0.33 0.08 -3.99 
herfindahlindex delta2 0.31 0.15 2.13 
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ete delta3 -6101.74- ×  -7103.77×  -4.62 
rde delta4 -8103.74- × * -8102.35×  -1.59 
lie delta5 -8104.81×  -8101.96×  2.45 
yoo delta6 -3109.36× * 0.01 1.74 
yoo2 delta7 -4101.05- × * -5106.32×  -1.66 
ite delta8 -6103.08- ×  -7105.69×  -5.42 
wrb delta9 -0.17* 0.15 -1.17 
wp delta10 0.08* 0.20 0.41 
db delta11 -0.82 0.19 -4.37 
dm delta12 -0.66 0.12 -5.38 
fp delta13 -0.53 0.23 -2.29 
fp_rde delta14 -6107.24- ×  1.25E-06 -5.80 
 gamma 0.27 0.09 3.20 
log likelihood function -2280.00  
Notes: The sample size is 1466. The shaded area is the estimation of the production 
frontier model. * indicates the coefficient is insignificant at 5% level. 
Source: Estimation by Frontier 4.1 with data constructed from Ministry of Finance, 
China, 2001 
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Table 7.10 Hypothesis Tests 
Null Hypothesis Model Test Statistics 
Critical 
Value Decision 
(a) Test for presence of technical inefficiency 
Model 1 t 2.11 1.96 reject H0 
Model 2 t 5.37 1.96 reject H0 
H0: gamma=0  
(no technical  
efficiency present) Model 3 t 6.59 1.96 reject H0 
(b) Test for presence of technology spillovers of FDI 
Model 1 LR 12.10 5.99  reject H0 
Model 2 LR 13.96 5.99  reject H0 H0: delta9=0, delta10=0 
Model 3 LR -24.23 5.99  fail to reject H0 
(c) Test for R&D's role in technology spillovers 
Model 1 t -0.51 1.96 fail to reject H0 
 LR 31.23 3.84 reject H0 
Model 2 t -6.22 1.96 reject H0 
 LR 2.28 3.84 fail to reject H0 
H0: delta10=0 
Model 3 t -1.48 1.96 fail to reject H0 
    LR -5.60 3.84 fail to reject H0 
Note: the significance level is 5%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.11 Summary of Estimated Technical Efficiency  
  TEO TEE TEA
 Mean 0.16 0.32 0.36 
 Median 0.13 0.27 0.33 
 
Maximum 0.94 0.97 0.92 
 Minimum 0.04 0.07 0.05 
 Std. Dev. 0.11 0.15 0.16 
 Skewness 3.44 1.83 0.80 
 Kurtosis 19.70 6.27 3.25 
Note: TEO/TEE/TEA denote technical 
efficiency estimated using foreign 
presence measured in terms of output 
share, employment share, assets share 
respectively. 
Source: Estimate with Frontier 4.1 
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8. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
FDI into China makes a large contribution to the Chinese economy and to 
Chinese exports. The study examined evidence that confirms the presence of 
important spillover effects from FDI to domestic firms and industries. The 
evidence has been drawn from cross-sectional and panel data for industries and 
firms and has allowed technology and export spillover effects to be evaluated by 
industry and region.  While there is evidence of spillover effects, they are not 
universal or necessarily strong. The magnitude of the spillover effect depends on 
the characteristics of the domestic industry or firms, and their capacity to absorb 
technology or engage in export activity. Besides, there is also some evidence of 
negative spillovers. This chapter summarises the main findings. 
Findings  
In Chapter 3, we analysed technology spillovers from FDI and their determinants 
using eight-year balanced industry level panel data. Based on an econometric 
specification, in which domestic industry value added is a function of the capital 
stock, labour supply and the interaction terms of the FDI technology transfer 
with the technology gap, relative factor intensity, and relative labour supply, we 
found that FDI inflow in China had a quite different impact on technology in 
different industries, and that, on average, FDI exerted a negative impact on 
domestic industries. For every 1 per cent increase of FDI, domestic industry 
productivity on average decreased by 0.11 per cent. There are problems in 
interpreting these results because aggregation to industry level may disguise the 
significant effects. Moreover, technology spillovers from FDI over time were 
positive in the sense that from 1995 to 2003 more and more industries began to 
receive positive benefits from FDI. In 1995 only one industry benefited from the 
presence of FDI, while in 2003 there are 20 industries that benefited from the 
presence of FDI. In addition, even for industries that never benefited from the 
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presence of FDI in our sample periods, the negative impact from FDI became 
smaller between 1995 and 2003.  
The positive dynamics of technology spillovers from FDI during the period 
between 1995 and 2003 was driven by the technology gap, relative factor 
intensity, and relative labour supply. These three factors are a measure of the 
absorptive capacity of domestic industries. We found that the technology gap had 
a negative influence on the extent of technology spillovers, while relative factor 
intensity and relative labour supply played a positive role. A bigger technology 
gap makes it more difficult for domestic industries to learn from FDI. In contrast, 
a higher relative factor intensity and relative labour supply contribute positively 
to the occurrence of spillovers, as a higher relative factor intensity implies 
domestic industries can afford to invest more on R&D, a highly capital-intensive 
activity that enhances the absorptive capacity of domestic industries. A higher 
relative labour supply increases the likelihood of technology diffusion through 
labour mobility, namely the contagious effect. The upward trend of technology 
spillovers from FDI indicates that Chinese industries show capacity to absorb 
technology from FDI continuously over, possibly through learning by doing and 
other institutional reforms. These results are consistent with what might be 
expected a priori. 
As noted, there are problems in isolating FDI spillover effects using industry 
level data. In Chapter 4, we explored the technology spillovers from FDI by 
examining a comprehensive firm level micro-data set in the manufacturing sector 
in 2003, covering over 140,000 domestic firms. In this chapter, following 
previous studies, we hypothesized that domestic firms’ labour productivity 
depends on their capital intensity, intermediate inputs per employee, labour 
quality, age, FDI, economies of scale in the industry, domestic market structure, 
ownership structure, regional location, and industry heterogeneity, in which the 
coefficient of FDI, measured by foreign presence, is the focus of interest. At the 
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same time FDI (foreign presence) depends on domestic market size, the 
industry’s export intensity, industry unit production costs, domestic firms’ labour 
productivity, regional location and industry heterogeneity. Hence there exists a 
simultaneity between domestic firms’ labour productivity and foreign presence. 
This simultaneity allows for the possibility that, on the one hand, FDI inflow 
promotes domestic firms’ labour productivity and, on the other hand, FDI tends 
to flow into industries with higher domestic labour productivity. The 
simultaneous equation model was estimated using a 3SLS estimator, and it was 
found that FDI generated a positive impact on domestic firms’ labour 
productivity, and meanwhile that FDI also tended to flow into industries with 
higher domestic labour productivity. For a 1 per cent increase in the presence of 
FDI in the domestic industry the domestic firms’ labour productivity was boosted 
by 5.77 per cent, and in turn 1 per cent increase in domestic firms’ labour 
productivity enlarged the foreign presence by 0.01 per cent. This chapter’s 
findings confirmed the findings in Chapter 3 that 20 industries out of all 23 
industries benefited positively from FDI presence in 2003. 
Using the same data set, we then turned to the analysis of export spillovers from 
FDI in China in Chapter 5. We first set up a partial equilibrium model, in which 
the representative domestic firm and FDI invested firm are engaged in Cournot 
competition in the domestic market and are faced with a competitive world 
market. The FDI invested firms’ activities help to reduce other firms’ export 
costs, because of such factors as spillovers of knowledge about foreign markets 
and employee movement. Both firms choose their quantity of production and 
export intensity to maximize profit. Firms’ profit maximization behaviour leads 
to the prediction that domestic firms will unambiguously increase their export 
intensity for an exogenous increase in foreign presence. This hypothesis was then 
tested using a sample selection model, to account for the fact that we observe 
firms’ export intensity only if they decide to participate in exporting. In the 
sample selection model, domestic firms’ decisions on whether to export depends 
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on firm size, age, capital intensity, unit production cost, average wage, unit 
labour cost, marketing expenses, the Herfindahl index, ownership structure, 
regional heterogeneity, industry heterogeneity, past export experience, foreign 
presence, and its interaction terms with such firm characteristics as size and age. 
Conditional on each firm deciding to participate in exporting, the domestic firm’s 
export intensity depends on the same set of explanatory variables except for past 
export experience. Regional heterogeneity and industry heterogeneity also 
control for the potential endogeneity of FDI, namely that FDI tends to flow into 
industries with higher export intensity. The sample selection model was then 
estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator. It was found that FDI in 
manufacturing industry generated export spillovers, and that the scale of the 
spillovers depended positively on domestic firm size, capital intensity, and unit 
labour cost, and negatively on firm age, unit production cost, average wage, 
marketing expense, ownership structure and geographical location. 
Chapters 6 and 7 focused on an industry case study of technology and export 
spillovers and a regional case study of technology spillovers. In Chapter 6, we 
examined both the technology and export spillovers from FDI in the cultural, 
educational, and sporting product manufacturing industry, where both FDI and 
exporting were active, in a panel data context. By focusing on a particular 
industry, we avoided the FDI endogeneity problem that derives from the 
possibility that FDI tends to flow into industries with higher productivity and/or 
export intensity, and the panel data context allowed us to pick up the dynamic 
nature of spillovers.  
Following Chapter 4, the econometric specification used in testing technology 
spillovers hypothesized that domestic firms’ labour productivity depends on a set 
of firm characteristics, such as capital intensity and labour quality, and foreign 
presence and its interaction terms. The econometric specification in testing 
export spillovers follows that of Chapter 5, namely, export intensity was 
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hypothesized to depend on a set of firm characteristics, industry characteristics, 
foreign presence, and its interaction with firm characteristics. The data set used 
was a four-year unbalanced panel data in the cultural, educational, and sporting 
product manufacturing industry from 2000 to 2003. The fixed effect estimator 
was employed in testing for technology spillovers, and for testing export 
spillovers the Heckman sample selection model was estimated, which pooled the 
four year data together. We found no evidence for technology spillovers, which 
may be due to the fact that FDI in this industry mainly comes from overseas 
Chinese MNEs as previous studies found that FDI from overseas Chinese MNEs 
generates much fewer, or even no, technology spillovers. For export spillovers, 
we found they depended on firm characteristics, such as firm ownership and 
geographical location, and there were more domestic firms that benefited from 
FDI than those that suffered from FDI.  
Chapter 7 focused on Gansu Province, one of the least developed provinces in 
China. It handled technology spillovers in the stochastic production frontier 
framework, in which technology spillovers exist if the foreign presence 
positively affects domestic firms’ technical efficiency. The chapter started from a 
general specification of a production function, in which different industries were 
allowed to have different production functions by using industry dummies. The 
use of industry dummies also controlled for the potential endogeneity of foreign 
presence, namely the FDI tends to flow into industries with higher technical 
efficiency. Firms’ mean technical efficiency was hypothesized to depend on firm 
geographical location, the Herfindahl index, employee training expenses, R&D 
expenses, labour insurance expenses, age, expenditure on introducing technology, 
whether they are resource based, ownership structure, firm scale, foreign 
presence, and its interaction with previous variables. A general-to-specific 
approach was adopted to estimate the empirical model, using a cross-sectional 
firm level micro-data set that covers 1,466 firms. It was found that if the FDI 
invested firms’ activities are measured in terms of output share and employment 
  219
share, the FDI invested firms do have a positive impact on other firms’ technical 
efficiency, namely that technology spillovers exist, and domestic firms’ R&D 
spending plays a positive role in the scale of such technology spillovers. 
To summarize, the thesis finds that the FDI inflow in China does have significant 
impact on domestic industries and firms. However, it is too simplistic to say the 
impact is positive or negative. The impact varies across industries, firms, and 
regions, which in turn requires related policies, such as the policy to encourage 
FDI to flow into western China, to specifically take account of these differences. 
At the same time, China’s FDI policy needs to be more open, as FDI has positive 
spillovers on a large majority of firms.  
In Chapter 4, we tried to accommodate the impact of round-tripping FDI on 
examining FDI spillovers. To our best knowledge, this is the first attempt to do 
this. We were not able to do so in the subsequent chapters due to lack of data. 
The nature of the data used in these chapters to a greater or lesser extent may 
distort the findings, owing to the presence of round-tripping FDI and to other 
factors. This constitutes the weak point in the argument of the thesis, even 
though similar studies on China are also subject to this same problem. To 
disentangle the impact of round-tripping FDI, we need to separate round-tripping 
FDI from genuine FDI and this requires information on the source of the 
investment at a project level. This would be an appropriate direction in which to 
take future research as more detailed survey data becomes available. 
The thesis systematically examined intra-industry spillovers from FDI in China, 
with a particular focus on the determinants of the magnitude of such spillovers 
and emphasizing the role of the capacity to absorb spillovers, signalled by 
different characteristics of firms and industries. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
previously, the thesis does not cover all aspects of FDI spillovers, for example 
the inter-industry spillovers, which are a subject for further study 
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Policy Implications and Conclusions 
This review of findings reveals that spillovers from FDI have important 
industrial and regional dimensions and implications for policy. First of all, China 
will benefit from attracting more FDI inflow in that positive spillovers from FDI 
outweigh the negative impact. For export spillovers, as shown in Chapters 5 and 
6, there are more domestic firms that obtained positive export spillovers from 
FDI than firms that did not. In respect of technology spillovers, Chapter 3 
revealed that domestic industries have become more and more capable of 
benefiting from the presence of FDI from 1995 to 2003, and in 2003 most 
industries obtained positive technology spillovers, a finding which was 
confirmed in Chapter 4. In addition, FDI also exerted positive technology 
spillovers on domestic firms in Gansu province, a less developed region in China. 
Thus generally speaking, FDI inflow into China has had a positive impact on the 
underlying forces that promote the growth of productivity in the Chinese 
economy. Nevertheless, some firms and industries may suffer. Hence, it appears 
that a more focused industrial policy may be called for, which of course should 
not be targeted at shielding domestic industries/firms from the competition of 
FDI, but rather helping domestic industries/firms face the challenge of FDI and 
reap the benefits from it. 
As shown in Chapter 3, some industries will suffer from foreign presence, and 
whether the industry suffers depends negatively on the technology gap, and 
positively on the relative factor intensity and relative labour supply. It is likely to 
take time for domestic industry to absorb the benefits from the presence of FDI. 
For industries that are less developed compared with their counterparts in the 
world, for example for industries that are technological inferior like petroleum 
processing and coking products industry and printing and record pressing 
industry and for industries that have less favourable domestic configuration, 
namely with lower relative capital intensity and less relative labour supply, like 
smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals industry, with the inflow of FDI, 
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policies might be adopted to help domestic industries to handle the challenge 
from FDI. Such policies might include, but not be limited to, tax privileges or 
subsidies to encourage domestic R&D activities, encouragement in introducing 
technology, and enhancing labour quality, and other non-tax policy instruments, 
such as promoting the agglomeration of domestic and FDI invested firms through 
establishing technological parks.  
It can occur that industries that suffer from the presence of FDI initially can grow 
and benefit from it in the future, as revealed by the dynamic process of 
technology spillovers from FDI in Chapter 3. The improvement of industries 
implies that policies that are originally designed to help domestic industries can 
become outmoded and should be amended, if the government values fair 
competition between domestic and FDI invested firms. 
Second, in framing industrial policy, the distributional characteristics of domestic 
firms in the industry should also be considered, even though typically we do not 
worry about whether one firm will gain or lose from the presence of FDI and 
instead we are more interested in whether the industry as a whole will gain or 
lose. As shown in Chapter 5, we find that domestic firm size, capital intensity, 
and unit labour cost positively affect the scale of spillovers from FDI, while the 
firm age, unit production cost, and marketing expenses affect the scale negatively. 
Thus, these factors need to be considered in framing industry policy.  
Third, concerning regional aspects of FDI policy, currently China has been 
offering more policy privileges to attract FDI to western China, in the hope that 
FDI will promote domestic development. In Chapter 7, where we studied 
technology spillovers from FDI in Gansu Province, one of the much less 
developed regions in western China, the impact of FDI was found to be positive, 
even though it appears to be sensitive to different measurements of foreign 
presence. Thus encouraging FDI to flow into western China appears to be 
justifiable.  
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Compared with their counterparts in central and coastal China, domestic firms in 
western China appear to be less developed, measured in terms of such firm 
characteristics as capital intensity. This weakness may indicate that they have 
less absorptive capacity to benefit from the foreign presence. Hence, while 
encouraging FDI to flow into western China, other supporting policies need to be 
implemented. Investment in infrastructure, such as road and other transportation, 
should be increased, which provides a better economic environment not only for 
FDI invested firms but also for domestic firms, and policies, such as a reduction 
on red-tape procedures, tax privileges or subsidies on R&D activities and 
introducing technology, support for labour quality upgrading, and industry 
information provision, should be designed to help domestic firms. Again, all 
these policies should be designed with an aim of eventually providing a 
competitive environment to both FDI invested firms and domestic firms. 
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